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Introduction
Une the`se est bien souvent e´crite comme une suite d’ide´es qui s’enchaˆınent au fil
des pages, se de´roulent a` la lecture et s’e´coulent en lignes aussi pre´cises que droites.
La fluidite´ apparente n’est toutefois que l’artefact d’une pre´sentation depuis un point
de vue pre´cis en fonction d’une conclusion choisie. Si l’on pouvait remonter le cours
de la pense´e, on passerait par de nombreux me´andres, d’innombrables bras morts
et quelques de´rivations qui, parfois, au bout d’un long parcours souterrain, trouvent
une re´surgence et viennent alimenter la re´flexion principale. Une the`se par articles
perd en structure ce qu’elle gagne en richesse d’approches, de me´thodes et de ques-
tionnements.
A la source fut le quatrie`me et dernier chapitre. Co-e´crit avec Gani Aldashev, Joa-
quin Morales Belpaire et Astrid Similon, il fait suite a` un travail de maˆıtrise entame´
sous la direction de Jean-Philippe Platteau. L’article  Ecouraging private owner-
ship of public goods  analyse sur le plan the´orique et empirique l’effet sur le marche´
de la terre d’un me´canisme de subvention aux organisations non-gouvernementales
(ONG) de conservation de la nature. Cette subvention permet aux be´ne´ficiaires d’eˆtre
rembourse´s de la moitie´ du prix d’achat des terrains convertis en re´serves naturelles
agre´e´es. Nous montrons que l’introduction du subside accroˆıt le prix des terrains
a` court terme, comme pre´dit par les the´ories les plus classiques. Par contre, sur le
moyen terme, pour peu que les acquisitions permettent aux ONG de recruter de
nouveaux be´ne´voles et que les objectifs de ces derniers soient identiques a` ceux des
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anciens membres, le prix des terrains peut redescendre. Dans le cas d’e´tude analyse´,
il descend meˆme progressivement a` un niveau moyen proche de celui qui pre´valait
avant l’introduction de la mesure incitative. Cette diminution des prix ne peut s’ob-
server que dans un contexte ou` les ONG ont une capacite´ a` trouver des vendeurs qui
valorisent l’inte´reˆt ge´ne´ral et a` les convaincre de baisser leur prix pour contribuer a`
la fourniture de biens et services publics.
La proble´matique de la conservation de ressources naturelles renouvelables et
e´puisables est le pont qui lie le quatrie`me et le troisie`me chapitre.  Success and
failure of communities  pose la question des conditions sous lesquelles une com-
munaute´, dont la capacite´ a` surveiller et sanctionner ses membres est limite´e, peut
ge´rer l’acce`s a` une ressource. La re´ponse est structure´e autour d’un mode`le the´orique
ou` les membres de la communaute´ fournissent un effort qui permet de re´colter la
ressource, mais aussi de s’en re´partir les gains lorsque cette dernie`re est exploite´e
jusqu’a` e´puisement. La lec¸on principale de l’exercice the´orique est qu’il n’est pas
ne´cessairement plus simple pour une communaute´ de partager, sans effort exce´dentaire,
la ressource a` un moment donne´ du temps que de la conserver pour une exploitation
future. Cela reste vrai meˆme si la communaute´ ne peut qu’imparfaitement empeˆcher
ses membres d’exploiter la ressource entre ces deux pe´riodes et meˆme si l’exploita-
tion future ne peut eˆtre encadre´e et donne lieu a` une de´bauche d’efforts exce´dentaires
pour s’approprier une ressource dont la valeur est devenue e´leve´e.
La coe´criture avec Jean-Marie Baland et Dilip Mookherkee de  Firewood col-
lections, forest degradation and economic growth  a rythme´ toute la the`se. Tel un
fleuve qui s’e´panche mais re´gulie`rement revient vers son lit mineur, cet article a ali-
mente´ les autres chapitres et en a retire´ des e´le´ments nourriciers. C’est aussi l’article
qui pousse le plus loin la mise en pratique des re´flexions sur la conservation des
ressources, et plus particulie`rement de la ressource forestie`re dans l’Himalaya. Ce
chapitre analyse les de´terminants individuels de la collecte de bois de feu, e´value le
lien entre ces collectes et la de´gradation des foreˆts ne´palaises et mesure la re´action
des me´nages aux changements de leur environnement. La conclusion principale de
l’article est que la croissance e´conomique a un effet ambigu sur la consommation de
bois de feu. Un revenu plus important pousse les me´nages a` collecter davantage de
bois. Mais le de´veloppement e´conomique co¨ıncide e´galement avec un changement de
structure occupationnelle des me´nages qui les ame`ne a` quitter l’agriculture. Or, au
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fur et a` mesure que les me´nages utilisent moins de terre, posse`dent moins de teˆtes de
be´tail, s’e´duquent plus et de´veloppent des activite´s non-agricoles, ils collectent moins
de bois et utilisent plus de substituts. Au niveau des villages, des collectes agre´ge´es
plus importantes sont corre´le´es a` une diminution de la couverture forestie`re. Or, un
couvert forestier restreint augmente le temps de collecte de chaque unite´ de bois
re´colte´e. Cette augmentation re´duit elle-meˆme les quantite´s de bois collecte´es. Les
estimations pre´sente´es dans l’article montrent toutefois que l’effet retour sur les col-
lectes est trop faible pour jouer un effet de stabilisateur automatique entre le niveau
de collecte et l’e´tendue du couvert forestier.
Autour de la pe´riode e´tudie´e dans le deuxie`me chapitre, le Ne´pal endura onze
anne´es de guerre.  Households in times of war  analyse les strate´gies d’adapta-
tion des me´nages pendant le conflit puis examine comment ces choix de court terme
de´terminent les trajectoires de reconstruction lorsqu’une paix relative s’installe. Les
re´sultats principaux montrent qu’a` court terme, le conflit re´duit les ine´galite´s de re-
venus entre les me´nages de hautes castes et le reste de la population. Le revenu de
tous les me´nages baisse et celui des hautes castes diminue davantage encore dans les
zones plus expose´es au conflit. Les me´nages de castes supe´rieures s’adaptent a` la vio-
lence notamment en envoyant leurs jeunes hommes en dehors des zones de conflit. Les
autres me´nages investissent relativement plus de temps dans les activite´s agricoles,
ce qui amortit la chute de leur revenu total. A moyen terme, cette strate´gie perdure
mais elle ne ge´ne`re plus de revenus additionnels. Les castes supe´rieures peuvent,
quant a` elles, compter sur plus de ressources par individu et leurs sources de revenus
sont plus diversifie´es, notamment graˆce a` la migration. Si les ine´galite´s entre castes
sont re´duites a` court terme, elle se creusent a` nouveau a` moyen terme. La violence
en elle-meˆme n’est pas un gage de redistribution durable.
Il est important de noter que cette analyse se base sur les variations spatiales et
temporelles de l’intensite´ du conflit au sein du Ne´pal. Elle n’a donc point pre´tention a`
e´valuer l’effet global du conflit, exercice ardu s’il en est puisque rien ne permet d’ima-
giner ce qu’il serait advenu du Ne´pal en l’absence de guerre. Toutes les conclusions
doivent donc se lire de manie`re relative, comme une comparaison de zones expose´es
plus ou moins fortement a` la violence du conflit. Il est donc tout a` fait possible qu’en
sus et inde´pendamment des variations locales de l’intensite´ du conflit, la guerre ait
facilite´ une redistribution du pouvoir politique, redistribution qui peut en elle-meˆme
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modifier la socie´te´ dans son ensemble. Mais des moyens aux fins, le chemin peut eˆtre
long, sineux et parseme´ d’embuˆches. Or, dans le contexte actuel, tant les analyses que
les de´cisions politiques sont rares. Pour les citoyens, les incertitudes sont nombreuses
et rendent te´nus les espoirs de vie meilleure.
Au bout du chemin, il reste a` de´gager un fil. Trois chapitres analysent des insti-
tutions qui permettent de conserver des ressources naturelles. Le chapitre the´orique
et celui sur les ONG de conservation de la nature mettent plus l’accent sur l’aspect
institutionnel. Le chapitre sur les collectes de bois de feu au Ne´pal place davantage
les institutions en filigrane pour mieux mettre en e´vidence les interactions entre les
me´nages et leur environnement.
Dans tout cela, le premier chapitre de cette the`se, le dernier chronologiquement
parlant, semble bien isole´. Pourtant, il n’a pu atteindre sa profondeur qu’alimente´
par les autres chapitres. Il est un peu comme un estuaire ou` l’on pourrait croire que
l’eau du fleuve a disparu, masque´e par le sel et les premie`res e´cumes de la mare´e.
Pourtant, tous les e´le´ments accumule´s au fil du parcours sont bien pre´sents. Des
e´le´ments me´thodologiques. Des e´le´ments de rigueur. Des e´le´ments de contexte. Et
meˆme des e´le´ments the´matiques, comme le bois qui intervient comme resource que
les be´llige´rants convoitent. Ces e´le´ments sont re´organise´s, dilue´s, me´lange´s a` d’autres
afin de leur donner une nouvelle ampleur et faire de ce premier chapitre un point
d’entre´e cle´ pour remonter le cours de la the`se.
Chapter 1
Households in Times of War:
Adaptation strategies during the Nepal Civil War
Franc¸ois Libois
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Abstract 1
This paper analyses short and medium term consequences of the Nepalese civil
war on rural households livelihoods and on the inter-group distribution of income.
Conclusions rely on two very rich datasets: the Nepal Living Standards Survey
collected before, during and after the war and data on the number of killings by
month and village during the eleven years of the conflict. Using the survey timing
as a quasi-natural experiment, results indicate that in the short-run all households
loose, but high castes by a larger extent. Short-term coping strategies determine
medium term diverging recovery paths. Non-high castes allocate more labour in
agriculture and loose more in the medium term. High castes diversify their income
sources, notably by relying on migration, which allows them to recover.
Keywords:
Civil war ; Income distribution ; Labour ; Inequality ; Migration ; Nepal
JEL Classification:
O1, D1, D74, Q12, N45
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There is no example of a nation that would have benefited from a long war.
Sun Tzu, VI century BC, The Art of War
The sharp reduction in income inequality that we observe in almost all the rich countries between
1914 and 1945 was due above all to the world wars and the violent economic and political shocks
they entailed (especially for people with large fortunes). It had little to do with the tranquil
process of intersectoral mobility described by Kuznets.
Thomas Piketty, 2013, Capital in the Twenty-First Century
1.1 Introduction
One of the declared goals of Maoists in Nepal was to “free the Nepalese society
from feudalism and imperialism through the bourgeois democratic revolution” 2. Few
years after peace agreements in 2006, can we see premises indicating that eleven years
of war contributed to challenge historical inequalities? This study analyses the short
and medium term effects of war on rural households livelihoods and disaggregates
the consequences of the conflict between high castes and others.
This paper takes advantage of two very rich datasets to develop an original iden-
tification strategy of households’ responses in times of war. Household level data
were collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics of Nepal, in collaboration with the
World Bank, before, during and after the war. The dataset has both repeated cross-
sections and a rotating panel at the household level. The conflict dataset, collected
by the Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) of Nepal, gathered information on
the number of casualties for each month and each of the 3,972 village development
committees in Nepal during the eleven years of the civil war.
To identify short-term effects of the conflict, I use the second wave of data col-
lection, which occurred during the conflict, as a quasi-natural experiment. Showing
that the timing of the survey is orthogonal to the conflict, I compare villages within
the same neighbourhood randomly surveyed at different points in time. The overall
exposure to violence in a given area is not random. But, conditionally on the local
exposure, whether an additional casualty occurred just before or just after the survey
is random by the fact the order in which villages were surveyed is orthogonal to the
conflict. In other words, the number of casualties before the survey, controlling for
2. Prachanda, Chairman of the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist, A brief introduction to the policies of the
CPN(Maoists). Source: Maoist Information Bulletin, No 8, 20 January, 2004
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the total number of casualties around the survey, becomes a quasi-random variable
and allows the estimation of causal effects.
I find that, in the short-term, violence reduces income and consumption for all
rural households and especially more for high caste households. The analysis directly
relates the reduction of income to a reduction of labour time in non-agricultural
occupations. Non-high caste households mitigate the income loss by increasing their
agricultural labour. For high castes, migration appears as a dominant strategy.
A back of the envelope calculation allows estimating that the short-term effect of
violence in 2003 has pushed 200,000 productive males of the high castes out of their
households, which represents 4% of the high caste rural population.
The short-term adaptation pattern of households has lasting effects and has
steered the recovery of high castes and others on different tracks. In the medium
term, non-high castes households in conflict zones allocate relatively more labour to
self-employed agricultural occupations, while high castes do not. Despite this diver-
gence in terms of work time, both type of households experience a reduction of this
income source. High castes mitigate this loss by a diversification of income sources
and by the relative reduction of household size, two channels in which migration
plays a key role. Consequently, even if high castes, who were specific targets of the
Maoists, were losing more income in the short-term, they recovered in a seven years
period including four years of peace are found to keep holding the upper hand.
I estimate the medium term effects on the last two waves of the panel. It allows
focusing on the recovery path of households through the last years of the conflict
and the first three to four years of peace as a function of conflict intensity between
the two survey waves. The use of the household level panel already removes all time
unvarying characteristics of households and villages which could be correlated with
war and affect outcomes. Yet, conflict intensity might still be correlated with the
change in income for instance. I therefore develop a two-step approach where I use
the interaction between the price of wood and the distance to India as an exogenous
predictor of the number of killings in surveyed villages. This predictor is strong from
a statistical angle. It is relevant from an historical perspective because Maoists had
financial needs, and timber smuggling to India was an important source of income.
I also show that the exclusion restriction holds, given the large set of controls used
and a series of exogeneity tests estimated using the pre-war wave of data collection.
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This paper contributes to the literature in several dimensions. First, data are of
high quality and were collected before, during and after the war at the household
level. Considering the additional presence of a rotating panel, this is, in itself a
rare strength. Second, the paper analyses household decisions in times of war and
is immediately able to relate these choices to households’ trajectories in post-war
conditions. Third, the short-term methodology is creative. It actually builds on
the work of Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) and Lind et al. (2014) who rely on
the timing of violent events to identify the effect of war. I somehow combine their
approach with a strategy similar to Miguel and Kremer (2004). To identify treatment
externalities of a deworming treatment on health and education outcomes they use
experimental spatial variations in treatment intensity. The short-term methodology
of this paper uses the survey as a quasi-natural experiment to identify effects of
temporal variations of conflict intensity on household behaviour.
The current economic literature on the consequences of conflict is relatively scarce,
by lack of data, and can grossly be divided in two parts, none of them directly address-
ing effects at the household level nor explicitly analysing inequalities between groups.
Studies discussing effects on income mostly focus on mezzo or macro-economic out-
comes and a significant share of the literature is based on cross-country studies (see
Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a review and discussion) or on variations within
countries and between sub-regions, like in Miguel and Roland (2011) analysis of post-
war Vietnam or in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) analysis of the Basque country.
There is an emerging and growing literature on micro-level consequences of conflict
focusing on human capital accumulation through schooling 3, health 4 or social cohe-
sion 5 and outcomes on the labour market 6. Most of these papers identify a causal
relationship using difference-in-differences between cohorts. This technique is how-
ever hard to apply at the household level and researchers who analyse production or
consumption decisions often rely on extensive sets of controls 7 or exclusion restric-
tions 8. As any study on a specific country, this paper does not address changes at
3. Chamarbagwala and Moran (2011); Shemyakina (2011)
4. Bundervoet et al. (2009); Minoiu and Shemyakina (2012); Valente (2015)
5. Bellows and Miguel (2009); La Mattina (2014)
6. Galdo (2013)
7. Kondylis (2010); Verpoorten (2009)
8. Miguel and Roland (2011)
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the nationwide level since it would affect all households in the same way. The scope
of the paper is not to address all consequences of the conflict on household lives.
Yet, this research highlights that the redistributive effects of violence were anything
but durable. The short-term adaptation strategies are key to understand what the
postwar process has meant for rural households, what are some of the economic chal-
lenges they are confronted by. Last, the losers and winners of one day may actually
change status once the war is over.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the Nepali context.
The third section describes data. Short-term effects of the conflict come in the fourth
section and are followed by medium term effects in the fifth section, just before the
conclusion.
1.2 Conflict in Nepal
In 1996, the “People’s War” broke out in the Kingdom of Nepal, a landlocked
country between India and China. The Communist Party of Nepal - Maoists (CPN-
M) launched attacks against an agricultural bank and police posts in four of the 75
administrative districts of the country (Thapa, 2004, p.48). The conflict lasted for
eleven years. At the signing of the peace agreement in June 2006, the death toll
exceeded 13,000 casualties (INSEC, ears).
From a small scale and localized rebellion to a country wide war, the evolution
of the conflict can very much be related to Maoists’ military strategy 9. At the
beginning it was a small guerilla like organization. It benefited from the remoteness,
the under-development and the lack of attention - if not the power vaccum - in a few
isolated rural districts (Onesto, 2005, p.9-11). Following Mao’s principles, Maoists
first waged a mobile warfare, harassing police forces and building support in the
countryside, mostly around their strongholds (Thapa, 2004, p.99).
The year 2001 is an important milestone in the civil war. The government created
the Armed Police Force in January. In June, the King was murdered by his son.
Two months later, a short cease-fire followed. In November, the Maoists broke it by
launching a raid against the Royal Nepali Army (RNA), which got officially involved
in the war thereafter. 2001 is the first year of the “strategic balance” phase of the
9. See Cowan (2013) and Mehta and Lawoti (2010) for a deeper discussion of Maoists’ military strategy.
1.2. CONFLICT IN NEPAL 7
Maoists’ plan. This year witnesses a clear extension and intensification of the conflict.
The vast majority of killings occurred after this date.
In 2004, Maoists declared to control over 80% of rural Nepal (Onesto, 2005, p.227).
They had established “People’s Governments” in many localities. This year also
corresponds to the “strategic offensive”, the third phase of Maoists strategy. The
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) selectively targeted the RNA. At the nationwide
level, the PLA was outnumbered by government forces (Onesto, 2005, p.220) and it
had never been able to control any cities nor district headquarters. Conversely, the
central government authority over the rural areas was very weak.
Waging a war requires resources. The CPN-M got little support from foreign
countries (Ujpreti, 2010). 85% of arms and ammunition were looted during raids
against police forces and, in a second stage, army bases (Mehta and Lawoti, 2010).
Villagers had to offer food and shelter for Maoists fighters walking from one place
to another. Sometimes villagers had also to provide free labour (Lecomte-Tilouine,
2013, p.234). On top of direct contributions in nature, the CPN-M levied taxes or
resorted to extortions especially against villagers earning monetary income through
labour, pensions or remittances (Lawoti, 2010, p.23). Cailmail (2013, p.157) quotes
a former Gorkha soldier in the Indian Army stating:
Life is hard, for the Maoists regularly come here asking for food and money.
(...) If I do not abide by their rules, they threaten me. Five months ago,
they kidnapped my son to force me to give them money. They still come
every month, when I get my pension, and ask me for money, food and
lodgings.... The Maoists see only my income and not all the expenses I
have.
While this example is extreme, contributions were generalized (Ghimire, 2013;
Lecomte-Tilouine, 2013; Lama Tamang et al., 2006). Another source of income was
the partial to full control of forest products trade. Lekhraj Bhatta, Head of Seti-
Mahakali People’s Government, explains that “the resources for running our govern-
ment come from taxes on the natural resources available in our region (such as herbs
and timber), trade duties and voluntary contributions from various professionals and
the ordinary working population” (ICG, 2005).
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Means have ends. The CPN-M increased their control of the countryside to put
pressure on cities and change the development path of Nepal (Onesto, 2005, p.13).
In the 40 demands presented just before the onset of the conflict, 17 items deal with
democratic reforms asking for more equality and 14 with livelihoods improvements
(Bhattarai, 1996). The location of casualties reflects this last point. Poverty (Do and
Iyer, 2010; Hatlebakk, 2010), inequalities and ethnic fractionalisation (Nepal et al.,
2011) and land concentration (Hatlebakk, 2010) were fertile grounds for fighting and
recruitment (Macours, 2011).
Ethnicity is neither the official motto of the conflict nor its sole driver 10. However,
there is a strong correlation between long standing economic and political exclusion
and the membership to some ethnic groups of the Hills and Mountains - like Magars
and Gurungs - or other clearly identified population subgroups such as Dalits.
The Maoists were keen on targeting high caste members and especially Bahuns
and Chhetris. Nevertheless, the civil war had deep consequences on all villagers’
livelihoods. The effect on schooling attainment is debated among economists (Va-
lente, 2014; Pivovarova and Swee, 2015). Regarding gender consequences, Valente
(2015, 2011) finds that the sex ratio at birth is distorted against men and that women
marry earlier. Women would also work more (Menon and Rodgers, 2013).
The anthropological literature reports much broader consequences on the life of
villagers. Migration, especially of young males was massive. Every young men was
a potential warrior for the Maoists and was therefore a potential recruit. Ghimire
(2013, p125) observes “voluntary exile in practically every family”. Mobility of stay-
ing villagers was severely restricted. Access to cities was difficult and trade activities
were disrupted (Lama Tamang et al., 2006). Even activities around the village,
like forest products collection, were getting harder. Maoists repressed formal and
informal lenders, “feudals” and “exploiters” (Shrestha-Schipper, 2013, p.272). On
the other side, Maoists claimed to provide public goods, increase teacher assiduity,
empower women and dalits, reduce alcohol consumption, .... (Lawoti, 2010; Lecomte-
Tilouine, 2013, p.252). Ghimire (2013, p.128) reports that Maoists fighters spent also
time to help villagers in their everyday life with the aim of building support for the
rebellion.
10. For a longer perspective on the political economy of the Nepalese conflict, see inter alia Sharma (2006).
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The mode of action and the strategy of the Maoists has therefore deep conse-
quences on the distribution of power and income, especially in rural areas where the
conflict was concentrated. The goal of Maoists was not to crush the rural economy
since rural support was important for them both for political and economic reasons
(ICG, 2005). Hence, this paper focuses both on the average effect of violence and on
the differential consequences of violence on particular population subgroups.
1.3 Data
Compared to the usual scarcity of microlevel data in times of war, Nepal stands
up as a fertile ground for quantitative work on the consequences of conflict. On the
one hand, the civil war in Nepal is well documented. On the other, household level
data were collected even during hostilities. In this section, I first describe data on
conflict intensity, then household level data and discuss how both sets overlap. The
final subsection quickly introduces secondary sources of information used as controls.
1.3.1 Conflict data
The Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), a very active Nepali human rights
organization, collected extensive data on conflict intensity and human rights viola-
tions during the whole duration of the conflict. The INSEC database (INSEC, 2009)
is considered the most reliable data source on conflict intensity during the Maoist
insurgency. This database is used in many papers dealing with the conflict including
Nepal et al. (2011) and Valente (2014). INSEC had a broad grassroots network of
local contacts in the 3972 Village Development Committees (VDCs) and municipal-
ities of Nepal. For each and every VDCs, INSEC reports the number of conflict
related casualties by warring parties and by months during the eleven years of the
conflict. Of the 13,236 casualties reported by INSEC, I use 12,957 of them which are
time and geo-localized. The remaining 2% do not have a precise location or month
and are therefore omitted in the analysis.
Casualties are widely spread over the entire country. By the end of 2006, 40.7% of
Nepali VDCs experienced at least one conflict related killing within their perimeter.
Figure 1.1 shows the geographical extent of the conflict at the end of the war. The
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Figure 1.1 – Spatial distribution of killings during the People’s War
darker a VDC on the map, the larger the number of killings during the conflict 11.
All regions of Nepal were directly affected by the conflict, however at varying de-
gree 12 and varying timing. Over the eleven years of the conflict, there is a clear
intensification in the 2000’s. As shown in figure 1.2, hostilities till 2001 were mainly
concentrated around the Rolpa and Rukum district in the West, and at the East of
Kathmandu. The creation of the Armed Police Force, the attack of army barracks
by the Maoists and the subsequent implication of the Royal Nepal Army corresponds
to a clear escalation of the conflict, both in terms of intensity and extension.
1.3.2 Household data
The Central Bureau of Statistics of Nepal (CBS) in collaboration with the World
Bank gathered the Nepal Living Standards Surveys (NLSS). It is a nationally repre-
sentative survey conducted in 1995/96, 2003/04 and 2010/11 13. The surveys follow
the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) methodology and
11. Transparent areas within Nepal correspond to national parks
12. The apparent peace in the North is just related to the low attractiveness, the remoteness and the under-
population of the Himalayan high mountains
13. I further refer to the 3 waves as 1995, 2003 and 2010 since, for each wave, 75% of data collection occurred in
the first of the two years.
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Figure 1.2 – Spatial distribution of killings till December 2000
compile household and village level data. I use household level data in rural areas
which cover a wide range of topics: demography, production decisions, consumption
choices, income level and sources, health, education, etc.
The structure of the dataset is rich, with both repeated cross-sections and a
rotating panel. Households in the cross-sections were always selected in a two-stage
sampling process, with a sampling of wards 14 followed by a sampling of households
within the ward. Since we focus on the effect of the conflict in rural areas, we
are left with a sample of 2,657, 2,748 and 3,900 rural households living in 215,
229 and 325 wards respectively in 1995, 2003 and 2010. In 2003, the CBS tracked
previously surveyed households in 75 randomly sampled rural wards of the first wave.
Enumerators could find back almost 800 households. In 2010, the CBS tracked
households in 35 of these 75 wards and in 40 of the 229 rural wards of the second
cross-section. The sampling of wards was again random. On top of the three repeated
cross-section, we have a rotating panel with 368 households surveyed three times, 424
households surveyed both in 1995 and 2003 and 434 surveyed in 2003 and 2010 15.
14. A rural ward roughly corresponds to a hamlet and is the smallest administrative unit in Nepal. In practice,
the rural sample has at most one ward per VDC.
15. Additional details on sampling methodologies are available in CBS (2009), CBS (2004) and CBS (2011).
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1.3.3 Household and conflict data
The existence of pre, contemporaneous and post-conflict household level data
already is a major boon. Their combination with precise information on insecurity
levels is a clear advance with respect to the quantitative literature on conflict. It
avoids many drawbacks arising when recall data are used, both with respect to
household behaviour and to conflict shocks. I also work at a very disaggregated
level. It means that causes and consequences can be related with little aggregation
bias and measurement errors, which often are at risk in the analysis of conflicts.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the partial temporal overlap between household surveys and
the Nepal civil war. The solid red line displays the number of people killed by month
between 1996 and 2006. Bars and the associated right scale stand for the number
of cross-sectional wards surveyed in each month. The first wave of data collection
started clearly before the onset of the conflict. The second wave of data collection
lasted for one year and occurred shortly after the first intense period of the conflict
and at the beginning of the second intense phase. The last wave of data collection
happened in 2010, way after the end of the conflict.
For the short-term analysis, I focus on the second wave of the NLSS. Data collec-
tion started in April 2003 and ended up in April 2004. If the enumeration started
during a cease-fire as underlined by the drop in the number of casualties at the be-
ginning of 2003, a new violence episode broke out in September and the remaining
data collection continued in times of war. Figure 1.4 illustrates the coverage of the
2003 survey and the spatial dispersion of the conflict 16. The blue dots indicate that
a village has been enumerated as part of the second cross-section. The darker red is a
village, the higher the number of conflict related killings during the 13 months of the
survey. CBS (2004) reports that interviewing households in conflict affected areas
was challenging. They however managed to do it, but for eight cross-sectional and
four panel wards. Only eight wards of the 229 could not be surveyed as scheduled
initially. For the panel, six of the 75 wards were visited during a second attempt.
Considering that 2,678 people got killed during this period, the timely enumeration
rate can be considered as a great record. Data quality is further discussed in the
short-term identification strategy section.
16. In the appendix, figures 1.10,1.11,1.12 and 1.13 provide the spatial dispersion of killings and the coverage of
the survey by quarter
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Figure 1.3 – Number of people killed and of wards surveyed by month
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Figure 1.4 – Spatial distribution of killings during NLSS2 and coverage of the survey
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The longer term analysis also rely on pre- and post-conflict data. Pre-conflict data
picture livelihoods baseline levels unaffected by the conflict’s extent and sequence.
Post-conflict data incorporate the overall effect of the conflict on all Nepali house-
holds, and also the heterogeneous consequences of varying conflict intensities over
time and space.
In this context and despite a smaller sample size, the household panel sharpens
the understanding of potentially remaining estimation bias. I use the panel to esti-
mate the medium term effects of war while controlling for unobserved time invariant
characteristics at the household level. I test whether conflict related attrition is im-
portant too. In this sense, the panel is used to shed light on potential biases related
to household selection in cross-sections.
1.3.4 Additional sources of data
The unit value price of timber imports in India comes from the International
Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO). In yearly reports (ITTO, ears) and in its An-
nual Review Statistics database (ITTO, 2013), ITTO monitors the trade of primary
wood products. More specifically, I use data on the yearly average import prices (in
USD per cubic meter) of industrial round wood in India. Prices are differentiated for
coniferous trees, non-coniferous tropical trees and non-coniferous non-tropical trees.
The price is adjusted for the VDC biome data (MENRIS-ICIMOD, 2008). Figure
1.14 in the appendix shows the evolution of these three timber prices between 1996
and 2010.
The subsequent analysis also relies on satellite images from two different sources
to measure environmental and climatic conditions at the VDC level. The Tropical
Rainfall Measurement Mission (TRMM) provides monthly rainfall estimates at 0.25
degree grid square 17. The TRMM is a joint project between the NASA and the
Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency which has been launched in 1997 to study
tropical rainfalls. Various technological innovations (including a precipitation radar,
flying for the first time on an earth orbiting satellite) and the low flying altitude of
the satellite increase the accuracy of climatic measures. It is therefore well adapted
to the Nepalese context. Interestingly enough, the TRMM products combine satellite
measures with a regular calibration using monthly terrestrial rain gauge data. These
17. It roughly corresponds to 27 km in Nepal.
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are currently some of the most accurate measures of precipitations. Together with
Baland et al. (2015) and Fetzer (2014), this paper is the first one to use these data
in the economics literature, and the first to use them for Nepal.
I also use a VDC level Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) to capture
the greenness of a VDC in a given year. Using the MODIS sensor, NASA and
Carroll et al. (2011) provide a bimonthly measure of the NDVI at a 250m resolution.
The NDVI is defined as the ratio Near Infra Red - Visible Red
Near Infra Red + Visible Red
. It proxies the amount of
radiation captured by chloroplasts, which are green because they absorb all visible
colours but green. The closer to one the ratio is, the denser is the vegetation cover
of the pixel. In this project, and consistently with the bimonthly measure, I average,
for each VDC, the yearly maximum of each VDC’s pixel 18. This variable intends to
capture the peak biomass potential over the last 12 months in the VDC. It can be
used as a VDC level control of the renewable natural resource productivity, including
potential agricultural production.
1.4 Short-term effect of the conflict on households’ choices
This section aims at estimating households short-term responses to violence episodes
in their immediate neighbourhoods. I first discuss the econometric strategy before
exposing results.
1.4.1 Identification strategy: the survey as a quasi-experiment
common wisdom approach
A naive approach to estimate the short-term effects of a conflict on a variable y,
say income, can be written as:
yim = γ0 + γ1K
[m−z;m−1]
κvm + im (1.1)
where outcome y of household i in month of survey m is a function of the number
of killings K in the last z months in the κ kilometres around its village v. γ1 is the
average variation of y related to one more killing in the z months before the survey.
 is an idiosyncratic term.
18. The observed maximum over the period is already what is done over the 16 days period of production. It
reduces measurement errors related to cloud cover.
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This approach might be misleading because of reverse causality or omitted variable
bias. If belligerents target wealthier households, because the Maoists want to free
Nepal from feudalism or because the Government overprotects richer households,
then the estimation of γ1 will be upward biased. If Maoists recruitment is easier in
poorer areas or if poverty is correlated to remoteness, while remoteness eases up the
insurgency, then we expect the estimation of γ1 to be downward biased.
It is therefore crucial to compare comparable households facing different conflict
intensities. This is straightforward in a thought experiment where citizens would
be randomly killed across the country. In such a case, a difference in means would
suffice and the equation (1.1) would be the right model. This thought experiment
is however not feasible nor desirable in the real world. Hence, I propose to use the
timing of the survey as a source of exogenous variation in conflict exposure.
Intuitive approach
Intuitively, consider four villages, A, B, C, and D. By design of the survey, let’s
assume that households in the first two villages are enumerated in May and in July
for the last two. This sequence has been arbitrarily determined before the survey
starts. Let’s further assume that someone got killed in June close to villages A and
C, far away from villages B and D. Then, the following model could be estimated:
yim = α0 + α1K
[m−z;m−1]
κvm + α2K
[m−z;m+z−1]
κvm + α3Julym + ηim (1.2)
In this intuitive model with four villages and one casualty, the dependent variable
y is a function of the number of conflict related killings K. The first variable,
K
[m−z;m−1]
κvm , captures the number of killings in the z months before enumeration in
the κ kilometres around the village v. It is equal to one only for households living
in village C, enumerated in July. The second variable, K [m−z;m+z−1] is the number
of killings around the enumeration month. It is equal to one for villages A and C
and zero for the two others. In terms of interpretation, the parameter α1 captures
the differential effect in y of being exposed to one more casualty just before the
survey, compared to experience it just after. By design of the survey, A and C are
statistically similar sampling units. They face the same potential violence around
the survey date, but at the time of enumeration, only inhabitants of village C had
a direct experience of violence in their neighbourhood. Of course, villages A and
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C are systematically different from the two others because they were potentially
affected by the same strictly positive level of violence. This systematic difference is
captured by α2, the parameter associated with the level of violence around the survey.
The parameter α2 captures the correlates of household exposure to current conflict
conditions. It includes adaptation to anticipated levels of violence in the κ kilometres
around the village as well as short-term general strategies of the belligerents. The
specification (1.2) also incorporates a month fixed effect to partial out the estimation
of α1 from seasonal fluctuations.
This econometric strategy is close to Miguel and Kremer (2004) when they iden-
tify the treatment externalities of a deworming treatment on education and health
outcomes of students. In their main specification, they control for the total number
of schools in a given area, a potentially endogenous variable, to infer the effect of the
treatment by estimating the parameter associated with the total number of treated
schools in this area. In this paper, I control for the total number of killings in a given
area over a arbitrary period of time, and the key orthogonal variation comes from
the predetermined random timing of the survey and not from the random treatment
assignment over space.
Econometric specification
The model presented in (1.2) can be extended for a continuous measure of con-
flict intensity and additional controls. Econometrically, the short-term estimation
strategy is written as
yim = β1K
[m−z;m−1]
κvm +β2K
[m−z;m+z−1]
κvm +β3K
[onset;m−z−1]
κvt +XimΦ+λl+µm+εim (1.3)
in which the outcome variable y, say income, is a function of the killings in the last
z months, K [m−z;m−1], controlling for the number of killings in the z months before
and after, K [m−z;m+z−1]. Additional controls include the number of killings from the
onset of the conflict till z − 1 months before the survey, K [onset;m−z−1], a vector of
control variables X as well as spatial and temporal fixed-effects. ε is a idiosyncratic
component.
The causal interpretation of β1 relies on several assumptions. First, conditionally
on controls, the timing of enumeration has to be orthogonal to the conflict expansion.
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Second, the correlation between killings before and after the enumeration should be
relatively small to allow the estimation of β1. Third, the quality of the survey has to
be independent to the conflict. Fourth, the pool of households enumerated in a given
village should not be affected by the conflict. Fifth, households should not perfectly
anticipate violence. Sixth, villages experiencing similar level of violence around the
survey should follow a parallel trend. Under these assumptions, the coefficient of
interest β1 captures the differential effect of experiencing one additional casualty
before the survey compared to have it just after.
Important assumptions: discussion
The short-term identification strategy of this paper relies on the randomness of
the enumeration timing so as to create a quasi-natural experiment. Due to the ex-
tent of the survey, the 229 wards could not be surveyed at the same point in time.
13 months were necessary to enumerate the 2,748 households of the second cross-
section. To guarantee a representativeness of seasons, the CBS surveyed different
wards in different months within the same region. On top of the qualitative infor-
mation reported in the data section which support the claim that primary sampling
units could be enumerated as planned, I can build a test of orthogonality between
the survey process and the conflict expansion. Knowing the spatial and temporal
distribution of killings during the whole duration of the survey I can try to predict
the enumeration of a ward using violence over the last months. Based on equation
(1.3), the following equation formally tests the quasi-randomness assumption:
survvm = β1K
[m−z;m−1]
κvm + β2K
[m−z;m+z−1]
κvm + β3K
[onset;m−z−1]
κvt + XimΦ + λl + µm + εim
(1.4)
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating if the sampled village
v got surveyed in month m. Estimation of equation (1.4) is restricted to the set of
villages surveyed and to the duration of the survey. Table 1.1 reports estimations of
equation (1.4) by a linear probability model for a distance of 20km. The coefficient
of the number of killings 3, 6 or 9 month before is never statistically significant, with
or without controls for environmental conditions, such as NDVI or rainfall z-scores
(even columns). Correcting standard errors for spatial auto-correlation using Conley
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(1999) does not affect the conclusions 19. In the appendix, figure 1.15 reports the
average effect of the conflict on the probability to enumerate households in a VDC in
a given month, using month windows ranging from one to twelve months. The four
graphs, from top to bottom and left to right, respectively correspond to casualties
within, in the 10km, 20km and 40km around the village. All coefficients plotted
in this figure are estimated following equation (1.4) with an empty X vector. It
confirms that, conditionally on fixed-effects, the enumeration timing is statistically
orthogonal to the conflict expansion.
Table 1.1 – Linear probability model of a sampled village enumeration month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
3 months 3 months 6 months 6 months 9 months 9 months
Killings
[m−z;m−1]
20km -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003
[-0.46] [-0.45] [-0.38] [-0.36] [-0.84] [-0.85]
Killings
[m−z;m−1+z]
20km 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
[0.32] [0.32] [0.62] [0.62] [0.53] [0.53]
Killings
[onset;m−z−1]
20km -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
[-0.12] [-0.20] [-0.57] [-0.66] [0.51] [0.46]
Belt-Zone F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Environment controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2977 2977 2977 2977 2977 2977
Standard errors clustered at the VDC level, t-statistics in brackets ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The weak correlation between killings before the survey and after is a more tech-
nical requirement. The survey could well be orthogonal to the conflict, but if the
conflict intensity does not vary at all over time, the variance of the estimator of
β1 would be infinitely large. Figure 1.5 reports the correlation between demeaned
killings before and after enumeration 20. This correlation is equal to 0.073 in the
three months window and to 0.11 in the six months window. The inflation of the
variance due to collinearity thus remains moderate.
Figure 1.5 also shows that the distribution of killings in the 20km around the
village is very similar before and after the survey, using a three or a six months
19. The correction is performed following Hsiang (2010), tables available upon request.
20. “Demeaned” stands for the fact that killings are partialled-out from month and belt-zone fixed effects.
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Figure 1.5 – Distribution of demeaned killings before and after the survey month in each village,
NLSS2
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window. The left column reports kernel densities of both distributions for the 229
villages of the second cross-section. Distributions overlap nicely, both if we consider
killings three months (top row) or six months (bottom row) around the survey. The
overlap is even more striking in the right column which displays the corresponding
quantile-quantile plots allowing a finer comparison of the two distributions. The
small discrepancy between the two distributions only comes from the distribution’s
tails. The similarity between distributions is consistent with a quasi-randomness of
the enumeration timing, conditionally on temporal and spatial fixed-effects.
A threat to identification strategy could arise from variations in the quality of
data. Hatlebakk (2007) shows that this should not be a worry. Enumerators did not
spend a different amount of days in areas controlled by the Maoists. Response rates
are very similar. Standardized answers like 0 and 5 are not more frequent. There is
no evidence of Maoists influence on critical questions like the minimal daily wage.
Standard deviations of critical variables are stable. The author concludes that the
quality of data in 2003 is not different from data collected in 1995, before the conflict.
Another concern is representativeness of the cross-section collected during the
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war. Data correctly reflect rural Nepal only if households’ conflict related migration
is limited. While I cannot explicitly measure migration, I use the panel to show
that conflict related attrition of households was not large. This indirectly shows
that households, as a whole, did not migrate more in conflict zones. For individuals,
variations in households size provide a more precise, however implicit, measure of
migration. This is widely discussed, among other results, in the next subsections.
The relevance of the method also hinges on limited households’ anticipations of
conflict intensity. If households anticipate perfectly the conflict intensity, then, there
should not be any differences between experiencing killings just before or just after
enumeration. In such conditions, β1 should not be different from 0. Under imperfect
anticipations, the effect of conflict intensity on household choices therefore tend to
be underestimated.
The last and crucial assumption is that villages facing similar level of violence
actually follow a parallel trend. This assumption is first weakened by the presence
of a large set of controls in equation (1.3). β3 captures the correlates of household
exposure to historical levels of violence. It is potentially affected by the Maoists
long term strategy and by Governmental responses. Month specific parameters µ
control both for the general rise in violence during the survey due to the end of the
cease-fire and for seasonal effects. 33 belt-zone specific parameters λ restrict the
estimation of the coefficient of interest to villages in comparable areas. Belt-zones
are defined as the interaction between ecological regions and administrative areas.
Mountains, Hills and Terai form the three main ecological regions of Nepal and are
located along a North-South gradient. The 14 administrative zones are organized
on a West-East gradient 21. Hence, the interaction captures systematic differences
in ecological conditions and long-term development which are highly correlated with
the distance to Kathmandu. X is a vector of control variables including rainfall
anomalies (z-scores) and greeness of vegetation (NDVI) of the village associated
with a vector of parameters Φ. It is important to control for rainfall and biomass
potential since micro-spatial variation of ecological conditions could determine both
the level of violence in a specific area and outcome variables of rural households.
As in any study relying on parallel trend assumptions, controls, despite their
number, might still be insufficient to guarantee the parallel trend assumption. This
21. See figure 1.9 in appendix for a map of belts and zones.
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study is partly an exception. Indeed, the fact that village A was surveyed before C
is purely random. The two villages are ex-ante statistically similar and, by the law
of large numbers, have on average, the same trend. On top of that, trends are short
since we mostly focus on the 6 months before and after the survey. This further
strengthens the credibility of the parallel trend assumption.
1.4.2 Results
The short-term analysis relies on the cross-sectional regression presented in equa-
tion (1.3). Each household i is observed once, in month m. The dependent variables
are different outcomes important to understand household livelihoods in war times.
The next tables report estimations for z = 6 and κ = 20, i.e. I report the effect
of violence in the last six months and in the 20 kilometres around the village. This
specific choice is arbitrary, clarifies the exposure, is discussed later on and does not
affect conclusions. For each dependent variable, results appear first without addi-
tional controls and second with controls for rain deviations and greenness in the last
twelve months. Both estimations include months and belt-zone fixed effects.
This subsection is organized in three parts. I start with short-term effects on
the whole rural population, continue with heterogeneous responses for high castes
versus non-high castes and finally discuss mechanisms behind and robustness of the
results. In terms of themes, I first consider the short-run impact of conflict on
changes in household income and decompose it by sources. This raises the question
of labour allocation and production decisions. I then analyse how it translates into
consumption choices. The main insight is the drop of income for all households, but
especially more for high castes, the additional working time of non-high castes in
agriculture and the fact that high castes resort to migration.
Short-term effect of the conflict
Additional killings have large and statistically negative effects on total house-
hold annual income. Estimation (2) in table 1.2 shows a drop of annual income by
1,257NPR2010 when one additional person got killed in the 20km around the village
during the six months before the survey, compared to having this person killed in
1.4. SHORT-TERM EFFECT OF THE CONFLICT ON HOUSEHOLDS’ CHOICES 23
the six months just after the survey 22. The average short-term effect of increased
violence before the survey is equal to -15,164NPR. It represents a sizeable drop by
15% with respect to the average annual household income of 104,727NPR, reported
in the penultimate line of the table. This conclusion is robust to controlling for
environmental conditions, like rain and greenness of the area.
Table 1.2 – Income in war times in (NPR2010)
Total income Agri. labour inc. Non-Agri. labour inc. Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Killings
[t−6;t−1]
20km -1265.4*** -1256.8*** 163.5 305.8 -851.4*** -971.1*** -511.1** -529.8*
[-3.28] [-2.89] [0.90] [1.61] [-2.65] [-2.76] [-2.35] [-1.97]
Killings
[t−6;t+5]
20km 347.2 341.3 -230.2** -242.1** 288.5 295.1 298.5** 298.8**
[1.60] [1.60] [-1.98] [-2.13] [1.43] [1.47] [2.21] [2.17]
Killings
[onset;t−7]
20km 84.92 77.50 75.74** 60.45* -82.26 -73.57 81.98** 82.39*
[0.90] [0.78] [2.13] [1.75] [-1.26] [-1.07] [2.04] [1.87]
Environment controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Belt-Zone fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2748 2748 2748 2748 2748 2748 2748 2748
Mean dependant variable 104726.89 50471.61 30482.81 20107.35
Average effect of killings -15267.17 -15163.62 -10272.97 -11716.25 -6166.39 -6392.38
Standard errors clustered at the village level, t-statistics in brackets, ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The last lines of the table report average effect of casualties in the last 6 months for coefficient with p− value ≤ 0.10
The survey details allow decomposing income components and further precise the
effect of violence. Decreasing income from non-agricultural labour and transfers -
remittances and pensions - accounts for most of the total income reduction. Columns
(5) and (6) in table 1.2 show that income generated by non-agricultural labour rep-
resents one third of the total annual income and it drops by one third. The fall of
transfers in the last two columns is relatively comparable in proportion but smaller
in absolute value. There might be a small compensation through agricultural labour
income but it is anyway not sufficient to stabilize income as shown in columns (3)
and (4).
22. All monetary values are computed on an annual basis. They are expressed in NPR2010 using the price deflator
proposed by the CBS. Results are not affected by this choice since regional variations in price levels are capture by
belt-zones fixed-effects
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Labour allocation mirrors changes in income. The time spent by households in
non-agricultural wage employment - paid on a daily up to monthly basis - diminishes
by 20% on average. Estimations (1) and (2) in table 1.3 indicate that every additional
conflict related casualty before the survey reduces wage working time by roughly one
workday per year. The effect is almost identical for non-agricultural own-labour
but statistically less precisely estimated. Agricultural labour represents the bulk of
household annual working time and is stable if not increasing slightly as reported in
column (8).
Table 1.3 – Labour allocation in war times (Hours per year)
Non-agri. wage labour Non-agri. self-labour Agri casual labour Agri self-labour
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Killings
[t−6;t−1]
20km -8.657** -8.418* -5.780 -9.593* 0.970 0.634 4.380 14.50
[-2.04] [-1.93] [-1.22] [-1.94] [0.26] [0.16] [0.50] [1.55]
Killings
[t−6;t+5]
20km 2.386 2.346 3.810 4.098 1.067 1.053 -1.778 -2.628
[0.99] [0.98] [1.31] [1.44] [0.62] [0.61] [-0.37] [-0.56]
Killings
[onset;t−7]
20km 1.024 0.973 -1.181 -0.808 -1.614*** -1.629*** 1.735 0.640
[1.30] [1.20] [-1.19] [-0.85] [-3.18] [-3.09] [0.67] [0.26]
Environment controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Belt-Zone fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2748 2748 2748 2748 2748 2748 2748 2748
Mean dependant variable 541.31 441.67 441.22 3358.66
Average effect of killings -104.45 -101.57 -115.74
Standard errors clustered at the village level, t-statistics in brackets, ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The last lines of the table report average effect of casualties in the last 6 months for coefficient with p− value ≤ 0.10
Falling income does affect household consumption. One additional casualty de-
creases household total annual consumption by 1,344NPR (estimation (2) in table
1.4). This magnitude mirrors the estimated effect on income. The reduction of con-
sumption is only partly related to a drop in frequent consumption expenditures, as
reported in columns (3) and (4). However it is not due to a fall of food consumption.
Households actually cut their expenses in frequent non-food expenditures - like fuel,
transport and personal care -, in infrequent expenses, in durable good acquisition
as well as in schooling and health expenditures 23. The last two columns show that
household size is stable. Therefore, the reduction of income and consumption is not
23. Tables available upon request.
1.4. SHORT-TERM EFFECT OF THE CONFLICT ON HOUSEHOLDS’ CHOICES 25
driven by the departure of household members. On the contrary, it reflects a real
drop in household living conditions.
Table 1.4 – Household consumption in war times (NPR2010)
Tot. consumption Freq. consumption Food consumption Household size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Killings
[t−6;t−1]
20km -1264.4*** -1344.3*** -447.1** -444.5* -33.93 -35.27 -0.000562 0.00241
[-2.74] [-2.78] [-2.06] [-1.91] [-0.28] [-0.27] [-0.06] [0.26]
Killings
[t−6;t+5]
20km 63.13 63.25 63.05 59.94 -44.53 -46.68 0.00206 0.00159
[0.30] [0.30] [0.58] [0.55] [-0.71] [-0.76] [0.32] [0.25]
Killings
[onset;t−7]
20km 189.7*** 190.2*** 80.68** 76.83** 32.57 29.92 -0.000721 -0.00131
[2.63] [2.64] [2.36] [2.19] [1.43] [1.28] [-0.43] [-0.82]
Environment controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Belt-Zone fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2748 2748 2748 2748 2748 2748 2748 2748
Mean dependant variable 111565.98 85553.99 62977.44 5.34
Average effect of killings -15256.04 -16220.07 -5394.71 -5363.53
Standard errors clustered at the village level, t-statistics in brackets, ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The last lines of the table report average effect of casualties in the last 6 months for coefficient with p− value ≤ 0.10
Heterogeneous effects by caste
The conflict did not affect all groups of the population in the same way. From
Maoists rhetoric and deeds, Hindu high castes of the Hills were specific targets. They
had therefore specific reasons to be affected and to react in different ways than the
overall rural population. I therefore estimate a modified version of equation (1.3) by
including a dummy variable indicating whether the household is Brahmin or Chhetry
and its interaction with violence measures.
High castes have a significantly higher income on average than others. Their
income drops significantly more in conflict times compared to the remaining part of
the population. This is true both in absolute value and in proportion. Estimation
(2) in table 1.5 shows that the effect of an additional conflict related casualty for
the overall population is -1,004NPR. The additional marginal effect for high castes
is -1,785NPR. On average, there is a reduction of household income of non-high
castes by 12,107NPR. This represents 12% of the average income of this population
group. For the high castes, the average net effect on income reaches -33,637NPR.
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This amounts to more than 30% of their average income. This average effect should
be compared to the 36,684NPR annual household income differential between high
caste households and others estimated in (2) by the parameter associated with the
high castes indicator variable. In other terms, the short term average effect of the
conflict has drastically reduced the income gap between high caste and others.
The large additional reduction of non-agricultural labour income drives most of
the differential in the total income decline as shown in estimation (5-6) of table
1.5. Specification (6) tells us that one more killing around the village decreases all
household non-agricultural labour income by 771NPR. For high castes, there is a
statistically and economically sizeable additional contraction of 1,476NPR. On the
other side, non-high caste households generate a slightly higher agricultural labour
income since the interaction term for high castes cancels the effect for this last sub-
group (columns (3-4)). All households suffer from a reduction of transfers and, in
this dimension, there is no difference between high castes and others as shown in
columns (7) and (8).
If non-agricultural labour income goes down, especially for high castes, it is di-
rectly related to the drop of working time in self-employment in non-agricultural
activities. One additional person killed around the village reduces the annual work-
ing time of high caste household men by 15 hours, almost two working days. It has
no significant effect on the rest of the population. On average in the short-term,
the conflict reduces men working time of high caste households in non-farm busi-
ness activities by more than 200 hours on an annual basis (see specifications (7-8) in
table 1.6). Men self-employed labour in agriculture increases by 10 hours per addi-
tional killings following violence episodes but only in non-high castes households. It
represents a 10% of non-high caste self-employed labour in agriculture 24.
Household size varies differently between high castes and others, with high castes
losing their young males while other households size remain stable. The first two
columns of table 1.7 report the estimation of household size as a function of conflict
intensity. There is no short-term relation between violence and household size for
non-high castes households. For high castes, there is a significant negative effect on
household size, with an estimated drop of 0.03 members when one additional person
24. The working time in non-agricultural wage labour paid on monthly basis decreases both for high castes and
others but not differentially across the two groups. Tables available upon request.
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got killed in the surrounding 20km. It means that, on average, and in the short-term,
the conflict has pushed one person in every three high caste households to leave it.
Columns (3) to (6) indicate that the effect is largely driven by the departure of young
males between 16 and 49 years of age. On average, one high caste household out
of five loses a productive male 25. Notice that the departure of productive males is
not compensated by hiring workers, as reported in the last two columns of table
1.7. On the contrary, high caste households reduce expenses related to payments
compensating agricultural casual workers.
25. Within this broad age class, the effect is larger for younger male but the statistical power goes down as I slice
the age classes.
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Mechanisms and robustness
Violence episodes in the vicinity of households have an immediate negative effect
on their non-agricultural income, their consumption expenditures and push produc-
tive males of the high castes to leave villages in conflict zones. Behind these measured
effects are increased isolation and Maoists’ taxes/extortions. Long-term workers in
rural areas are, for more than 40%, employed as teachers, health practitioners and
civil servants. They are known, identifiable and have a regular source of income.
They thus make up easy targets for a rebellion in need of cash. There is small neg-
ative effect on casual work outside agriculture. Knowing that 54% of casual workers
out of agriculture are engaged in the construction sector, this is far from surprising.
The conflict severely affects self-employed businesses out of agriculture, especially
for high caste households. These businesses very often are active in the retail trade,
the restaurant or the food processing sector 26. Such occupations require frequent
connexions between villages and between villages and urban areas, both to reach
suppliers and to attract consumers. Last but not least, transfers, whether they are
pensions or remittances, decline. Indeed, someone has to channel them to recipients
from distant urban areas. In war times, carrying cash is risky both for the handler
and the handled. This explains why they fall, contributing to the sharp decline in
household income.
One could wonder whether the decreasing income is not simply attributable to
taxation and extortions imposed by the Maoists. This might be part of the story
and no question allows to directly address transfers to Maoists. However, looking at
various consumption items and at labour allocation, it appears that actual taxation
per se does not fully explain income reduction. First, income and consumption ap-
proaches yield similar estimates of the consequences of violence despite the fact that
households are not asked to report a post-tax income. Second, the decomposition
of consumption by items shows that the reduction in consumption expenditures is
partly driven by education and health expenses. It reflects the income drop of teach-
ers and health workers. Third, real effects in terms of working time mirror income
variations 27. It means that insecurity also affects income through labour realloca-
tion. Fourth, one productive male is missing in every five high caste households. I
26. source: NLSS2, author’s calculation.
27. This also reassuring if we would suspect households to strategically under-report their income after violent
events.
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interpret this fact as a short-term life protection decision and a medium term eco-
nomic diversification strategy. In the short-term, these males escape violence. In the
medium term, they might generate income in other areas and bring it back in some
form.
As for migration, the magnitude of the effect could be dampened if (forced) re-
cruitments and conflict casualties were likely to have sizeable effects on household
size. Considering the 1,070,000 high caste households living in rural area at the be-
ginning of the 2000’s, it means that more than 200,000 productive males left their
households in reaction to spikes of violence 28. It cannot be explained solely by forced
recruitments and conflict related casualties. There were less than 14,000 people killed
during the conflict and the PLA comprised around 10,000 cadres in 2005 (Mehta and
Lawoti, 2010, p.179). This is almost negligible compared to the estimated additional
migration, especially if we take into account that Brahmins and Chettrys were not
the bulk of recruits in the PLA. Hence, the high number of missing men has to
be the result of out-migration. The destination of these migrants is not known. It
might result from a displacement effect from risky zones to safer rural areas. While
I cannot completely rule out rural to rural migration, most of the displaced people
moved to urban centres, where governmental control was sufficient to guarantee a
relative security, or to foreign countries.
The mechanisms described here are robust if I modify the month or kilometre
window. Figure 1.6 plots the estimated average effect of killings on annual total
income, based on equation (1.5), for a one to twelve months window and killings in the
ten, 20, 30 and 40 kilometres radius. The average estimated effect of specification (1)
in table 1.2 is the six months value of the top right graph. Even if all coefficients in the
figure are negative, they become statistically significant only for time windows that
are large enough. As the window increases, the effect becomes larger in magnitude
and statistically significant. The influence of distance is similar. For short and
long distances, estimates are very imprecise. The sharpest effects are estimated for
distances between ten and 30 kilometres.
The low precision for small values of m and κ is related to the low statistical power.
The number of killings before (and after) tends to zero in more and more villages as
windows get tighter. For large month windows 29, the effect on total income tends to
28. Source: author’s calculation based on NLSS2.
29. I do not extensively discuss the effect of an increased kilometres radius on estimates. The larger κ becomes,
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Figure 1.6 – Average effect of the conflict on total income
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fade out. I interpret this as a progressive absorption of the casualties effect by the
overall level of insecurity, which is captured by the killings in the area around the
enumeration.
Household size dynamics show persistent effects over time for high castes. For
the whole population, as reported in specification (1-2) of table 1.4 and in figure 1.7,
household size is relatively stable. The average differential effect for high castes in
table specification (1-2) of table 1.7 and in figure 1.8 depicts a clear out-migration in
this population subgroup. If the effect is not precisely estimated in the very short-
run, it becomes neater as the month window enlarges. It pushes forward a story
where the violent episodes of having people killed close by has a ratchet effect on the
migration decision. Migration of individuals does not take place immediately but
once it occurs, it tends to last.
The framing of questions is also important to understand the time structure of
effects. Almost all of the questionnaire is framed in terms of “past twelve months”
and “typical month”. It means that households smooth their answers over the period
and therefore reduce the short-term effects of conflict on outcomes. For consistency
the smaller are variations in exposition between villages and precision vanishes.
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Figure 1.7 – Average effect of the conflict on household size
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Figure 1.8 – Average differential effect of the conflict on household size for high castes
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of measures in the whole survey, I have computed all values on an annual basis.
However if I focus on disaggregated measures, short-term measures are more reactive.
For instance, health expenditures for illnesses in the last 30 days are more affected
than health expenditures for chronic illnesses over the past twelve months. Using
the activity roster, I provide, in appendix, estimates of labour allocation in the last
seven days. Tables 1.13 and 1.14 respectively mirror tables 1.3 and 1.6. Coefficients
go in the same direction and are more precisely estimated.
Interpretations assume up to now that the sample of households is representative
of the rural population. Yet, in war times, entire households migrate as well. While
I cannot use the cross-section to analyse household migration, the panel allows an
indirect measure of potential migration if one looks at attrition. Using the 75 villages
of the panel, I can estimate the following model:
Ai2003 = β1K
[m−z;m−1]
κv + β2K
[m−z;m+z−1]
κv + β3K
[onset;m−z−1]
κvt + XiΦ + XiKΨ + λl + εi
(1.5)
whereA, a dummy variable indicating whether a household i could not be surveyed
in a village selected for the 2003 panel is a function of the number of people killed
in the κ kilometres around village in the m months before, the 2?m months around
and between the onset of the conflict and m − 1 months before the 2003 survey. A
vector of household level controls X is included and eventually interacted with the
three conflict measures. λ is a belt-zone specific parameter while ε is an idiosyncratic
term. βs, Φ and Ψ denote parameters and vector of parameters to estimate.
Table 1.15 indicates that the short-term intensity of the conflict does not increase
general attrition. In all specifications, the number of people killed around the village
is never statistically significant, and therefore does not contribute, as such to the
14% attrition rate. Conclusions remain similar if I take a more simple measure of
the conflict, like the number of people killed between the two rounds of the panel.
Still, it is interesting to understand household level correlates of attrition. The second
specification of table 1.15 shows that neither pre-war income nor asset holdings allow
to predict attrition 30. Large and non-high caste households have a higher probability
to be resurveyed. This differential attrition rate does not impact my conclusions as
30. Pivovarova and Swee (2015) suggest a negative relation between attrition and landholdings but this is driven
by a composition effect when urban and rural households are mixed in the same sample.
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long as high caste and small households disappear at the same rate whatever the
conflict exposure.
Specification (3) shows that despite a higher overall attrition of high caste house-
holds, their attrition is smaller in villages witnessing higher conflict intensity. If
attrition can be interpreted as household migration, then high caste households mi-
grate less after violent events. On the other side, we already know that productive
men do migrate more in these areas. One possible interpretation is that, when high
caste households cannot migrate as a whole, they send members at risk out of con-
flict zones. The last two columns add controls for total income, households size, land
ownership and big livestock as well as their interaction with the three measures of
conflict. None of the interactions is statistically significant. Results on the main
variables are stable 31.
The short-term results are robust to several additional tests. First, removing the
number of people killed between the onset of the conflict and seven months before the
survey does not alter any conclusions. Actually, estimates are even more precise. This
is not a real surprise since belt-zone fixed effects and killings in the window around
the survey already control for many factors. Results are also stable if I remove the
villages where no one was killed in the six months before or after the survey, reducing
the sample by 177 observations. Last, conclusions are unaffected if I remove the
killings within the village over the period from the different killings variable. This
rules out explanations in which the death within potentially enumerated households
could drive the causal mechanism.
1.5 Medium term consequences of the conflict
The persistence of short-term adaptation strategies emerges as a natural question
after the previous section. How far do immediate responses shape recovery trajecto-
ries? Do they affect the development path of a country? Based on the last two survey
waves, this section compares household level outcomes between 2003 and 2010 as a
function of conflict intensity. I first describe the medium term identification strategy.
I then present results showing how the conflict affects households level outcomes in
rural areas.
31. All conclusions hold if I use a more simple measure of the conflict, i.e. the number of people killed in the 20km
around the village between 1995 and 2003
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1.5.1 Identification strategy and econometric specification
The richness of the household survey allows following households during and after
the war. To understand how they recover, one direct approach is to analyse how
changes at the household level are related to variations of conflict intensity in the
household’s vicinity. In terms of econometric modelling, the relation can be written
as:
∆2010−2003yi = α∆2010−2003Killingsvκ + ∆
2010−2003Xiψ + λl + ∆2010−2003εi (1.6)
in which the difference in the outcome y of household i between 2010 and 2003
is a function of the change over the same period in the number of killings in the κ
kilometres around the village v where the household lives. X are time varying control
variables. λ is a set of five region specific parameters controlling for differential
trends at the regional level. It is important because regions are the spatial level of
the deflator proposed by the CBS for 2003. It avoids to mix up the effect of inflation
- which is potentially affected by the conflict - with the effect of additional casualties.
ε is a household specific component and α and ψ respectively are a parameter and a
vector of parameters to estimate.
The first difference removes all unobserved and time unvarying heterogeneity at
the household level. Two potential concerns may arise in such specification. First
attrition might be conflict specific, something discussed later on. Second, despite
the presence of region specific trends, the dependent variable, say income, might still
partly be endogenous to the conflict. This would be the case if casualties, in the last
years of the war, were concentrated in faster growing areas. A potential solution is
to rely on a two-step procedure in which conflict intensity is exogenously predicted
in the first step. This is feasible because the People’s war specificities provide us
with an interesting predictor.
Maoists had financing needs. One of the important income source was the control
of timber smuggling to India (ICG, 2005). I therefore propose the price of imported
timber in India interacted with the inverse of the distance to the Southern border of
Nepal as exogenous predictor of the number of casualties around a surveyed village.
The first stage equation is written as
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Ktvκ = ρKt−1,vκkm+γ1wood pricevt+γ2
wood pricevt
distance to Indiav
+Xvtζ+τl+υv+ηvt (1.7)
where the number of killings K in the κ kilometres around the surveyed village
v in year t is a function of the number of killings around the same village in the
previous period, the price of imported timber in India and the interaction between
this price and the inverse of the distance to India. X is a vector of controls, including
rainfall anomalies and greenness (NDVI). τ and υ respectively are year-region trends
and VDC specific parameters while η is an idiosyncratic component.
The exogenous predictor is composed of two parts: the price of timber and the
distance between the VDC and India. First, the relevant price of imported timber in
India varies spatially across Nepal because there exists different markets for timber
and different biomes for trees. ITTO (2013) divides the price of timber in three
broad timber categories: coniferous trees, non-coniferous tropical trees and non-
coniferous trees (Figure 1.14 draw their variations over time). I match each VDC
with the relevant price according to its dominant biome. Second, the distance to
India is computed as the distance between a VDC centroid and the Southern border
of Nepal. Most of Nepali international trade goes through its Southern border, the
Northern border being too mountainous to allow for regular transportation of heavy
goods like timber 32. Following Samuelson (1954), I assume that the transport cost
is a share of the traded good total value. The use of the ratio between timber price
and distance to India is the econometric translation of the “iceberg cost” model.
It implies that the value of trade decreases proportionally with the distance to the
trading partner.
I estimate equation (1.7) for years between 2001 and 2006. It corresponds to years
where the conflict started to expand from Maoists’ base areas and to spread over the
whole country 33. The predicted number of casualties is then aggregated over the
relevant period and plugged into equation (1.6), the second stage of the two-step
procedure. Table 1.8 presents various specifications of equation (1.7), modifying the
set of controls. The estimation of the first stage eventually used is presented in
32. Due to the shape and geography of Nepal, flat Western and Eastern borders are negligible.
33. As stated by Maoists, this corresponds to the “strategic balance” and the “strategic offensive” phases of their
strategy.
1.5. MEDIUM TERM CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 39
column (4). The coefficient of the interaction between wood price and the inverse
of the distance indicates that there were more casualties around surveyed villages as
wood price of timber went up, and this was especially true as villages were closer to
the Indian border. There were also more killings in years witnessing positive rainfall
shocks and where NDVI was larger. It is an indication that the conflict was more
intense in areas where agricultural income was potentially higher.
Table 1.8 – Annual number of killings in the 20km around surveyed VDCs between 2001 and 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Killings20km 0.00594 0.00375 -0.00424 -0.0209
(0.10) (0.06) (-0.07) (-0.36)
Indian timber price -0.0410*** -0.0584*** -0.0528***
(-2.99) (-3.78) (-3.25)
Indian timber price
Distance to India 0.624*** 0.627***
(4.17) (4.02)
NDVI -0.00609
(-1.27)
Rainfall z-score 3.292**
(2.27)
VDC fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 450 450 450 450
Standard errors clustered at the village level
t-statistics in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The validity of an instrument requires both relevance and validity of the exclusion
restriction. The exogenous predictor is statistically strong as its F -stat of 16.16 is
above the commonly accepted threshold of 10. It is also relevant from an historical
perspective. As discussed in the context section, timber trade was a source of finance
for Maoists. “The Nepal army and the Maoists needed forest products to maintain
their presence in rural areas. They needed fuelwood and grazing for animals and
timber for construction, whilst the Maoists needed timber to sell as a source of rev-
enue” (LFP, 2010). The sign of the coefficient indicates that there were more people
killed as the revenue potential of timber went up in a given VDC. Results are thus
consistent with anecdotal evidence.
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Regarding the exclusion restriction, the instrument should not be directly related
to the outcome y, conditionally on controls. First, it is very unlikely that the conflict
has affected timber prices in India. Nepal is small enough to have a negligible impact
on imported timber prices in India. Over the period 2001-2006, India imported more
than 20 million cubic meters of industrial round-wood while Nepal officially exported
1,240 cubic meters 34. Even if illegal trade could have been large, it remains tiny with
respect to Indian imports. Second, VDC fixed-effects capture any time unvarying
characteristics - like distance to India, hilliness, etc. - which could affect the conflict
and be correlated with the instrument. Third, the set of controls includes a year
trend and the price of imported timber in India. It allows to capture factors changing
over time and potentially correlated with the conflict, like the general rise of conflict
intensity over the period and the dynamism of the Indian economy, which is also
potentially correlated with wood prices.
Despite this large set of controls, we might still be worried that the instrument
directly affect our outcomes of interest. It would be the case if many villagers de-
rive their income from timber exploitation. Higher prices close to India would push
their income upwards, attract Maoists and generate a positive correlation between
income and casualties. The same type of correlation could arise if “People’s Gov-
ernments” could use their resources to build infrastructure, improve irrigation and
reduce poverty.
These channels however are of limited importance. In 2003, only 2.15% of rural
households declare to have a non-agricultural business in the forestry sector. There
is no evidence that the conflict had a positive effect on running such activities. If
any, the conflict even had a deterrent effect on forest resource exploitation. Thapa
(2004, p.146) reports that “traditional livelihood opportunities such as going to the
forest to collect non-timber forest produce has been disrupted because anyone found in
the forest has been liable to be treated as a Maoist”. The ability of villagers of going
into the forest was reduced by fear of being caught in crossfire between the Maoists
and the Nepal Army (LFP, 2010). To answer such concerns, I estimate the relation
between wood prices and various pre-conflict outcomes. More precisely, table 1.17
displays results based on the 1996 cross-section and show that the instrument is not
correlated with outcomes potentially affected by the demand for industrial round-
34. Source: author’s calculation based on ITTO (2013)
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wood. Specification (1) shows that income is not correlated with the ratio between
timber price in India and the distance to India. It is also true for consumption
(Specification (2)), household size (3), non-agricultural income (4) or labour time
(6), casual labour income (5) and income from casual labour out of agriculture (7).
These results further establish the validity of the strategy.
1.5.2 Results
In this subsection, I analyse effects of variations in conflict intensity exposure on a
set of rural household level outcomes. Conflict intensity is measured as the number of
people killed in the 20 kilometres around the village between the 2003 and 2010 survey
wave. Results reported in the next five tables are all presented in the same way.
Every table displays estimation results of equation (1.6) for two outcome variables.
The first two columns report ordinary least square estimations and the next two
report results based on the two-step procedure described in the previous subsection
with clustered bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications. Columns
with even numbers focus on the average effect of killings. Odd columns include
an interaction term between killings and an dummy variable indicating whether
the household belongs to high caste groups, namely Brahmin and Chettry. They
therefore emphasize potentially diverging paths across caste statuses. All regressions
include region specific trends, controls for price of timber in India, rain anomalies
and NDVI at the village level. Last, all parameters are identified on variations in
conflict intensity across time and space in the last year of the war. As in the short-
term strategy, all interpretations should be read in terms of deviation with respect
to the mean trend. Our paper addresses heterogeneous changes across rural Nepal,
not homogenous ones (like the overall decline in poverty or the general out-migration
trend).
Self-employment in agriculture is the main occupation in rural Nepal. Between
1995 and 2003, the average self-employed labour time in agriculture has been stable
at around 3,350 hours per year and per household. It represents 70% of the average
working time in rural areas. Between 2003 and 2010, the self-employed labour time
in agriculture went down by 1,400 hours to reach 1,956 hours, which only represented
53% of total working time, as shown in table 1.19. Column (1) of table 1.9 indicates
that this reduction is more pronounced in areas where the conflict was more intense.
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The estimation of column (2) shows that the story differs across caste status. High
castes reduce their working time in self-employed agricultural activities by 6.7 hours
more than others for every additional casualty between 2003 and 2010. The average
differential effect on high caste working time amounts to 500 hours, more than half
of the trend differential between high castes and others. The two-step procedure,
reported in column (4) confirms this divergence, even though point estimates are
smaller in magnitude than in the OLS estimation. The main difference between the
OLS and the two-step procedure is the positive and significant effect of killings on
non-high caste households working time in self-employed agricultural occupation.
Table 1.9 – Agricultural labour and income
∆ Agricultural self-labour ∆ Agricultural self-income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Killings
[observed]
20km -3.978 -1.027 -36.42 -15.77
[-1.47] [-0.37] [-0.66] [-0.30]
H.Caste ∗∆Killings[observed]20km -6.709** -46.95
[-2.51] [-1.31]
∆Killings
[predicted]
20km 2.705 3.133** -30.45 -24.77
[1.62] [2.11] [-1.38] [-1.01]
H.Caste ∗∆Killings[predicted]20km -5.538* -73.56
[-1.70] [-1.02]
Environment controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indian timber price Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 744
Mean change dep. variable H.caste −1708.47??? 68.04??
Mean change dep. variable others -1069.48 2332.67
Avg.effect of killings all 358.53
Avg. effect of killings H.caste -500.81 -633.86
Net effect on high caste -577.44
Standards errors clustered at the village level. t-statistics in brackets, ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Village block-bootstrapped errors based on 500 replications of the two-step estimations.
The last lines of the table report average effect of casualties in the last conflict years for coefficient with p− value ≤ 0.10
This finding is consistent with short-term results showing that high castes were
leaving agriculture while others would invest more into it. It is also in line with the
overall trend observable in the cross-section. High castes average working time in
self-employed agricultural labour went down from 4,048 hours in 1995 to 3,749 hours
in 2003 and 1,928 in 2010. For other households, there is first a slight increase from
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2,954 hours in 1995 upto 3,180 hours in 2003 and finally down to 1,970 hours in 2010
(see table 1.20 and 1.21). The differential intensity of the conflict has thus mitigated
the drop for non-high caste households.
While beneficial in the short-term, the relatively more important reliance of non-
high castes on agriculture proves to be detrimental in the medium term. Column (5)
to (8) indicates that an additional conflict related casualty has not increase income
generated by self-employment in agriculture. Even if it is not precisely estimated,
column (7) suggests that in a village exposed to the average level of violence, house-
holds experience an estimated reduction of 3,484NPR, around 10% of the average
income generated by self-employment in agriculture. It is however hard to conclude
whether high castes, who have reduced their working time in this type of occupation,
face a larger drop than other households.
The diverging tracks between high castes and others in terms of agricultural labour
allocation transcribes in diverging paths in terms of overall working time, something
which can be related to changes in household size. OLS estimations for total working
time are reported in table 1.10. Column (2) shows that results are similar to those
obtained for self-employed agricultural labour. Estimation (3) shows that households
increase their working time by 3.8 hours for every additional casualty in their neigh-
bourhood. This effect is clearly driven by non-high castes as depicted in column
(4).
Changes in working time might partly be a consequence of changes in household
size. Given the overall negative trend of household size, estimation (6) of table 1.10
suggests that the household size of non-high castes has decreased less in area where
the conflict was more intense. In other words, they have maintain their labour force
more than high castes in these areas. For high castes, the net effect is not statistically
different from 0, if not slightly negative. The two-step procedure yields coefficients
of the same sign but of a lower magnitude. Table 1.18 in the appendix shows that
this difference across caste status is driven both by the relatively less important
departure of productive females and males of the non-high castes. It confirms that
the differential reduction of working time is related to changes in the household size
and composition.
Given the importance of migration and remittances in the post-war Nepal, the
departure of productive household members needs to be related to transfers received
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Table 1.10 – Labour force and Household size
∆ Work time ∆ Household size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Killings
[observed]
20km -6.664 -3.309 0.00150 0.00439*
[-1.62] [-0.78] [0.61] [1.72]
H.Caste ∗∆Killings[observed]20km -7.629** -0.00657***
[-2.19] [-4.15]
∆Killings
[predicted]
20km 3.801* 4.246** 0.00137 0.00152
[1.78] [2.14] [1.14] [1.13]
H.Caste ∗∆Killings[predicted]20km -5.764 -0.00192
[-1.52] [-0.62]
Environment controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indian timber price Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 744
Mean change dep. variable H.caste −1398.32??? −.63??
Mean change dep. variable others -502.47 -.12
Avg.effect of killings all 435.02 485.96 .33
Avg. effect of killings H.caste -569.49 -.49
Net effect on high caste -816.47
Standards errors clustered at the village level. t-statistics in brackets, ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Village block-bootstrapped errors based on 500 replications of the two-step estimations.
The last lines of the table report average effect of casualties in the last conflict years for coefficient with p− value ≤ 0.10
by rural households. The first four columns of table 1.11 suggest that transfers
received by households in areas more intensely affected by the conflict increased
less than in other areas. A decomposition of transfers shows that the conflict has
reduced the remittances received from Nepal by non-high caste households. One
more casualty decreases these in-flows by 20NPR (specification (8)). In the average
village, remittances received from Nepal would have been reduced by -2,330NPR, a
sizeable amount compared to the 6,900NPR received by an average non-high caste
household. For high castes, the net effect of killings is not statistically different from
zero.
Table 1.12 suggests that the conflict has increased the income and consumption
gap between high castes and others 35. OLS estimates for both income and consump-
tion per capita show that high castes in conflict area have done much better in terms
of income and consumption per capita that other households. An additional casu-
alty raises high castes’ income per capita by 169NPR and consumption per capita
35. Per capita measures are build using different weights for household members. The first adult is fully weighted,
other adults have 80% of the first adult weight, children between 6 and 16 years of age 50% and children under 6
receives no weight. The use of the number of members as measure of household size does not affect the conclusions.
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by 324NPR more than others. The net effect of the violence on high castes’ income
in an average village is to increase per capita income by 13,634NPR and consump-
tion per capita by 23,805NPR which correspond respectively to one third and 40%
of the average income and consumption per capita in 2010 for this subgroup of the
population. Estimations using the two-step procedure are less precise and of a lower
magnitude but go in the same direction. The reduction in the size of coefficients
might indicate that violence in the last year of the conflict was more concentrated in
areas where inequalities between high castes and others were growing, an argument
consistent with Macours (2011).
Table 1.11 – Transfers and remittances
∆ Transfers ∆ Remittances from Nepal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Killings
[observed]
20km 83.80 59.74 12.11 -23.03
[1.14] [0.66] [0.42] [-0.85]
H.Caste ∗∆Killings[observed]20km 54.71 79.89**
[0.62] [2.24]
∆Killings
[predicted]
20km -40.07 -45.79 -20.36** -26.20***
[-1.39] [-1.64] [-2.07] [-2.59]
H.Caste ∗∆Killings[predicted]20km 74.12 75.67
[0.94] [1.41]
Environment controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indian timber price Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 744
Mean change dep. variable H.caste 22583.18?? 11039.53???
Mean change dep. variable others 17662.54 2424.72
Avg.effect of killings all -2329.74 -2998.45
Avg. effect of killings H.caste 5963.59
Net effect on high caste
Standards errors clustered at the village level. t-statistics in brackets, ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Village block-bootstrapped errors based on 500 replications of the two-step estimations.
The last lines of the table report average effect of casualties in the last conflict years for coefficient with p− value ≤ 0.10
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Table 1.12 – Total income and consumption per capita
∆ Income per adj. capita ∆ Consumption per adj. capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Killings
[observed]
20km 88.21 14.04 137.7 -4.648
[1.28] [0.21] [1.56] [-0.06]
H.Caste ∗∆Killings[observed]20km 168.6* 323.6***
[1.95] [3.11]
∆Killings
[predicted]
20km -35.05 -45.11* -43.72 -59.33
[-1.33] [-1.79] [-1.00] [-1.26]
H.Caste ∗∆Killings[predicted]20km 130.2 202.2
[0.91] [1.36]
Environment controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indian timber price Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 744 744 1194 1194 744 744 1194 1194
Mean change dep. variable H.caste 29543.2?? 47415.56???
Mean change dep. variable others 18400.02 27558.62
Avg.effect of killings all -5162.83
Avg. effect of killings H.caste 12586.24 24152.43
Net effect on high caste 13634.47 23805.51
Standards errors clustered at the village level. t-statistics in brackets, ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Village block-bootstrapped errors based on 500 replications of the two-step estimations.
The last lines of the table report average effect of casualties in the last conflict years for coefficient with p− value ≤ 0.10
1.5.3 Discussion
In light of the previous results, we have both immediate responses in times of war
- the short-term - and changes between war time and peace time, as a function of
conflict intensity - the so-called medium term. This section discusses the latter in
light of the former.
Immediately after violence episodes, I showed that total income drops. Transfers
in the form of remittances and pensions fall. Households reduce their working time
in non-agricultural activities and register a sizeable loss of income paid on a regular
basis. High castes experience a larger reduction of self-employed non-farm activities
and income.
To address the immediate reduction of income, high caste households adopt dif-
ferent strategies than other households, a divergence which has consequences on
post-war recovery trajectories. Both types of households react in the short-run by
reducing their consumption expenditures, especially for non-food frequent expendi-
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tures like fuel, transport or schooling and for infrequent expenditures such as health
or durable acquisition. Non-high castes also react by allocating more labour time in
agriculture. It eventually generates additional income and dampens the short-term
income contraction. High castes adopt a distinct strategy. They send productive
males out of the household. It reduces their labour force but also their consumption
needs. However, increased migration does not generate immediate returns in terms
of remittances inflows. Instead, in the short-term, high castes register a larger fall of
their total income.
Three years after the war ended, non-high caste households in conflict zones con-
tinue to allocate more working time in self-employed agricultural occupations. This
contrasts with high castes who do not rely more on agriculture. While the “agricul-
tural” strategy was beneficial for the non-high castes in the short-run, it does not
translate in a higher agricultural income. Actually, agricultural income increases less
in conflict zones affected by the conflict than elsewhere. This lower growth can be
directly related to a rise in agricultural labour expenditures 36. This reduction of
agricultural income is true for both types of households but high castes have other
strategies to avoid negative consequences on their living standards.
High castes rely more than others on migration. This trend has already been
observed in the short term and remains after the peace agreement. This differential
migration affects productive members and, while it was more important for men in
the short-run, it is not gender specific in the medium term. It suggests that males
are the first to leave - it is also riskier for them to stay - and females tend to depart
later on. The relative reduction of household size among high castes pushes their
income and consumption per capita upwards. The migration channel can also be
interpreted as an income diversification strategy improving the safety net of staying
household members. High caste rural households in conflict zones do not receive
less remittances from people living in Nepal. One can argue that migration within
the country is less risky than migration to foreign countries, even if the latter has
higher returns, conditionally on success. Last but not least, high caste households
retrieve jobs paid on a regular basis which contributes to a reduced volatility of their
income 37.
36. Additional tables available upon request
37. Table for permanent jobs available upon request.
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For non-high caste households, the post-war situation looks gloomier. On average,
their total remittances in-flow are not affected by the conflict. But, they receive less
remittances from Nepal, which suggests a higher variance of inflows across house-
holds. Migration abroad is more uncertain than migration within the country, both
for the migrant and for the potential recipient of remittances. Their larger reliance
on agriculture in the short-term does not generate additional revenue. On the con-
trary, they face higher operational costs following the rise in agricultural labour
expenditures, thereby reducing agricultural income.
The medium run analysis teaches us that the adverse effects of the conflict prove to
be stronger and more persistent for non-high caste households. The relative labour
intensification in agriculture has set non-high caste households on a path which,
despite appearing beneficial in the short-run ends up being detrimental after conflict
resolution. On the other hand, high castes lose more during the conflict but their
short-term adaptation strategies help them to recover quickly once peace settles.
1.5.4 Robustness and validity of the strategy
The medium term strategy is subject to two main potential biases arising from
sample selection related to the conflict and from potential threats to the validity of
the instrument. Table 1.16 reports an analysis of household attrition in the third
wave of the panel. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether
a household surveyed in 2003 could not be surveyed again in 2010. The conflict
never seems to increase attrition and the conclusion holds through in the two-step
procedure. The size of households and livestock holdings are the most robust deter-
minants of attrition. It is however unlikely to affect the conclusions of the previous
analysis. Column (5-6) show that there is no differential attrition of small households
in villages more severely affected by the conflict. The coefficient of household size is
extremely stable when its interaction with conflict intensity is introduced in column
(6).
The two-step procedure has particularly large effects when income is at play.
Coefficients switch from a positive correlation between the conflict and the increase
of total income and transfers to a negative effect of violence. This is consistent with a
story where violence was more intense in areas where income was growing the most,
and eventually where the differential growth rate of income was the largest between
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high castes and others. This is in line with the argument developed in Macours
(2011). Notice also that the main concern with the exclusion restriction was that the
price of imported timber would directly and positively affect household income. If
so, then the instrument should reduce the negative effect of the conflict on income,
which is clearly not the case here. The relation between agricultural self-employed
labour and the conflict is also affected by the two-step procedure, even though the
differential between high castes and others is very stable. It suggests that most of
the casualties in the last years of the conflict were concentrated in areas where the
agricultural transition was more advanced.
Last but not least, it should be clear that the analysis never claims to be exhaustive
nor to reflect the total effect of the conflict on rural households. For instance, data
are insufficient to shed light on psychological costs associated with the uncertainty of
violence or of migration. Both identification strategies rely on variations in conflict
intensity within Nepal. Yet, the civil war affected the whole country and there
exists no perfect counter-factual, i.e. a peaceful Nepal over the same time span.
It remains hard to analyse changes which have homogeneously affected the country
such as overall migratory movement out of rural areas, the general under-provision
of some public goods or the anticipated end of aid programs across the country. All
discussions are based on variations over time and space in the number of killings
within the same country.
1.6 Conclusion
I have confirmed and shown to what extent more intense episodes of violence
during the People’s War have, in the short-term, significantly reduce household in-
come, particularly for high caste households, a declared target of the Maoists. The
drop of income is driven by the reduction of revenue derived from non-agricultural
activities and transfers. High castes lose more because their income generated by
self-employed non-agricultural occupations sharply declines. In reaction to episodes
of violence, productive males of the high castes leave their village while non-high
caste households allocate more time to agricultural labour which slightly dampens
their income loss. Violence has large and immediate consequences on all rural house-
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holds living around. In the short-term, everyone loses, and high castes even more,
thereby reducing inequalities. In the medium term however, there is a reversal of
fortune and distributional effects of the conflict go against non-high castes. High
caste households recover faster by reshuffling their capital. Migration appears as a
key mechanism in the capital re-composition. It is also striking to see that, even
if migration abroad is highly profitable conditionally on success, rural high castes
do not directly invest in this strategy following violence episodes. Migration within
Nepal appears as a less risky strategy. For non-high castes, the short-term labour in-
tensification in agriculture is not sufficient to generate long term gains in this sector,
often presented as key in rural development strategies.
Nepal emerges from the war but neither war nor peace has healed the country
from its wounds. If inequalities were fuelling the conflict, it is not clear at all that
the war has helped to reduce them. In the long-term, a fast convergence between
income groups remain unlikely in Nepal, such as the ones described for Vietnam by
Miguel and Roland (2011). Obviously, this paper cannot address nationwide policies
such as political emancipation of formerly neglected ethnic groups or investment in
infrastructure across the whole country. Hence, the current study highlights that
violence cannot, on its own, create a more egalitarian society, even if it is the alleged
goals of one of the parties at war. It might eventually redistribute political power, a
potential tool to shape a new society. But from means to ends, there is a long way,
many directions and up to now, little guidance by politicians in Nepal or researchers.
What remains is a lot of uncertainty for citizens.
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1.7 Appendix
Figure 1.9 – Surveyed rural villages in NLSS2, administrative zones and ecological belt of Nepal
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Figure 1.10 – Number of killings and villages surveyed in the first quarter of NLSS2
Figure 1.11 – Number of killings and villages surveyed in the second quarter of NLSS2
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Figure 1.12 – Number of killings and villages surveyed in the third quarter of NLSS2
Figure 1.13 – Number of killings and villages surveyed in the last four months of NLSS2
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Figure 1.14 – Evolution of imported timber price in India
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Figure 1.15 – Average effect of the number of killings on the probability to survey a village in a
given month
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Table 1.15 – Household attrition in the panel between 1995 and 2003
Dep. variable: Dummy variable indicating that a panel household is not surveyed in 2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Killings
[t−6;t−1]
20km 0.00155 0.00264 0.00342 -0.000841 -0.000432
[0.77] [1.39] [1.51] [-0.15] [-0.08]
Killings
[t−6;t+5]
20km -0.00127* -0.00150** -0.000894 -0.000280 -0.000581
[-1.88] [-2.33] [-1.23] [-0.17] [-0.34]
Killings
[onset;t−7]
20km 0.000329 0.000289 0.000467 0.000926 0.000829
[0.75] [0.64] [1.03] [1.36] [1.15]
High Caste 0.0621** 0.178*** 0.194*** 0.213***
[2.20] [3.39] [3.67] [4.17]
Tot. income1995 -0.000164 -0.00130 -0.00150*
(1000NPR) [-0.45] [-1.52] [-1.70]
Household size1995 -0.0243*** -0.0213*** -0.0201***
[-5.73] [-3.22] [-2.89]
Land owned1995 0.00952 0.0192
(Hectares) [1.26] [1.36]
Big livestock1995 -0.00712 -0.0114
[-1.46] [-1.22]
H.Caste?Killings
[t−6;t−1]
20km -0.00501** -0.00483** -0.00537**
[-2.01] [-2.05] [-2.24]
H.Caste?Killings
[t−6;t+5]
20km -0.00108 -0.00133 -0.00120
[-1.10] [-1.35] [-1.19]
H.Caste?Killings
[onset;t−7]
20km -0.000509 -0.000641 -0.000727
[-1.00] [-1.30] [-1.47]
Belt-zone fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Killings?Total income No No No Yes Yes
Killings?Household size No No No Yes Yes
Killings?Land owned No No No No Yes
Killings?Big livestock No No No No Yes
Observations 920 920 920 920 920
Standard errors clustered at the village level t-statistics in brackets, ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.16 – Household attrition in the panel between 2003 and 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2Step OLS 2Step OLS 2Step
∆Killings20km -0.000385 0.000208 -0.000478 0.000205 -0.00122 0.0000398
[-0.86] [0.87] [-1.17] [0.96] [-1.64] [0.09]
High Caste2003 0.0160 0.00859 -0.0116 -0.00276
[0.54] [0.28] [-0.19] [-0.07]
Household size2003 -0.0164*** -0.0169*** -0.0131 -0.0170**
[-3.03] [-2.95] [-1.05] [-2.54]
Total income (1000NPR)2003 0.0000664 0.0000552 -0.0000997 -0.0000712
[0.53] [0.43] [-0.38] [-0.49]
Land owned (Ha)2003 0.00144 0.00104
[0.16] [0.12]
Big livestock2003 -0.0125** -0.0113**
[-2.39] [-2.07]
∆K20km * H.Caste 0.000238 -0.000132
[0.33] [-0.21]
∆K20km * HH size -0.0000123 0.0000270
[-0.10] [0.56]
∆K20km * Tot. inc. 0.000000816 0.000000580
[0.29] [0.43]
Delta Timber price Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance to India Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∆ Environment controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 843 843 843 843 843 843
Standard errors clustered at the village level, t-statistics in brackets, ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In even columns, village block-bootstrapped errors based on 500 replications of the two-step estimations.
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Table 1.18 – Number of males and productive females in the household
∆ Number of males ∆ Number of women aged 15-49
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Killings
[observed]
20km -0.00151 -0.000312 0.000537 0.00153
[-1.13] [-0.19] [0.46] [1.08]
H.Caste ∗∆Killings[observed]20km -0.00273** -0.00227***
[-2.57] [-2.75]
∆Killings
[predicted]
20km 0.00108 0.00119 0.000538 0.000666
[1.29] [1.28] [0.99] [1.25]
H.Caste ∗∆Killings[predicted]20km -0.00147 -0.00165
[-0.74] [-1.45]
Environment controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indian timber price Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 744
Mean change dep. variable H.caste −.35?? −.18???
Mean change dep. variable others -.07 .04
Avg.effect of killings all .12
Avg. effect of killings H.caste -.2 -.17 -.19
Net effect on high caste -.23
Standards errors clustered at the village level. t-statistics in brackets, ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Village block-bootstrapped errors based on 500 replications of the two-step estimations.
The last lines of the table report average effect of casualties in the last conflict years for coefficient with p− value ≤ 0.10
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Table 1.19 – Descriptive statistics: household level variables
Variable 1996 2003 2010
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Total income 84746.90 63767.3 ??? 104726.89 76233.34 ??? 178014.46 112583.7
(107672.32) (111557.83) (308770.77)
High Caste .35 0 ??? .31 0 ??? .33 0
(.48) (.46) (.47)
Agri. labour inc. 53798.16 41459.76 ?? 50471.61 41476.32 ??? 54912.08 39906.89
(54355.36) (44544.48) (79089.97)
Agri. self-inc. 31895.02 21143.36 ??? 28471.36 19927.88 ??? 32467.15 21447.4
(39729.44) (33874.94) (68309.95)
Non-Agri. labour inc. 23290.17 0 ??? 30482.81 4459.40 ??? 70689.91 15373.95
(81411.39) (77693.01) (232601.95)
Transfers 5822.49 0 ??? 20107.35 0 ??? 48165.57 1968.16
(38234.13) (62634.25) (180229.66)
Remittances received 8183.56 0 ??? 17366.54 0 ??? 44710.97 1668.22
(47651.97) (60133.53) (173041.81)
Remittances from Nepal 3707.03 0 ??? 4053.82 0 ??? 8154.66 0
(30446.39) (20723.91) (33189.82)
Remittances from Abroad 4476.53 0 ??? 13312.71 0 ??? 36556.31 0
(36730.44) (56880.23) (169939.89)
Remittances sent 1452.23 0 ??? 3513.62 0 ??? 37567.67 0
(10523.54) (65777.51) (1860099.7)
Household size 5.68 5 ??? 5.34 5 ??? 5 5
(2.81) (2.58) (2.42)
Men 16-49 1.16 1 ??? 1.04 1 ??? .9 1
(.91) (.89) (.85)
Women 16-49 1.34 1 ??? 1.33 1 ??? 1.3 1
(.85) (.87) (.84)
Total Consumption 90868.19 71424.77 ??? 111565.98 83142.72 ??? 230202.31 158611.13
(97864.25) (119618.55) (282305.69)
Frequent Consumption 72687.67 63506.07 ??? 85553.99 70852.83 ??? 130641.27 112851.66
(47155.7) (61128.02) (80764.13)
Food cons. 58167.04 50768.8 ??? 62977.44 55489.61 ??? 92560.31 82405.77
(37125.99) (35823.89) (49889.85)
Work time 4908.3 4248 ??? 4794.22 4314 ??? 3703.54 3209.5
(3369.47) (2945.79) (2735.41)
Work time: agri. casual labour 681.51 0 ??? 441.22 0 ??? 274.79 0
(1349.62) (940.05) (753.82)
Work time: Non-agri. casual labour 295.09 0 ??? 279.35 0 ??? 380.28 0
(665.52) (676.29) (883.05)
Working time: agri. self-labour 3339.47 2680 ??? 3358.66 2873.5 ??? 1956.76 1500
(3174.79) (2698.13) (1985.63)
Working time: Non-agri. self-labour 370.04 0 ?? 441.67 0 ??? 686.56 0
(1183.38) (1211.06) (1679.69)
Working time: Permanent labour 221.25 0 ?? 273.32 0 ??? 405.16 0
(786.36) (811.96) (1075.88)
Observations 2657 2748 3900
Descriptive statistics for the three repeated cross-sections of NLSS in rural villages. All monetary values expressed in NPR2010
Standard errors in parentheses – ?p < 0.10,?? p < 0.05,??? p < 0.01 for difference in means between waves
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Table 1.20 – Descriptive statistics: household level variables for Brahmin and Chhetry
Variable 1996 2003 2010
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Total income 83886.40 60138.41 ??? 117062.23 83321.44 ??? 199137.23 120155.94
(94609.46) (140472.58) (323135.54)
Agri. labour inc. 52588.46 36817.43 ??? 54619.29 46147.44 ??? 59705.6 43800.29
(64673.21) (44422.25) (94323.07)
Agri. self-inc. 34055 22877.47 ??? 29234.62 24050.36 ??? 33581.95 22656.67
(42579.17) (26993.97) (83186.87)
Non-Agri. labour inc. 21717.98 0 ??? 35976.89 0 ??? 80806.33 6930.14
(50277.37) (115813.93) (264633.19)
Transfers 6806.1 0 ??? 21361.66 0 ??? 53112.57 4232.05
(30993.51) (59301.02) (152203.65)
Remittances received 10610.06 0 ??? 19185 0 ??? 47255.26 3157.76
(54201.61) (58552.5) (131676.83)
Remittances from Nepal 5636.11 0 ??? 6254.94 0 ??? 10757.86 0
(46028.86) (31446.63) (33073.25)
Remittances from Abroad 4973.95 0 ??? 12930.06 0 ??? 36497.41 0
(29559.15) (49760.56) (127986.4)
Remittances sent 1942.65 0 ??? 6408.65 0 ??? 100566.32 0
(11703.43) (115407.96) (3261707.29)
Household size 5.60 5 ??? 5.04 5 ??? 4.71 4
(2.56) (2.07) (2.16)
Men 16-49 1.1 1 ??? .98 1 ??? .84 1
(.87) (.83) (.82)
Women 16-49 1.37 1 ??? 1.33 1 ?? 1.25 1
(.86) (.79) (.8)
Total Consumption 99421.07 74045.22 ??? 132004.78 95147.72 ??? 269678.31 181214.66
(128634.37) (167666.02) (346167.25)
Frequent Consumption 74576.38 65370.99 ??? 93870.16 78110.44 ??? 137558.74 119474.64
(50644.84) (68679.51) (84669.01)
Food cons. 57568.18 49403.01 ??? 66758.91 60015.89 ??? 94858.21 85767.69
(39594.48) (33856.54) (49663.8)
Working time 5067.05 4320 ? 4782.32 4452 ??? 3354.4 2880
(3419.26) (2793) (2571.82)
Working time: agri. casual labour 236.91 0 ??? 112.72 0 ?? 79.03 0
(714.86) (360.44) (329.16)
Working time: Non-agri. casual labour 235.73 0 ??? 153.37 0 ??? 219.21 0
(596.51) (462.66) (595.5)
Working time: agri. self-labour 4048.03 3532 ?? 3749.83 3330 ??? 1928.92 1536
(3249.81) (2559.87) (1843.56)
Working time: Non-agri. self-labour 270.4 0 ?? 383.03 0 ??? 614.34 0
(971.1) (1235.87) (1608.86)
Working time: Permanent labour 275.47 0 ??? 383.37 0 ??? 512.9 0
(786.09) (950.29) (1164.46)
Observations 935 859 1268
Descriptive statistics for the three repeated cross-sections of NLSS in rural villages. All monetary values expressed in NPR2010
Standard errors in parentheses – ?p < 0.10,?? p < 0.05,??? p < 0.01 for difference in means between waves
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Table 1.21 – Descriptive statistics: household level variables for non-high castes
Variable 1996 2003 2010
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Total income 85214.12 65471.27 ??? 99117.54 73145.13 ??? 167834.43 109953.95
(114164.28) (95075.12) (301137.73)
Agri. labour inc. 54454.99 43669.46 ??? 48585.51 39415.03 ?? 52602.74 38487.62
(47838.12) (44483.9) (70491.69)
Agri. self-inc. 30722.2 20115.89 ?? 28124.28 18357.86 ?? 31930.09 20106.7
(38054.42) (36579.7) (59847.96)
Non-Agri. labour inc. 24143.82 2662.62 ?? 27984.44 7541.69 ??? 65816.19 18147.07
(94099.39) (51644.01) (215362.99)
Transfers 5288.42 0 ??? 19536.96 0 ??? 45782.29 1371.19
(41640.36) (64099.86) (192260.87)
Remittances received 6866.04 0 ??? 16539.61 0 ??? 43484.76 1236.76
(43646.89) (60836.2) (189796)
Remittances from Nepal 2659.59 0 ??? 3052.89 0 ??? 6900.06 0
(16663.48) (13125.46) (33179.24)
Remittances from Abroad 4206.44 0 ??? 13486.72 0 ??? 36584.7 0
(40096.07) (59849.95) (186847.39)
Remittances sent 1185.94 0 ?? 2196.45 0 ??? 7217.26 0
(9817.07) (15320.12) (37465.41)
Household size 5.72 5 ??? 5.48 5 ??? 5.14 5
(2.94) (2.77) (2.52)
Men 16-49 1.2 1 ??? 1.06 1 ??? .93 1
(.92) (.91) (.86)
Women 16-49 1.32 1 ??? 1.32 1 ??? 1.32 1
(.84) (.9) (.86)
Total Consumption 86224.21 69731.03 ??? 102271.68 78394.85 ??? 211184.24 149024.38
(75758.26) (88129.36) (243487.48)
Frequent Consumption 71662.15 62464.58 ??? 81772.31 67200.78 ??? 127308.69 109671.23
(45130.56) (56985.7) (78613.36)
Food cons. 58492.2 51564.51 ?? 61257.87 53720.02 ??? 91453.26 80052.23
(35721.97) (36563.16) (49970.08)
Working time 4822.1 4165 ?? 4799.63 4244 ??? 3871.75 3360
(3339.96) (3013.41) (2795.78)
Working time: agri. casual labour 922.92 0 ??? 590.6 0 ??? 369.1 0
(1538.84) (1074.85) (873.25)
Working time: Non-agri. casual labour 327.32 0 ??? 336.63 0 ??? 457.87 0
(698.20) (746.77) (983)
Working time: agri. self-labour 2954.75 2270 ?? 3180.78 2640 ??? 1970.18 1500
(3066.38) (2740.95) (2050.78)
Working time: Non-agri. self-labour 424.13 0 ?? 468.33 0 ??? 721.35 0
(1281.06) (1198.99) (1711.98)
Working time: Permanent labour 191.81 0 ?? 223.28 0 ??? 353.25 0
(785.17) (735.42) (1026.7)
Observations 1722 1889 2632
Descriptive statistics for the three repeated cross-sections of NLSS in rural villages. All monetary values expressed in NPR2010
Standard errors in parentheses – ?p < 0.10,?? p < 0.05,??? p < 0.01 for difference in means between waves
64 CHAPTER 1. HOUSEHOLDS IN TIMES OF WAR
Table 1.22 – Descriptive statistics: village level variables
Variable 1996 2003 2010
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Killings
[t−6;t−1]
20km .04 0
??? 12.03 8 ??? 0 0
(.25) (12.72) (0)
Killings
[t−6;t+5]
20km .23 0
??? 30.28 25 ??? 0 0
(1.12) (21.82) (0)
Killings
[onset;t−7]
20km .07 0
??? 58.82 43 ??? 146.22 129
(.25) (59.97) (85.68)
Wood price (USD) 69.59 62.98 ??? 200.27 230.25 ??? 289.25 333.35
(23.85) (67.97) (87.32)
Distance to India (km) 49.98 50.77 ??? 47.53 45.06 ??? 46.72 43.33
(37.03) (37.07) (35.19)
NDVI× 100 ??? 82.68 84.16 ??? 83.04 83.75
(6.55) (6.01)
Rain anomalies (z-score) ??? .46 .55 ??? -.74 -.77
(.69) (.72)
Observations 215 229 325
Descriptive statistics for the three repeated cross-sections of NLSS in rural villages. All monetary values expressed in NPR2010
Standard deviation in parentheses – ?p < 0.10,?? p < 0.05,??? p < 0.01 for difference in means between waves
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Abstract 1
A combination of satellite imagery with household cross-sectional and panel data
set is used to investigate the effects of economic growth on firewood collection in
Nepal between 2003 and 2010, and their implications for the evolution of the forests.
We first find that (a) increased firewood collections are associated with rising con-
sumption levels, contrary to the Poverty-Environment hypothesis; but (b) the nature
of the growth process matters, as a switch away from farm based activities reduces
collections substantially. More abundant forest biomass and lower collection times
both increase collections, but the effects are relatively small. Conversely, collections
represent at most 0.5% of the available forest biomass, and therefore do not as such
pose a major problem. Forest biomass has indeed remained essentially stable over
the last decade in the region. Finally, the presence of Forest User Groups, the village-
based forest management decentralization scheme in Nepal, are associated with lower
collections, longer collection times and larger expenditures on alternative fuels.
Keywords:
Deforestation ; Growth ; Environmental Kuznets Curve ; Nepal
JEL Classification:
O1, D12, Q2
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2.1 Introduction
Deforestation in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa poses serious developmental
and ecological problems. Large sections of neighbouring populations of developing
countries rely on forests for household fuel, timber and fodder, and spend a large
amount of time collecting these products. The ecological problems pertain to in-
creased soil erosion, water salinity, siltation in rivers, and increased likelihood of
landslides and floods which affect large non-neighbouring populations adversely 2. In
these countries, wood fuel extraction is the main driver of biomass removal. Figure
2.1 shows that almost all African and Asian countries mostly extract wood fuel from
their forest, and notably the main producer of wood like India, China, Democratic
Rebublic of Congo, Ethiopia or Nigeria. Industrial roundwood production is sizeable
only in a very limited set of developing countries including Brazil, Gabon, China,
Indonesia and Malaysia. It is therefore crucial to understand the relation between
household demand for fuel and forest degradation.
Figure 2.1 – Extraction of forest products in the world
Country main production
Industrial roundwood
Wood fuel, including charcoal
No data
Share of the country production, circle prop. to total product°
Industrial roundwood
Wood fuel, including charcoal
Source: FAO 2014            Authors: Baland, Libois and Mookherjee (2016)
Wood fuel and industrial roundwood production
2. For detailed references concerning these problems, see Arrow et al. (1995), Dasgupta and Ma¨ler (1995), Das-
gupta et al. (2000) and various references cited in Baland et al. (2010b)
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In this paper, we investigate the interactions between economic growth, firewood
collections and deforestation in the context of the Hills and the Mountains of rural
Nepal over the last decade 3. To this end, we use the two large scale household surveys
organized by the Central Bureau of Statistics of Nepal in collaboration with the World
Bank in 2003 and 2010, which also contain a limited but representative household
panel. We combine this data set with various measures of forest biomass based on
satellite imagery, which we reconstructed at the village level over different periods.
We focus on firewood collection for two reasons. First, it represents by and large
the main driver of forest degradation in the Himalayas compared to encroachment
or timber collection (see e.g. (Baland et al., 2014, pp.209-210)). Second it is the
only information available at the household level. Nepal is an appropriate context
to study since it has been subject to serious deforestation in the last century, with
forest cover declining at an estimated annual rate of 1.9% over the 1980s and the
1990s (UNEP, 2011).
At the household level, we first explore firewood collections, which fell by 8%
over this period while living standards, as measured by consumption expenditures,
increased by 59%. These changes can be rationalized in a number of ways. Some
scholars indeed argue that poverty is the major factor that drives households to rely
on forest firewood rather than modern fuels; hence declining poverty made possible
by economic growth will reduce the pressure on forests. This view, commonly referred
to as the Poverty-Environment hypothesis (PEH), is apparently compatible with the
changes described above 4. These changes can also be ‘explained’ as the declining part
of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), which states environmental degradation
will intensify with growth in living standards until a threshold, beyond which it will
fall 5. By contrast, another common view, expressed by the World Bank as well as
the 2006 World Economic Forum Summit, believes that income growth will increase
the demand for household energy, thereby putting additional pressure on forests (the
principal source of household fuel). This view does not seem to support the observed
changes 6.
3. We therefore exclude the low-level Terai regions as they are subject to completely different agro-climatic and
ecological conditions.
4. Barbier et al. (1997); Barbier (1998, 2010); Duraiappah (1998); Jalal (1993); Lele (1991); Lopez (1998); Maler
(1998)
5. Barbier (1997); Grossman and Krueger (1995); Yandle et al. (2002)
6. World Economic Forum 2006 Summit Report, Word Bank (2000)
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The differences between these hypotheses stem from alternative assumptions re-
garding the nature of wealth effects (i.e., whether firewood is a normal or an inferior
good) and their strength relative to substitution effects. We estimate Engel curves
and find that, contrary to the observed average changes, collections are essentially
rising with consumption levels. Hence growth in living standards per se tends to ac-
celerate the pressure on the forest for the vast majority of the population, which goes
against the PEH. This result is robust to functional forms, the use of cross-sectional
or panel data and a large range of household and village attributes. These Engel
curves however fail to capture the overall trends described above.
Given the identification problems, we then propose a reduced form approach and
find that the observed fall in collections is explained by a substantial shift away
from farm based traditional assets, and the corresponding changes in occupational
patterns. While a key question frequently debated by scholars 7, media 8 and policy-
making community 9 concerns the likely effect of economic growth on environmental
degradation in these countries, we therefore find that it is not growth itself but the
nature of the growth process that matters. These findings are consistent with the
trends followed by household expenditures on alternative fuels 10.
We then investigate the relation between fuelwood collections and the local forest
conditions at the village level, using the forest biomass data we collected. First, we
find that forest biomass has been essentially stable over the last decade, contrary to
the declining trends observed in the literature for the preceding decades. We also
find that collection times are sensitive to local forest conditions, but the effects are
not large. Collections are also sensitive to both local forest biomass and collection
times, but the effects there are also relatively small. Thus, a doubling in collection
time results in an average fall of at most 20% in the amounts collected. We then
investigate the impact of firewood collections on forest biomass. We first find that
total collections have not changed over the last decade in spite of the fall in individual
collections because population density has increased in the villages. Moreover, total
firewood collections account for at most 2% of the forest biomass, which does not
7. Arrow et al. (1995); Dasgupta et al. (2000)
8. The Economist, July 8 2004; The Economist, September 23 2010
9. For instance, the World Bank report on deforestation in India stated: “urbanization, industrialization and
income growth are putting a tremendous demand pressure on forests for products and services. The shrinking
common property resource base, the rapidly increasing human and livestock population, and poverty are all responsible
for the tremendous degradation pressure on the existing forest cover”(Word Bank, 2000, Summary section, page xx)
10. Amacher et al. (1996); Baland and Platteau (1996); Baland et al. (2010b); Bluffstone (1995)
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exceed the natural regeneration rate. Finally, we find that the presence of a Forest
User Group (FUG) is associated with longer collection times and lower collection
levels. Collection activities are also not directly affected by the regional differences
in the intensity of the civil war in Nepal during this period, nor by the out-migration
of household members.
Despite the importance of the issue, there are very few explicit attempts in the
literature at analysing the relationship between economic growth, fuel choices and
forests conditions at a micro-economic level. Moreover, given the scarcity of lon-
gitudinal data sets, nearly all studies are based on cross-sectional data, comparing
firewood collection behaviour between different households with varying incomes at a
single point of time. While our evidence is essentially based on cross-sectional data,
we will also partly rely on a household panel which corrects for the possibility of
unobserved heterogeneity between households and local communities. More impor-
tantly, forest conditions are often measured through imperfect proxies, such as the
time taken to collect firewood at the time of the survey. The recent availability of
high definition satellite imagery allows for a much more precise assessment of forest
conditions, and their relation with collection times. Moreover, their systematic mea-
surement over time also allows to investigate the impact of human activities such as
fuelwood collections on the evolution of the forests. With the exception of Foster and
Rosenzweig (2003), we are not aware of any study analysing the changes in forest
biomass and relating these to local energy use based on a household survey.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the major trends in
the collection of firewood in Nepal between 2003 and 2010. We then present Engel
curves and their reduced form counterparts in Section 3. In section 4, we examine
more closely the effects of forest biomass on collections and collection time. We also
investigate how changes in biomass are themselves related to the aggregate firewood
collection at the village level. Section 5 discusses the existing literature and concludes
the paper.
2.2 Data and descriptive statistics
The World Bank Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) for Nepal in-
terviewed 3912 households concerning their production and consumption activities
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for the year 2002-3 and 5988 in 2010-11 11. We focus on the villages located in the
Hills and Mountains of Nepal, which share a similar agro-ecological system and a
comparable reliance on forest resources, and therefore have a total sample of 3590
households (1474 in 2003 and 2116 in 2010), located in 301 villages. A random subset
of these households was selected by the World Bank to constitute a moving panel
representative of Nepal. Our panel data covers 382 different households in 40 vil-
lages. Tables 2.9 - 2.11 in the Appendix provides a description of the main household
level variables used in our analysis.
In this region, almost all households collect and consume firewood, which is the
primary source of cooking fuel and heating source. The quantities of firewood ex-
changed on the market are negligible. Each household collects on average 81.75
bharis of firewood (headloads corresponding to about 30 kg of wood), and spends
3.75 hours to collect one such bhari. Between 2003 and 2010, the amount of firewood
collected fell by 8%, while collection time increased by about 12%. Overall, fuel ex-
penditures (that exclude firewood collected) amount to 2,086 NPR (from 1,379 NPR
in 2003 to 2,578 NPR in 2010), which represents 2% of all expenditures.
Household living standards (measured by value of annual consumption at 2010
prices) were equal on average to 101,000 NPR, and increased substantially (by about
60%) during this period. This change is related to the sharp increase in remittances
received from migrants, with a rise in the mean number of migrant per household from
0.4 in 2003 to 0.8 in 2010. Remittances account for one-third of household income
by 2010. On average, households are mostly engaged in farming as they spend on
average 76% of their time in agricultural occupations. This dependence on farming
decreased substantially, as the proportion of time spent on agricultural activities fell
from 0.82 to 0.72 between 2003 and 2010. Changes in the structure of productive
assets owned by the households reflect this evolution. Thus, between 2003 and 2010,
the number of livestock heads fell from 3.53 to 3.15, the amount of land owned from
0.68 to 0.61 hectares and household size from 5.02 to 4.79 individuals. By contrast,
the average adult education increased from 2.41 to 3.16 years of schooling and the
proportion of households owning non-farm business assets, from 0.22 to 0.28.
11. Note that the 2002-3 LSMS was effectively administered in 2003 and part of 2004. To avoid confusion, we refer
to the year of that particular survey as 2003, and to the other as 2010. Another Nepal LSMS was also administered
in 1995 and has been analyzed in Baland et al. (2010b). Unfortunately, the satellite imagery data available in the 90s
do not provide the relevant information necessary for our research. We have therefore decided to drop this additional
dataset, and instead check the consistency of our new findings, with those already highlighted in this previous paper.
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We measure forest biomass in a village by three different approaches. All remote-
sensing measures suffer from non-trivial measurement errors observed at the micro-
level, which justifies the use of alternative approaches (see e.g. Glenn et al. (2008)).
All these measures have been averaged over the village territory, using administrative
boundaries of the survey villages to identify the relevant pixels 12.
Figure 2.2 – Evolution of biomass in surveyed villages in the 2000’s
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We first rely on the leaf area index, LAI, which corresponds to the share of an area
which is covered by leaves, and is therefore closely related to the more traditional
measure of crown cover, but in a finer way as it takes into account the differences
between pine and broadleaved trees. Given the seasonality in the density of leaves
in those areas, we use the 90 percentile of the measure in a year (we avoided using
the maximum as the latter is more subject to measurement errors). Our central
estimations are based on this particular measure. We also employ the fraction of
absorbed photosynthetically active radiation, FPAR, which measures the photosyn-
thesis capacity of standing vegetation. It is a key parameter to understand the
12. LAI and FPAR pixels have a 1km×1km resolution while NDVI is more precise with a 250m×250m resolution
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growth potential and carbon storage capacity of the biomass. There again, because
of seasonality, we will use the 90 percentile 13. Finally, we will also make use of the
more traditional Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), for which we com-
puted the village wise average of the November-December maximum of each pixel.
This methodology follows the bimonthly production algorithm which report for every
16 days the maximum of the ratio Near Infra Red −Visible Red
Near Infra Red +Visible Red
. It proxies the amount of
radiation captured by chloroplast, which are green because they absorb all visible
colours but green. The closer to one the ratio is, the denser is the vegetation cover of
the pixel. We focus on November and December to limit the greening of pixels due
to agricultural standing crops and capture as much as possible the canopy 14. These
three measures vary a lot across villages, but remain remarkably stable between 2003
and 2010. In Figure 2.2 above, we report for the villages surveyed in the Nepal LSMS
the evolution of our three measures of biomass between 2001 and 2013. While there
is some fluctuations between years, there are no discernible trends in any of those
measures, except perhaps a slight increase in NDVI over the decade.
The Forest User Group program was launched in 1993. Its objective has been to
transfer the management of accessible forests to local communities, via Community
Forest User Groups (CFUGs). These groups are empowered to control access to
the forests, taxing forest products, hiring forest guards and launching plantation
programme 15. Income generated by forest-related activities can be used to finance
local projects such as roads, schools and temple. Most of the villages have at least
one forest user group (87% in 2003 and 95% in 2010) and the area controlled by
CFUGs increased substantially over the period, from 14% to 20% of the total village
area.
Another important event during the study period was the Nepalese Civil War
between government forces and Maoist rebels, which started in 1996 and ended in
2006. The civil war culminated in 2003 and 2004 with the Maoist rebels controlling
a large part of the countryside. In this paper, we use the INSEC dataset which
provides the most reliable data source on conflict intensity, reporting the number of
13. Alternatively, we will also use as robustness checks the average of these measures in the early winter season,
during which most standing crops have been collected, and trees are still fully covered by leaves. More technical
details and sources about these measures are provided in Appendix A1. For more details on LAI and FPAR products
using MODIS data, see also Myneni et al. (2002).
14. For more details on NDVI products using MODIS data, see Solano et al. (2010)
15. Certain legal restrictions are set for the use of these funds. For example, 25% of revenue must be reinvested in
projects aimed at developing the forest.
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conflict related casualties, with the date of the event and its geo-localization. Using
the centroid of each village in our data set, we computed the total number of conflict
related deaths since the start of the conflict within a 20 km radius around the center
of the village 16
Last, we systematically control for environmental and climatic conditions using
remote sensing information. Snow cover and cooling degree days (CDD) determine
the demand for firewood. Growing Degree Days are computed for each monsoon
season to capture one of the important determinant of biomass growth over the year.
We also control for rainfall z-score, the village median altitude and within village
altitude variance. The appendix describes data sources and computational details
for these variables.
2.3 Firewood collection and living standards
In this section we focus on the relationship between household consumption and
firewood collections, in order to test commonly held views such as PEH or EKC
concerning the effect of growth in living standards on firewood collections. Concep-
tually this corresponds to estimating the nature of the income effect in the demand
for firewood, and therefore requires to control for collection time, which is the main
cost (price) associated with the consumption of firewood. We first provide cross-
sectional estimates of this relation. Controlling for village dummies and focusing on
intra-village variations in a cross-sectional analysis helps control for the bias resulting
from unobserved village heterogeneity, but does not allow to estimate the effects of
collection times, which is constant in a village. The estimation based on the panel
enables us to additionally gauge the bias resulting from unobserved household het-
erogeneity that is fixed over time, besides changes in observable household attributes.
This comes however at a cost, due to the lower number of households, and also to
the reduced variability across time of most of the variables of interest. Unless other-
wise specified, in all the other estimations, we will use belt-zones dummies to control
for regional characteristics. A belt zone is defined administratively as a region of
16. More details on this variable are available in Libois (2016). According to Do and Iyer (2010), the Nepal civil
war was concentrated in geographic locations favoring insurgents, such as mountains and forests, and in areas of
greater poverty owing to the need of the insurgents to recruit soldiers (see also Bohara et al. (2006) and Hatlebakk
(2010). As a result, we are not able to draw reliable estimates of the effects of the civil war on firewood collections,
and our estimations results in this respect are disappointing.
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roughly similar geographical characteristics (usually, low plains, hills and mountains
correspond to three different ‘belts’). We distinguish between 22 belt zones in the
Hills and the Mountains, which include on average 2.5 districts or 13.7 villages. The
use of belt zones allows for more variability across villages, but the results are robust
to the use of district fixed effects, with some loss in significance.
Table 2.1 presents estimated Engel relationships using alternative parametric spec-
ifications and with varying sets of controls. Consumption is measured by annual
household recurrent expenditures valued at 2010 prices. The first three columns
show estimated relationships from the cross-sectional data (which pools the two
waves) using a quadratic specification 17. In the first column, we control for village
and time dummies, in the second column, we control for a belt-zone dummy, and for
the median collection time in the village (which was absorbed by the village dummy
in column 1) 18. In column 3, we add other village level controls, including the share
of forest managed by Forest User Group, the distance to a paved road, the number of
conflicts related deaths within 20 km of the village, and various topographic and cli-
matic controls. Columns 4-6 present the corresponding panel estimates, with column
4 including a time-varying village fixed effect, column 5 and 6 including a different
set of village time-varying controls. Standard errors are clustered at the village level
in all regressions. Column 7 is a semi-parametric estimation on the panel that we
discuss later.
All columns show a significant increasing and concave relationship between fire-
wood collections and consumption. The estimated turning point are located at least
at 200,000NPR, corresponding to consumptions above the 93th percentile. The evi-
dence therefore firmly rejects the PEH but is consistent with the EKC. These patterns
do not however explain the observed changes in collections and consumption between
2003 and 2011.
17. Higher order polynomials were also tested, with little impact on the estimates. We report on a semi-parametric
specification below. While not reported here, all the results discussed are robust to using income instead of con-
sumption expenditures as the measure of income.
18. The use of individual self-reported collection time per bhari, while arguably more endogenous, does not affect
our conclusions.
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The effects of collection time is significant in the cross-section, but not in the
panel, due essentially to the low variability of this variable within a village. Where
significant, the estimated effect remains small, as one more hour needed to collect
one bhari (a 27% increase) is associated with a fall of at most 4 bharis collected,
which corresponds to an average elasticity of about -15%.
We next explore the robustness of the results with respect to functional form of
the relationship between collections and consumption. Figure 2.3 provides the semi-
parametric estimations of the Engel curve on the household panel, relating changes in
household firewood collection to the changes in household consumption expenditures
within the same household. To estimate this curve, we use the estimator proposed
by Baltagi and Li (2002) which allows consistent estimates in a semi-parametric
panel regression 19. The estimation controls for household fixed effect and the village
variables (such as conflict intensity or the presence of a FUG), the coefficients of
which are reported in column 7 of Table 2.1. We again find an increasing and
concave relation between firewood collections and consumption, which closely follow
a quadratic shape. The right hand panel of Figure 2.3 reports the distribution of
consumption across all households.
In a rural setting where households collect their own firewood and spend large
amounts of time doing so, it is hard to dispute the possibility that household con-
sumption and firewood collections are jointly determined by labour allocation deci-
sions and other underlying household and community attributes. Observable house-
hold attributes include household demographics, occupational patterns and assets
owned. The likely influence of these attributes motivates a reduced form analysis in
which collections are related to underlying household assets rather than consump-
tions. An added argument for such an approach is that household consumptions are
more prone to measurement error than household assets.
19. Baltagi and Li (2002) suggest eliminating the fixed-effects by first differencing the model over time, assuming
that the non-parametric part of the regression has the same functional form in both periods. Combined with the use
of sufficiently flexible splines, this assumption allows estimating consistent parameters which will be used to partial
out the non-parametric part of the model from its parametric components. The partialled-out residuals will then be
used to draw the non-parametric part of the regression. For more details, see Libois and Verardi (2013).
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Figure 2.3 – Firewood demand: Engel curve
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Table 2.2 reports the regression estimations of consumption expenditures and
the proportion of adult worktime allocated to agriculture on household assets and
demographics. Columns 1 and 3 include a village fixed effect, while various village
level controls are included in the two other columns. Clearly, living standards and
occupational patterns are closely related to all productive assets in the expected way.
These regressions have a within-R-squared varying between 27 and 33%. Changes
in assets and demographics therefore account for some but not most of the observed
growth in consumptions. This implies that while the results of an asset-based reduced
form approach is less prone to estimation bias, it is not able to incorporate all the
factors generating growth in living standards. Hence the reduced-form asset-based
approach and the Engel curve approaches are complementary.
In Table 2.3, we investigate the reduced form approach, in which collections are
related to household demographics and assets. As a first step, we reproduce the
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Table 2.2 – Consumption and occupational patterns: determinants
Frequent consumption Prop. agricultural worktime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Big livestock 1.660∗∗∗ 0.571 0.0181∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗∗
(3.63) (1.26) (7.60) (9.01)
Land owned, ha 14.70∗∗∗ 12.87∗∗∗ 0.0107 0.0265∗∗∗
(8.40) (7.79) (1.54) (3.58)
Household size 9.887∗∗∗ 9.923∗∗∗ -0.0126∗∗∗ -0.0126∗∗∗
(14.04) (14.01) (-4.96) (-5.11)
Prop. children -13.39∗∗∗ -18.45∗∗∗ 0.0294 0.0592∗∗∗
(-3.25) (-4.23) (1.33) (2.77)
Avg. education 4.991∗∗∗ 6.510∗∗∗ -0.0186∗∗∗ -0.0243∗∗∗
(12.65) (13.30) (-8.45) (-11.04)
= 1 if NFBus 9.922∗∗∗ 10.62∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗
(4.37) (4.45) (-17.40) (-19.91)
# Migrants -0.00755 -0.0320 0.0499∗∗∗ 0.0460∗∗∗
(-0.01) (-0.03) (8.89) (8.57)
% of Vil. area in FUG 13.79 -0.0481
(1.62) (-1.11)
Med. time to road 0.149 0.00142∗
(1.08) (1.91)
# killings 20km ar. 0.0357∗∗ 0.0000346
(2.26) (0.45)
Vil. snow cover -1027.7 -7.583∗∗
(-1.43) (-2.12)
Rainfall z-score 1.235 0.00841
(0.58) (0.84)
Monsoon GDD 0.00196 0.00000354
(0.40) (0.16)
Cooling Degree Days 0.0179 0.0000979∗
(1.57) (1.66)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Belt-Zone F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village F.E. Yes No Yes No
Observations 3590 3590 3590 3590
Standard errors clustered at the village level
t-statistics in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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estimated Engel curve, controlling for the proportion of adult productive time in
the household allocated to agricultural activities. The intuition here is that farming
activities, such as fodder collection or livestock grazing, are complementary to fire-
wood collection while others are not. Columns 1-3 reproduce the first three columns
of table 1, with the proportion of agricultural worktime as an additional control.
The estimated coefficients on consumption and collection time closely parallel those
obtained in Table 1, with a similar interpretation. Occupational patterns also mat-
ter: a complete switch by a household away from agriculture would result in a fall
in firewood collection by at least 16 bharis (col. 1).
The estimated reduced form approach is presented in columns 4-6, where con-
sumption expenditures and occupational patterns are replaced by household assets.
As expected, farm based assets (livestock and agricultural land) and household size
increase collections, as the effect of income and occupation complement each other.
With respect to household size, we also expect an additional positive effect as energy
use, particularly in terms of heating, is essentially a public good within the house-
hold. In contrast, the occupational effects dominate the income effect for the impact
of education and non-farm business asset ownership which both decrease collections.
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Table 2.3 – Engel curves and occupational pattern
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wood Wood Wood Wood Wood Wood
Consumption exp. 0.391∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗
(8.40) (6.49) (6.81)
Consumption exp.2 -0.000560∗∗∗ -0.000464∗∗∗ -0.000484∗∗∗
(-4.52) (-4.81) (-4.90)
Prop. agri. worktime 15.99∗∗∗ 31.17∗∗∗ 30.48∗∗∗
(4.37) (7.31) (7.22)
Med. collection time -3.219∗∗ -3.322∗∗ -3.411∗∗ -3.562∗∗
(-2.16) (-2.21) (-2.52) (-2.56)
% of Vil. area in FUG -17.02 -11.05
(-1.41) (-1.00)
Med. time to road -0.224 -0.217
(-0.87) (-0.94)
# killings 20km ar. -0.0182 0.00644
(-0.68) (0.27)
Vil. snow cover 303.1 69.15
(0.28) (0.07)
Rainfall z-score -1.993 -0.556
(-0.69) (-0.20)
Monsoon GDD -0.0200∗∗∗ -0.0179∗∗∗
(-2.78) (-2.67)
Cooling Degree Days -0.0106 -0.00617
(-0.59) (-0.36)
Big livestock 2.450∗∗∗ 2.979∗∗∗ 2.838∗∗∗
(4.61) (5.51) (5.24)
Land owned, ha 1.719 4.457∗∗ 4.052∗∗
(0.91) (2.41) (2.15)
Household size 6.390∗∗∗ 6.369∗∗∗ 6.547∗∗∗
(11.03) (10.70) (11.05)
Prop. children -5.105 -2.197 -3.071
(-1.12) (-0.47) (-0.66)
Avg. education -0.789∗∗ -2.348∗∗∗ -2.217∗∗∗
(-2.02) (-6.15) (-5.84)
= 1 if NFBus -4.378∗∗ -6.258∗∗∗ -6.391∗∗∗
(-2.10) (-2.81) (-2.85)
# Migrants 1.571 -1.141 -1.039
(1.60) (-1.08) (-1.00)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Belt-Zone F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village F.E. Yes No No Yes No No
Observations 3590 3590 3590 3590 3590 3590
Standard errors clustered at the village level, t-statistics in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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In Table 2.4, we reproduce the same analysis on fuel expenditures which exclude
collected firewood (sawdust, coal, charcoal, LPG, kerosene, etc.). The results closely
reflect those obtained for firewood: fuel expenditures increase with income and col-
lection times. Under the reduced form presented in the last three columns of table
2.4, fuel expenditures decrease with agricultural occupations and farm-based assets
(in particular livestock) but increase in non-farm based assets. Fuel expenditures are
therefore used by households as a substitute to firewood collections when collection
costs are high or occupations and asset ownership less based on farming. (We do not
report the results based on the household panel, as the reduced number of obser-
vations and the lower within-household variability of the variables of interest make
most coefficients insignificant).
We conclude these first results by rejecting the Poverty-Environment hypothesis:
collections, together with other fuel expenditures, increase in income. Collection
time have a robust and significant but relatively small impact on collections. The
nature of occupations clearly matters, since households owning more farm-based
assets, such as livestock and land, spent more time on agricultural activities, collect
more firewood and buy less alternative fuels.
2.4 Firewood collection and the local ecology
We first provide a simple model corresponding to our estimation strategy. Let the
amount of firewood collected by household i in village j at time t be denoted by Cijt.
Under the reduced form specification, this is a function of various household assets
Xkijt, the time taken to collect one unit of firewood Tjt and various village charac-
teristics Vzjt. In the preceding section we have estimated the following specification:
Cijt =
∑
βkXkijt + φTjt +
∑
γzVzjt + εijt (2.1)
The amount of firewood available in a village depends on forest conditions, as
measured by forest biomass, Bjt. The more biomass is available in a village, the
lower the time necessary to collect firewood. To avoid simultaneity biases, we assume
that the collection time at time t depends on the biomass available at time t−1. We
therefore have:
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Tjt = ξBjt−1 +
∑
ηzVzjt + εjt (2.2)
which can be directly estimated. As collection times depend on forest biomass,
equation (1) can also be rewritten as:
Cijt =
∑
βkXkijt + νBjt−1 +
∑
γzVzjt + εijt (2.3)
At the village level, the total amount of fuelwood removed per unit area 20 in a
village at time t, Cvt, is equal to the sum of all individual collections divided by
the area of the village, Av, or to the average amount collected multiplied by the
household density of the village, Nvt
Av
, where Nvt represents the number of households
in village v at time t. We therefore have: Cvt =
C¯jt×Nvt
Av
. The change in forest biomass
in a village is therefore equal to the natural growth of biomass minus the amounts
collected. We can therefore estimate the following equation:
∆Bjt = Bjt+1 −Bjt−1 = α + ϕCvt + σBjt−1 +
∑
ρzVzjt + εjt (2.4)
in which φ is expected to be negative, and σ measures the effect of the existing
biomass on its growth.
We now turn to the estimation of the last three equations. For robustness pur-
poses, we provide in the appendix a similar set of estimates using as alternative
measures of biomass the average measure of LAI and FPAR in November and De-
cember as this corresponds to a season during which there are very few clouds and
most agricultural crops have been collected (see table 2.16, 2.15 and 2.17 in the
appendix). Table 2.5 reports the results of regression of collection time on forest
biomass, where the three different measures of biomass will be used alternatively:
LAI, FPAR and NDVI. Columns 1, 4 and 7 present the simple correlation between
these two variables and columns 2, 5 and 8 correspond to the specification proposed
in equation (2.2) above, where various village controls are added. In the remaining
three columns, we allow for the possibility that total collections in a village have an
impact on current collection times, and we use the reduced form in household assets
(measure as densities at the village level) to capture this possible effect.
20. The various biomass index used are averages per pixel, and are therefore measures of biomass per unit area.
Hence the need to define village collections in terms of density per unit area.
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As expected, forest biomass has a robust and significant negative impact on me-
dian collection times in a village. The coefficients estimated are relatively small in
magnitude, as a one standard deviation increase in LAI (+7.37) results in a fall in
the median collection time of only 0.20 hours (using column 2 estimated coefficient).
This may partly be due to measurement errors. In particular, biomass measures,
which are constructed as averages over the whole administrative area of a village,
only imperfectly capture villagers’ access to forest products. On the one hand, the
latter go to specific forest patches which are not well captured by a village average.
On the other hand, these patches may be located in neighbouring administrative
villages, so that the administrative boundaries do not match perfectly the areas in
which collection of forest products take place. By contrast, collection times are
directly measured relative to the actual place of collection.
Interestingly, forest user groups (measured by the proportion of village area man-
aged by an FUG) tend to increase the time needed to collect firewood, by about
1.3 hours. This may be due to a restricted access to part of the forests but also
to the improved collection and lopping practices imposed by the FUG. However, as
Forest User Groups are created voluntarily by villages, it is difficult to estimate their
causal impact on firewood collections. Their creation and the time at which they
were created are likely to be affected by prior pressures of deforestation as well as
various unobserved political and economic factors. At the household level, member-
ship in a FUG is also voluntary. Hence the right to collect from a community forest
is not exogenous, even when one controls for village characteristics. Given our data,
we therefore refrain from drawing any inferences regarding the role of the FUGs in
forest conservation or regeneration 21. Most of the asset densities and the other vil-
lage variables are insignificant, with the exception of the altitude variability within a
village, which measures ruggedness and is associated with longer collection times 22.
21. For various attempts at identifying the impact of community forest management in Asia, we again refer to
Edmonds (2002), Somanathan et al. (2009) and Baland et al. (2010a).
22. In all regression at the village level, asset densities are not very significant, and will therefore be neglected.
Their inclusion does not affect the results reported below.
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In table 2.6, we report the impact of forest biomass on household collections.
Columns 2, 5, and 8 correspond to the specification given in equation (2.3) above.
In columns 1, 4 and 7, we replace village controls by a village fixed effect, while
in columns 3, 6 and 9, we additionally control for collection time. Forest biomass
has a robust, positive but small impact on household collections. Thus, a one SD
increase in LAI results in an increase in collections by about 3.8 bharis (7.37×00.521).
The alternative specifications and the other biomass measures provide somewhat
larger estimates. For instance, a one SD increase in NDVI results in an increase in
collections by 4.7 bharis (887×0.0053). Introducing collection times as an additional
control slightly reduces the estimated coefficient which remains significant. This
implies that forest biomass has an impact on collections which is independent of
its indirect impact through collection times. Forest biomass may be related to the
easiness in collections, or to the collection of associated forest products that influence
positively the collection of firewood, and these effects are not fully captured by
collection times.
The effects of household assets are very consistent and similar to those obtained
in the reduced form estimations presented in Table 2.3. Interestingly, Forest User
Groups are correlated with reduced collections (of about 13 bharis) even if the coef-
ficient is imprecisely estimated. When controlling for collection times, the coefficient
is systematically lower and looses significance, which supports the idea that FUGs
increase collection times. It remains negative which may be related to the improved
collection or changing cooking and heating practices that may accompany the cre-
ation of a FUG. FUGs may also play a role in promoting alternative energy sources.
In Table 2.7, we report the estimations obtained with fuel expenditures as the
dependent variable, following the same specifications as in Table 2.6. The results
there closely follow the previous results. Fuel expenditures decrease in villages with
more abundant forest biomass or lower collection times. Agricultural assets decrease
those expenditures, while education and non-farm business assets increase them by
a substantial amount. The importance of FUGs in the village also increase fuel
expenditures, which therefore again appear as a substitute to firewood collection.
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We now turn to examining the possible impact of firewood collections on forest
biomass, and report the estimations based on equation (2.4). For each of the three
forest biomass measures, we first report the simple correlation between changes in
biomass between year t − 1 and t + 1 and village collections in year t, controlling
for the initial stock of biomass 23. As argued above, village collections are measured
as densities, i.e. total collection per unit area, since biomass is also measured as an
average per unit area. In the second column (col. 2, 5 and 8), we control for all
the relevant village variables and therefore follow exactly the specification given in
equation (4). A robustness check is reported in the third column (cols. 3, 6 and 9),
in which the change in biomass is measured as the change between the year t − 2
and year t+ 1, controlling for the stock in t− 2.
Overall, village collections reduce biomass, even though the coefficient is not al-
ways precisely estimated. As discussed before, this is partly due to the measurement
errors related to the use of biomass averages over the administrative boundaries of
the village, which do not correspond to the actual collection points in the forest.
However, the results are consistent across the three measures of biomass. Using
the estimated coefficient in column (2), total collections in a village correspond to
a 1.9% reduction in LAI (0.000148*3276.17/25.4). The estimated impact on FPAR
are smaller in relative terms, as total collections correspond to a fall of about 0.7% in
FPAR. These can be compared to a rough calculation based on the stock of wood in
Nepalese forests (Oli and Shrestha, 2009). The average above ground stock in forest
is estimated to be around 200 tons per hectare, while village collections represent
a removal of about 2.5 ton per hectare (30 kgs per bharis * 3276 bharis per square
kilometers * 0.40 forest per unit area), which corresponds to a 1.25% decrease in
the stock of wood. The larger estimates obtained with the LAI measure comes from
the fact that LAI is based on the density of leaves, and a lot of firewood is collected
through cutting branches (lopping) instead of trees (Baland et al., 2010a) or collect-
ing dead wood which does not affect these measures but is accounted in measures
of wood biomass. Collections should therefore have a larger impact on LAI than on
the other two measures.
23. More precisely, we took the average in the biomass stock over the first 12 of the 24 months that precede the
date of the survey in the village, since collections were reported ‘over the last 12 months’
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2.5 Implied growth effects
In this short section, we discuss and summarize our main findings. Our enquiry
started with the observation that, across the two cross-sections of the Nepal LSMS,
average collections per household fell from 85.8 to 78.9 bharis, a fall of 7.1 bharis.
Given the increase in the number of households in the villages, this implied that total
collections in a village remained unchanged between 2003 and 2011. If we rely on
the Engel curve, with the large increase in consumption observed during the period
(from 75 to 119 thousands NPR), household collections should have increased by
8.17 bharis (using Table 1, equation 3). The increase in the average village median
collection time, from 3.42 to 3.83 is at best responsible for a fall of about 1.62 bharis.
These predicted changes are thus very far from the observed ones, and we therefore
conclude that the Engel curve is a very poor predictor of future changes.
The use of reduced forms allowed us to investigate in more details the role played
by occupational patterns, as measured by the productive assets owned by the house-
hold. Using the Engel curves but controlling for occupations (Table 2.3, equation
3), we find that occupational patterns matter but the predicted changes (of -3.05
bharis) are again too small to account for the fall in collections. By contrast, the
reduced form based on productive assets provides a much better prediction (Table
2.3, equation 6) 24. Livestock holdings fell by 0.38 over the period, land area by
0.07, household size by 0.23, while education increased by 0.75 and the proportion
of households owning non-farm assets increased by 0.06. These changes led to a fall
of respectively 1.1, 0.3, 1.5, 1.7 and 0.4 bharis per household. Taken together, the
observed changes in asset holding predict a fall in the number of bharis collected of 5
bharis. Changes in collection time accounts for a fall of 1.3 bharis. We can therefore
conclude that most of the observed changes can be explained by rising collection
times and the nature of growth, as measured by the changing structure of household
productive assets.
Another important question is whether collections would fall fast enough when
excessive, through their impact on forest biomass and collection times. For the
sake of the argument, consider that collections caused a 20% reduction in biomass,
i.e. a fall of 5 units in LAI. According to Table 2.5 (col. 3), such a fall increases
24. We discuss here only coefficients that were precisely estimated.
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collection times by 0.14 hours. Using the estimates in table 2.6 (col. 3), these changes
should reduce firewood collection by 3.3 bharis or 4%, (0.6% through the increase
in collection time, and 3.4% through the direct impact of biomass on collections).
These return effects of a degraded biomass on collections are therefore very small,
pointing again to the low sensitivity of collections to a degrading forest biomass,
either directly or indirectly through increasing collection times. This return effect
is much lower than the direct impact of collections on biomass. This being said, we
must again stress the fact that over the period analysed, the overall forest biomass
remained essentially stable, so that this question remains essentially hypothetical in
this context.
2.6 Relation to existing literature and concluding comments
The only longitudinal study on deforestation in South Asia that we are aware of
is Foster and Rosenzweig (2003). They used a panel of 250 Indian villages over the
last three decades of the 20th century. The satellite imagery data showed evidence
of reforestation, while the household data showed increased demand for wood and
wood products accompanying the rise in their living standards. They argue that
the increasing demand for wood products induced reforestation. Our results are
broadly consistent with theirs, despite pertaining to a different country and period
of analysis. In particular, the hilly and mountainous regions of Nepal do differ
from India in a number of important characteristics: (1) the forests are abundant
relative to the population, (2) the forests are still of an open access nature (though
possibly regulated by the FUG), which involves that households collect according
to their needs, and, most importantly, (3) the demand for heating energy in the
winter constitutes an important and relatively inelastic component of the demand
for firewood, for which few substitutes are available 25.
Numerous cross-section studies on Nepal and rural India suggest that firewood
is a normal good for all but the wealthiest households (see in particular Heltberg
et al. (2000); Arnold et al. (2006); Adhikari et al. (2004); Baland et al. (2006);
Gundimeda and Kohlin (2008)). The switch of high incomes households to higher
quality but more expensive substitutes (gas or kerosene) is known as the ‘energy-
25. In the same vein, Nepal et al. show that improved cookstoves do not affect firewood collections in Nepal. This
finding supports the idea of an inelastic demand for firewood.
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ladder’ hypothesis, and is often viewed as an important mechanism behind the EKC
(see Arnold et al, 2003). Recent evidence from China suggests that firewood is
becoming an inferior good in China, with coal being used as a superior alternative
(De´murger and Fournier, 2011). Chaudhuri and Pfaff (2003) find evidence of an
EKC in indoor air pollution, using a cross-sectional analysis of the Pakistan World
Bank LSMS while controlling for village dummies. While richer households tend
to consume more energy, they switch to cleaner and more efficient fuels (kerosene)
which reduces the amount of indoor pollution. Baland et al. (2006) also find that
the demand for firewood in Indian Himalayas to be sensitive to the price of kerosene.
These earlier findings are consistent with our estimations of the Engel curves for
fuelwood but also for expenditures on other fuels. However, the evidence concerning
EKC in preceding literature has been based on cross-sectional analyses, without
checks for robustness with respect to unobserved heterogeneity, functional form or
measurement error. More importantly, the nature of growth has not been examined
in this literature. Closest to our analysis, our previous paper Baland et al. (2010b),
based on a cross section Nepal LSMS of 1995, argued that the structure of productive
assets was a major determinant of firewood collections 26. Our earlier findings there
are strengthened by our main results above.
Our results on CFUGs tend to support the findings of Somanathan et al. (2009)
and, to a lower extent, of Baland et al. (2010a), who showed that the impact of
community forestry in India on the state of the forest was quite limited. While the
presence of CFUG is associated with higher collection times and lower collections,
they do not seem to affect forest biomass in our estimates. Our results are also
consistent with those obtained by Edmonds (2002) who found that the creation of
CFUGs in Nepal tends to reduce fuelwood extraction from forests (see also the recent
surveys by Kanel (2008) and Shyamsundar and Ghate (2011)). The methodology
used in those studies deals explicitly with the possibility of a selection bias in the
creation of the FUGs, a problem that we could not satisfactorily address with the
present data set.
26. See Bluffstone (1995) for similar cross-sectional evidence concerning the role of occupational structure in fire-
wood collections.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Additional tables
Table 2.9 – Descriptive statistics: household level variables
Variable Median Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations
Wood 70 81.75 59.2 0 500 3590
Collection time 3.5 3.75 1.83 .02 12 3344
Fuel expenditures 844.63 2086.1 3920.95 0 57266.64 3590
Consumption exp. (1000NPR2010) 87.52 101.01 63.65 6.98 860.77 3590
Prop. agri. worktime .91 .76 .3 0 1 3590
Big livestock 3 3.3 2.72 0 25 3590
Land owned, ha .46 .64 .71 0 10.38 3590
Household size 5 4.88 2.2 1 17 3590
Prop. children .4 .38 .24 0 1 3590
Avg. education 2.33 2.85 2.89 0 17 3590
= 1 if NFBus 0 .26 .44 0 1 3590
# Migrants 0 .64 .88 0 8 3590
Descriptive statistics for the repeated cross-sections of NLSS in rural villages. All monetary values expressed in NPR2010
Table 2.10 – Descriptive statistics: household level variables in 2003
Variable Median Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations
Wood 72 85.84 55.2 0 360 1474
Collection time 3 3.53 1.71 .02 12 1383
Fuel expenditures 812.14 1379.62 2613.21 0 57266.64 1474
Consumption exp. (1000NPR2010) 64.10 74.92 47.43 6.98 449.37 1474
Prop. agri. worktime .97 .82 .27 0 1 1474
Big livestock 3 3.53 2.92 0 25 1474
Land owned, ha .48 .68 .76 0 9.81 1474
Household size 5 5.02 2.24 1 17 1474
Prop. children .4 .39 .24 0 1 1474
Avg. education 1.67 2.41 2.7 0 13.67 1474
= 1 if NFBus 0 .22 .42 0 1 1474
# Migrants 0 .4 .67 0 6 1474
Descriptive statistics for the repeated cross-sections of NLSS in rural villages. All monetary values expressed in NPR2010.
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Table 2.11 – Descriptive statistics: household level variables in 2010
Variable Median Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations
Wood 60 78.91 61.68 0 500 2116
Collection time 4 3.91 1.9 .5 10 1961
Fuel expenditures 884.47 2578.22 4554.36 0 52486.48 2116
Consumption exp. (1000NPR2010) 106.29 119.19 67.11 9.05 860.77 2116
Prop. agri. worktime .86 .72 .32 0 1 2116
Big livestock 3 3.15 2.56 0 20 2116
Land owned, ha .43 .61 .66 0 10.38 2116
Household size 5 4.79 2.16 1 16 2116
Prop. children .4 .37 .24 0 1 2116
Avg. education 2.67 3.16 2.98 0 17 2116
= 1 if NFBus 0 .28 .45 0 1 2116
# Migrants 1 .8 .97 0 8 2116
Descriptive statistics for the repeated cross-sections of NLSS in rural villages. All monetary values expressed in NPR2010.
Table 2.12 – Descriptive statistics: village level variables
Variable Median Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations
Collection densities 2740.1 3276.17 2471.27 42.41 22515.49 301
∆LAI p90t+1t−1 -1.28 -1.41 2.93 -14.5 6.8 301
∆FPAR p90t+1t−1 -1.67 -1.59 3.67 -13.13 9.89 301
∆LAI p90t+1t−2 -.81 -.89 3.22 -11.57 10.68 301
∆FPAR p90t+1t−2 -.52 -.55 3.64 -11.07 11.33 301
∆LAI winter meant+1t−1 -.42 -.37 1.21 -3.98 5.16 301
∆FPAR winter meant+1t−1 -.16 -.34 2.6 -7.76 9.45 301
∆LAI winter meant+1t−2 -.72 -.63 1.79 -5.59 5.85 301
∆FPAR winter meant+1t−2 -.59 -.12 4.14 -8.95 13.29 301
∆NDV It+1t−1 55.21 59.35 210.76 -615.46 765.33 301
∆NDV It+1t−2 137.88 161.1 198.91 -488.65 769.82 301
LAI 90thpercentilet−1 25.69 25.4 7.37 1.72 50.43 301
LAI 90thpercentilet−2 24.86 24.87 7.26 1.69 45 301
LAI winter averaget−1 14.25 14.34 4.03 .99 29.18 301
LAI winter averaget−2 14.54 14.6 4.25 1.06 31.63 301
FPAR 90thpercentilet−1 67.78 66.25 10.07 8.73 85.29 301
FPAR 90thpercentilet−2 66.86 65.21 9.93 8.5 83.86 301
FPAR winter averaget−1 46.11 45.36 7.60 5.5 63.18 301
FPAR winter averaget−2 45.93 45.13 8.21 5.62 66.77 301
NDVI winter max t−1 7041.65 6898.53 887.98 1327.15 8491.89 301
NDVI winter max t−2 6891.5 6796.78 887.67 1448.34 8377.78 301
Med. collection time 3.38 3.66 1.38 1 8 301
% of Vil. area in FUG .13 .18 .18 0 1 301
Med. time to road 3.13 7.69 11.2 0 80 301
# killings 20km ar. 101 121.65 92.89 0 698 301
Vil. snow cover * 1000 .37 2.92 8.51 0 62.11 301
Rainfall z-score -.45 -.31 .99 -2.32 1.53 301
Monsoon GDD 1327.45 1210.26 396.37 0 1815.29 301
Cooling Degree Days 9.29 161.08 493.23 0 4042.55 301
VDC area in km2 25.6 45.23 88.95 2.36 815.01 301
Village # HH. 917 1076.16 705.14 125 4692 301
Descriptive statistics for the repeated cross-sections of NLSS in rural villages.
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Table 2.13 – Descriptive statistics: village level variables in 2003
Variable Median Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations
Collection densities 2700.06 3315.75 2436.23 42.41 15716.64 123
∆LAI p90t+1t−1 -.64 -.76 2.96 -14.5 6.8 123
∆FPAR p90t+1t−1 -.13 -.22 3.83 -12.78 9.89 123
∆LAI p90t+1t−2 -.5 -.26 3.4 -9.6 10.68 123
∆FPAR p90t+1t−2 .9 .8 3.93 -11.07 11.33 123
∆LAI winter meant+1t−1 -.05 .03 1.25 -3.37 5.16 123
∆FPAR winter meant+1t−1 .83 .76 2.46 -6.18 9.45 123
∆LAI winter meant+1t−2 -.07 .25 1.81 -3.84 5.85 123
∆FPAR winter meant+1t−2 1.94 2.63 4.16 -6.72 13.29 123
∆NDV It+1t−1 41.92 52.97 181.53 -432.45 464.5 123
∆NDV It+1t−2 152.83 170.25 191.57 -231.18 662.25 123
LAI 90thpercentilet−1 24.92 24.48 7.37 1.72 43.56 123
LAI 90thpercentilet−2 24.33 23.98 7.35 1.69 45 123
LAI winter averaget−1 14.22 14.33 4.2 .99 23.71 123
LAI winter averaget−2 14.1 14.1 4.23 1.06 22.59 123
FPAR 90thpercentilet−1 66 64.36 10.68 8.73 83.78 123
FPAR 90thpercentilet−2 64.79 63.34 10.34 8.5 81.33 123
FPAR winter averaget−1 46.11 45.18 8.24 5.5 58.88 123
FPAR winter averaget−2 44.14 43.32 8.62 5.62 56.82 123
NDVI winter max t−1 6945.72 6769.46 951.69 1327.15 8224.18 123
NDVI winter max t−2 6846.12 6652.19 963.39 1448.34 8377.78 123
Med. collection time 3 3.42 1.27 1 8 123
% of Vil. area in FUG .1 .14 .14 0 .64 123
Med. time to road 5 10.65 14.47 .08 80 123
# killings 20km ar. 56 78.67 64.97 0 354 123
Vil. snow cover * 1000 .48 3.36 9.96 0 62.11 123
Rainfall z-score .72 .59 .65 -1.39 1.53 123
Monsoon GDD 1372.6 1249.61 373.98 27.85 1672.61 123
Cooling Degree Days 16.6 178.68 526.18 0 3836.66 123
VDC area in km2 24.79 46.57 96.84 2.36 776.85 123
Village # HH. 837 970.89 557.06 125 3349 123
Descriptive statistics for the repeated cross-sections of NLSS in rural villages.
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Table 2.14 – Descriptive statistics: village level variables in 2010
Variable Median Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations
Collection densities 2745.6 3248.82 2501.67 55.91 22515.49 178
∆LAI p90t+1t−1 -1.56 -1.87 2.84 -13.14 4.18 178
∆FPAR p90t+1t−1 -2.38 -2.53 3.25 -13.13 7.12 178
∆LAI p90t+1t−2 -.9 -1.32 3.02 -11.57 5.75 178
∆FPAR p90t+1t−2 -1.45 -1.49 3.12 -10.89 7.92 178
∆LAI winter meant+1t−1 -.58 -.64 1.1 -3.98 1.6 178
∆FPAR winter meant+1t−1 -1.03 -1.1 2.42 -7.76 4.12 178
∆LAI winter meant+1t−2 -1.23 -1.24 1.52 -5.59 3.11 178
∆FPAR winter meant+1t−2 -1.97 -2.01 2.88 -8.95 6.26 178
∆NDV It+1t−1 66.24 63.76 229.18 -615.46 765.33 178
∆NDV It+1t−2 128.61 154.77 204.12 -488.65 769.82 178
LAI 90thpercentilet−1 26.34 26.04 7.33 4.71 50.43 178
LAI 90thpercentilet−2 25.35 25.49 7.15 3.99 42.57 178
LAI winter averaget−1 14.29 14.35 3.92 2.2 29.18 178
LAI winter averaget−2 14.9 14.94 4.24 2.39 31.63 178
FPAR 90thpercentilet−1 68.91 67.56 9.44 14.11 85.29 178
FPAR 90thpercentilet−2 68.12 66.51 9.44 12.9 83.86 178
FPAR winter averaget−1 46.11 45.48 7.14 8.48 63.18 178
FPAR winter averaget−2 47.45 46.38 7.7 8.52 66.77 178
NDVI winter max t−1 7115.3 6987.72 832.22 1976.44 8491.89 178
NDVI winter max t−2 6986.38 6896.7 819.29 1857.98 8148.56 178
Med. collection time 3.5 3.83 1.43 1 8 178
% of Vil. area in FUG .15 .2 .19 0 1 178
Med. time to road 2.5 5.65 7.61 0 40 178
# killings 20km ar. 126.5 151.35 97.69 0 698 178
Vil. snow cover * 1000 .3 2.61 7.37 0 60.21 178
Rainfall z-score -.9 -.930 .65 -2.32 .96 178
Monsoon GDD 1272.02 1183.07 409.96 0 1815.29 178
Cooling Degree Days 4.46 148.91 470.25 0 4042.55 178
VDC area in km2 25.95 44.31 83.33 2.36 815.01 178
Village # HH. 945.5 1148.89 784.75 240 4692 178
Descriptive statistics for the repeated cross-sections of NLSS in rural villages.
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Table 2.15 – Village median collection time
Median village collection time in hours per bhari
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LAI winter averaget−1 -0.0586∗∗∗ -0.0364 -0.0386
(-2.64) (-1.43) (-1.49)
FPAR winter averaget−1 -0.0359∗∗∗ -0.0255 -0.0269∗
(-3.39) (-1.56) (-1.67)
% of Vil. area in FUG 1.458∗∗∗ 1.306∗∗ 1.467∗∗∗ 1.323∗∗
(2.71) (2.43) (2.74) (2.48)
Med. time to road -0.00126 0.000958 -0.00129 0.00103
(-0.11) (0.08) (-0.11) (0.09)
# killings 20km ar. 0.00197∗ 0.00150 0.00208∗ 0.00162
(1.76) (1.32) (1.87) (1.41)
Vil. elevation: mean 0.000165 0.000173 0.000151 0.000152
(0.52) (0.57) (0.48) (0.49)
Vil. elevation: std. dev. 0.00225∗∗∗ 0.00233∗∗∗ 0.00228∗∗∗ 0.00238∗∗∗
(3.75) (3.71) (3.82) (3.84)
Vil. snow cover -10.61 -11.63 -15.72 -16.72
(-0.27) (-0.29) (-0.39) (-0.41)
Rainfall z-score -0.175 -0.177 -0.176 -0.178
(-1.54) (-1.55) (-1.53) (-1.54)
Monsoon GDD 0.000234 0.000173 0.000264 0.000188
(0.52) (0.40) (0.59) (0.43)
Cooling Degree Days -0.0000833 -0.000120 -0.000116 -0.000164
(-0.13) (-0.18) (-0.18) (-0.24)
Livestock density -0.00121 -0.00116
(-0.62) (-0.59)
Farm land density -0.00400 -0.00415
(-0.85) (-0.87)
Population density 0.00163∗∗ 0.00170∗∗
(1.99) (2.07)
Prop. child. density -0.000523 -0.000244
(-0.06) (-0.03)
Education density -0.00140∗∗ -0.00142∗∗
(-2.06) (-2.09)
Non-farm business density 0.00207 0.00194
(0.39) (0.37)
Out-migrant density 0.00776∗∗∗ 0.00773∗∗∗
(2.60) (2.60)
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Belt-Zone fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 301 301 301 301 301 301
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity – t-statistics in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.16 – Firewood collection
Household firewood collection in number of bharis per year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LAI winter averaget−1 0.351 0.586∗∗ 0.455
(1.46) (2.11) (1.62)
FPAR winter averaget−1 -0.00235 0.217 0.129
(-0.02) (1.12) (0.65)
Med. collection time -3.434∗∗∗ -3.512∗∗∗
(-4.37) (-4.47)
Big livestock 2.980∗∗∗ 2.823∗∗∗ 2.824∗∗∗ 2.992∗∗∗ 2.830∗∗∗ 2.832∗∗∗
(6.99) (6.52) (6.54) (7.01) (6.53) (6.56)
Land owned, ha 4.667∗∗∗ 4.260∗∗∗ 4.007∗∗ 4.661∗∗∗ 4.307∗∗∗ 4.042∗∗
(2.95) (2.66) (2.49) (2.94) (2.68) (2.51)
Household size 6.363∗∗∗ 6.520∗∗∗ 6.546∗∗∗ 6.373∗∗∗ 6.523∗∗∗ 6.548∗∗∗
(11.98) (12.28) (12.38) (11.98) (12.28) (12.38)
Prop. children -2.308 -3.234 -3.291 -2.172 -3.134 -3.181
(-0.56) (-0.78) (-0.80) (-0.52) (-0.75) (-0.77)
Avg. education -2.233∗∗∗ -2.083∗∗∗ -2.177∗∗∗ -2.235∗∗∗ -2.110∗∗∗ -2.203∗∗∗
(-6.99) (-6.40) (-6.70) (-6.98) (-6.48) (-6.78)
= 1 if NFBus -6.411∗∗∗ -6.469∗∗∗ -6.417∗∗∗ -6.465∗∗∗ -6.428∗∗∗ -6.386∗∗∗
(-3.04) (-3.03) (-3.01) (-3.06) (-3.01) (-2.99)
# Migrants -1.271 -1.145 -1.037 -1.216 -1.143 -1.035
(-1.31) (-1.18) (-1.07) (-1.25) (-1.18) (-1.07)
% of Vil. area in FUG -16.09∗∗∗ -11.84∗ -15.77∗∗∗ -11.41∗
(-2.62) (-1.89) (-2.58) (-1.83)
Med. time to road -0.229∗ -0.213∗ -0.232∗ -0.215∗
(-1.83) (-1.69) (-1.84) (-1.70)
# killings 20km ar. 0.000186 0.00618 -0.000671 0.00582
(0.01) (0.43) (-0.05) (0.41)
Vil. snow cover 70.76 97.42 97.53 107.1
(0.12) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18)
Rainfall z-score -0.287 -0.920 -0.0539 -0.706
(-0.17) (-0.54) (-0.03) (-0.41)
Monsoon GDD -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0179∗∗∗ -0.0168∗∗∗ -0.0181∗∗∗
(-4.17) (-4.51) (-4.26) (-4.58)
Cooling Degree Days -0.00559 -0.00516 -0.00594 -0.00560
(-0.55) (-0.51) (-0.59) (-0.56)
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Belt-Zone fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3590 3590 3590 3590 3590 3590
Standard errors clustered at the village level – t-statistics in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.17 – Degradation of forest and firewood collections
∆ LAI winter average ∆ FPAR winter average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Collection densities -0.0000344 -0.0000570∗∗ -0.0000519 -0.0000512 -0.000122∗∗ -0.000128∗
(-1.53) (-2.25) (-1.38) (-0.91) (-2.10) (-1.68)
LAI winter averaget−1 -0.0513∗∗ -0.0642∗∗
(-2.41) (-2.52)
LAI winter averaget−2 -0.142∗∗∗
(-4.68)
FPAR winter averaget−1 -0.0618∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗
(-2.67) (-4.01)
FPAR winter averaget−2 -0.291∗∗∗
(-7.43)
% of Vil. area in FUG 0.437 0.664 0.261 0.783
(0.88) (1.01) (0.27) (0.65)
Med. time to road -0.0142 -0.0336∗∗∗ -0.0342∗ -0.0612∗∗
(-1.65) (-2.69) (-1.80) (-2.33)
# killings 20km ar. -0.000265 0.000694 -0.000509 0.00155
(-0.32) (0.57) (-0.30) (0.67)
Vil. elevation: mean -0.000247 -0.000409 -0.00119∗∗ -0.00183∗∗
(-0.82) (-1.09) (-2.05) (-2.50)
Vil. elevation: std. dev. -0.000529 0.000126 -0.000612 0.000969
(-0.85) (0.15) (-0.45) (0.52)
Vil. snow cover 18.64 82.59 53.07 91.31
(0.41) (1.26) (0.55) (0.66)
Rainfall z-score -0.142 -0.212 -0.255 -0.404
(-1.18) (-1.22) (-1.09) (-1.20)
Monsoon GDD -0.000357 -0.00118∗ -0.00107 -0.00266∗∗
(-0.73) (-1.87) (-1.05) (-2.11)
Cooling Degree Days -0.0000761 -0.00158 -0.000903 -0.00360
(-0.11) (-1.50) (-0.59) (-1.61)
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Belt-Zone fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 301 301 301 301 301 301
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity – t-statistics in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.18 – Engel curves and occupational pattern: fuel expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exp. fuel exp. fuel exp. fuel exp. fuel exp. fuel exp. fuel
Consumption exp. 3.805 -1.233 -7.440
(0.44) (-0.12) (-0.82)
Consumption exp.2 0.00944 0.0388 0.0509
(0.33) (1.01) (1.65)
Prop. agri. worktime -1669.7∗∗ -2375.3∗∗ -2108.5∗∗
(-2.03) (-2.07) (-2.23)
Med. collection time 408.8 7.027 348.8 -62.46
(1.01) (0.03) (0.86) (-0.24)
% of Vil. area in FUG -3479.4 -4605.9
(-0.54) (-0.76)
Med. time to road 145.2∗ 171.7∗∗
(1.82) (2.25)
# killings 20km ar. 2.786 3.327
(0.34) (0.38)
Vil. snow cover -428559.3∗∗ -498498.1∗∗
(-2.19) (-2.45)
Rainfall z-score 88.55 156.3
(0.25) (0.44)
Monsoon GDD 3.862 4.633
(1.28) (1.42)
Cooling Degree Days -1.460 -0.405
(-0.43) (-0.11)
Big livestock -39.43 -36.57 -54.01
(-0.46) (-0.44) (-0.65)
Land owned, ha -389.2∗∗ -366.4∗ -454.7∗∗∗
(-2.19) (-1.93) (-3.21)
Household size 362.7∗ 338.8∗ 325.6∗
(1.83) (1.76) (1.92)
Prop. children -842.8 -707.7 -1172.7
(-0.61) (-0.50) (-0.90)
Avg. education -271.4 -264.1 -274.6
(-1.18) (-1.20) (-1.35)
= 1 if NFBus -265.2 -259.7 -268.7
(-0.68) (-0.62) (-0.64)
# Migrants 107.3 47.63 69.21
(0.73) (0.30) (0.41)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 764 764 764 764 764 764
Standard errors clustered at the village level, t-statistics in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.7.2 Description of variables
This paper uses a broad range of village level variables using remote sensing tech-
nology. This appendix aims at describing data sources, characteristics and treatment.
Biomass measures
The leaf area index (LAI) is a unitless ratio of the leaf area covering a unit of
ground area. The measure of leaf area is adapted for the type of vegetation and
takes into account the difference between leaves and needles. It is a good proxy
of canopy cover, which is especially relevant in our context since fuelwood is often
collected by lopping branches (Baland et al., 2010a). On top of being relevant for
firewood collection, it is also relevant for biomass production since the canopy cover
is one of the determinant of carbon storage in the woody biomass. To construct our
variable, we use the MOD15A2 product. This product, distributed by the NASA
using measures of the Moderate-Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS)
sensor on-board of the Terra satellite, is a eight-day measure of the LAI for every
1km × 1km pixel. For every date of production, we first compute the average LAI
for each Nepali village based on a central bureau of statistics shape file. For the
main regression, we use the 90th percentile within the last twelve months before the
survey as a measure of the current LAI. We opt for the 90th percentile to proxy
the canopy cover peak in the last twelve months while limiting measurement errors.
Another measure used in the appendix is the average LAI in November and December
preceding the survey. This measure intends to focus on two months where the sky
generally is clear and deciduous trees still have their leaves.
The Fraction of Absorbed Photosynthetically Active Radiation (FPAR) measures
the share of radiation that a plant absorb for photosynthesis. The closer to one is
the ratio, the highest the share of radiation in the 0.4-0.7nm spectral range absorbed
by the vegetation for photosynthesis and therefore for growth. This information is
also provided by the NASA in the MOD15A2 product. For our analysis, we process
the FPAR variables in the same way than the LAI variables.
The Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) is the third important vari-
able capturing biomass in our study. This index is define between -1 and 1, with larger
values indicating more vegetation. It is computed as the ratio Near Infra Red −Visible Red
Near Infra Red +Visible Red
.
A pixel covered by a dense forest would not reflect any visible red and the ratio would
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be close to one. To construct our variable, we use the MOD13A2 product distributed
by the NASA on a 16-day basis for every 250m × 250m pixel. The variable we use
in regressions is the village average of the each pixel maximum over last November
and December. This procedure is consistent with the NASA production algorithm
which minimizes measurement by picking the maximum of each pixel over 16 days
to construct the bi-monthly measure.
Within the three variables, the LAI is the best proxy of the canopy cover. The
correlation between LAI on one hand and FPAR and NDVI on the other is relatively
high but not perfect. FPAR and NDVI saturate more rapidly in relatively green
environment (Myneni et al., 2002). For most of our villages, values of FPAR and
NDVI are in the saturation range while LAI varies more. FPAR and NDVI are highly
correlated. FPAR takes into account the whole range of photosynthetically active
radiation while NDVI is based only on visible red and infra red. FPAR is therefore
computationally more intensive. NDVI has already been used in previous studies in
economics. In this study, we focus on NDVI in November and December to avoid the
monsoon greening which is also affected by crops and grass. November corresponds
to the beginning of harvest, a period in which grass and crops are less green while
trees still have their leaves. November and December are also cloud free month in
Nepal which minimize measurement errors.
Additional variables
We also use a broad set of environmental controls derived from satellite imagery.
We retrieve information on snow cover, temperatures and altitude from the NASA,
through the related MOD10A2, MOD11A2 and ASTER GDEM products. Snow
cover is then computed as the share of village area covered by snow during 12 months
before the survey. Temperature data allows us to construct a correlate of biomass
growth, namely the Growing Degree Days during the monsoon and a correlate of fuel
demand, namely the Cooling Degree Days (also named heating degree days in the
literature) over last year. Measures of altitude are standards. Rainfall information
were computed based the Tropical Rainfall Measurement Mission (TRMM) dataset,
the space standard for measuring precipitation over the last 17 years.
Chapter 3
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Abstract 1
This paper presents an analytical framework to understand why some commu-
nities successfully manage their renewable natural resources and some fail to do it.
We develop a N-players, two-period non-cooperative game where a community can
impose some exogenous amount of sanctions. We first show that rules preventing
dynamic inefficiencies may exist even though static inefficiencies still remain. Sec-
ond, an increase in the initial value of the resource may lower the utility of all users.
The model develops a nuanced view on Ostrom conjecture stating that conservation
is harder to implement than sharing.
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What makes the problem [of free-riding] more difficult in a CPR situation than in a public-goods
situation is that unless appropriation problems are resolved, the provision problems may prove
intractable.
Elinor Ostrom, 1990, Governing the Commons
3.1 Introduction
Traditional societies are often depicted as smart managers of their environment
when modern institutions would tend to overuse or even deplete natural resources.
Combined with a growing awareness of environmental issues, this vision frequently
supports plans to hand over natural resource management to local communities.
Nonetheless, this romantic view should be taken up with caution. Although long-
enduring societies have most probably found ways to match their living standards to
the available resources, they are not per se efficient resource managers. For instance,
Diamond (2005) argues that full deforestation of Easter Island has lead to a collapse
of a civilization. This example is clearly far away from sustainable development.
When population density is increasing, and natural resources are becoming scarcer
relatively to the size of the population, common-pool resources (CPR) use has to be,
in some way, restricted (Hardin, 1968). There is now a large consensus over the
potential ability of communities to overcome the tragedy of the commons (Ostrom,
1990). In general successful communities somehow craft rules of resource use and
preservation, implement them and sanction non-compliers. On the other hand, fail-
ure of management is often imputed to a lack of information on the state and the
dynamic of the resource by the communities at stake 2. We want to focus on the
former and abstract from the latter. Indeed, information on resource flows becomes
more and more widespread without necessarily ensuring resource preservation 3
This paper builds a N-players and two-period model of a renewable and ex-
haustible resource extraction to analyse the following conjecture: Ostrom (1990,
p. 31) says that in a CPR it is easier to solve the within period distributional is-
2. Members of traditional societies are assumed to ‘share a magical pre-rationalist view of the world’. Actually,
they consider the flow of resources as determined by some supranatural agencies when their own actions would be
irrelevant to explain fluctuations of the flow (Baland and Platteau, 1996, p. 211)
3. Readers interested by the exploitation of common-property resources under uncertainty can, for instance,
refer to Antoniadou et al. (2013). Kapaun and Quaas (2013) extensively discuss the optimal fishing strategy with
uncertainty on the growth rate through fish life cycle.
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sue than the between period conservation problem 4. Our model therefore incorpo-
rate both static and dynamic inefficiencies. Static inefficiencies refer to an excessive
amount of effort exerted within a time period in the aim of appropriating a re-
source. Dynamic inefficiencies refer to an excessive amount of effort in one time
period which prevent the resource to grow until the next period. The model is the
first to our knowledge to explicitly incorporate dynamic and static inefficiencies in a
regulated CPR context.
Based on this model, we first show that increases in the growth rate of the resource
lower incentives to harvest the resource in the first period and facilitates resource
conservation. For a large enough growth rate, conservation of the resource becomes
the payoff dominant strategy. With moderate growth rate, conservation is not fea-
sible in the absence of exogenous sanctions or reputation building mechanism. The
extraction of the resource with the optimal amount of effort also requires such mech-
anisms. This is true in the model but also in framed field experiments (see e.g. the
trout fishing experiment described by Noussair et al. (2015)).
We then introduce limited sanctions and show that conservation of the resource
between the two periods can be achieved while the players still engage into wasteful
competition in the last period, which clearly violates Ostrom’s conjecture. The
violation of the conjecture happens with a relatively small number of players, a large
enough growth rate and a moderate extraction cost. This suggests that Ostrom
conjecture especially applies to large communities with slow growing resources which
are relatively costly to harvest. It may explain why Huang and Smith (2014) observed
closing days on shrimp fisheries but no regulation preventing congestion in the fishing
season, for example by limiting the number of fishing vessels.
Finally, the comparative statics exercise rationalizes the decision of leaders manag-
ing community forest user groups observed in Rajasthan, India. Indeed, they prefer
to plant mango and bamboo trees over teak. Teak has a much higher value than the
former species but is not planted on community land while often observed on private
lands close to owners’ dwellings. We show that, under limited sanctions, a resource
with a higher initial value or a larger growth rate does not necessary improve players
4. Ostrom is not the sole author raising this point. Baland and Platteau (1996, p. 232) frame it as a question:
[If ] traditional rural societies were apparently able, at least in certain circumstances, to make effective collective
arrangements to solve distributive problems, why should they then have been less efficient in organizing to prevent
depletion/degradation of common-pooled resources?
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welfare and can even decrease their equilibrium payoffs.
The remaining part of the paper is organized in three sections. The second section
gives empirical and theoretical foundations to the model of the third sections. The
last section concludes.
3.2 Related literature and empirical foundations
Since Gordon (1954) and Hardin’s tragedy of the commons (1968), it is well-
known in the literature that rational users of common pool resources (CPR) tend
to over-exploit them. Their argument mostly remains static, without focusing much
on resource conservation and future yields. The analysis of the Great Cod War in
Levhari and Mirman (1980) introduces dynamic inefficiencies on top of the static
over-fishing problem. Hence, the same Cournot-Nash equilibrium repeats over time
and is only affected by the size of the fish stock. There is no discussion of institutional
arrangement to escape the bad equilibrium. Brander and Taylor (1998) later use
the classical Malthusian argument to explain CPR failure in Easter Island, mostly
based on the low growth rate of palm trees on these islands compared to other
Polynesian islands. Authors however acknowledge that institutional variations within
Polynesia might also explain the collapse of Easter Island. One possible change is to
convert unregulated common properties into private resources. This is however not
necessarily beneficial for users (Baland and Bjorvatn, 2013) and sometimes imply
violence (Sekeris, 2014).
Our focus the introduction of exogenous sanctions in an unregulated common
property. We therefore analyse a regulated common property, as defined in Baland
and Platteau (1996) and characterize conditions under which rules and associated
sanctions are sufficient to modify users behaviour. A first layer of rules addresses
‘appropriation problems’ by avoiding rent dissipation and reducing conflicts between
appropriators (Ostrom, 1990). For instance, rotation systems are largely used to
regulate access to scarce resources. (Arnold and Campbell, 1986, p 436) describes
“systems of spatial control” of access to resources ensuring an equal access for all to
both the nearby and the distant areas.
A second level of rules tackles ‘provision problems’ and reduce the effect of today
extraction on tomorrow harvest (Ostrom, 1990). Based on case studies in Uttarak-
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hand, India, Agrawal (1994) describes systems in rural communities where ‘villagers
who designed rules have attempted to match regeneration levels and withdraws by
assessing fodder growth during the year, fixing extraction levels below the annual re-
generation, and metering fodder extraction using simple measures’. An institution
- called panchayat - delegates officials to assess that fodder extraction remain be-
low the threshold determined ex-ante. Fines can eventually be levied on deviating
extractors (Agrawal, 1994, p 272).
It should well be noticed that the existence of one type of rule does not necessarily
involves the existence of the other (Baland and Platteau, 1996, p 210). In the same
study in Uttarakhand, Agrawal (1994) found also villages ‘where panchayats have
not designed rules to match withdrawn [with] regeneration’. In two forest villages
from the six analysed, grass is sold through auctions. The successful bidder has
little incentives to hold extracted quantities down. He can cut the grass so close to
the ground that he damages the roots and harms next year harvest (Agrawal, 1994,
p 272). In this case, even if appropriation rules are designed, little concern is set on
provision rules.
The opposite case is also depicted in the literature, like in North Carolina where
rules on net size, gear type and fishing seasons - partially - prevent to exhaust shrimp
stocks but where the industry would be better off by reducing its total number of
vessels on the water.
Different modelling options have been used to bring rules in CPR extraction games
with static and dynamic inefficiencies. The setup of our model is close to the approach
of Sethi and Somanathan (1996). They however tilt their analyses in the direction of
evolutionary game theory to analyse the evolution of the proportion of cooperative
and self-interested behaviour in a population. They further develop their argument
by including reciprocity in a later paper (Sethi and Somanathan, 2006). We prefer
to stick to self-interested harvesters and assume an exogenous leader. Our approach
then follows the description of motivated leaders of forest users groups in Ethiopia
who do not need to be incentivized to sanction non desirable behaviours (Kosfeld
and Rustagi, 2015). However, while they empirically analyse the characteristics of
leaders successfully managing an homogeneous resource, we collapse leaders ability
in one parameter. By doing so, we focus on resource characteristics and analyse how
they shape incentives of users, and therefore determine sanctions requirements.
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3.3 The model
In this section we present the model and its comparative statics. The one-period
set-up of the model is standard in the common-pool resource literature (Sethi and
Somanathan, 1996; Chung, 1996; Kotchen and Salant, 2011). We extend it to a
two-period model with external enforcement. The model can be applied to any
exhaustible resource which total value changes over time. For the clarity of exposure
and without loss of generality, we frame it as a timber harvest problem.
3.3.1 Model setup
N identical, risk-neutral and perfectly informed woodcutters can log trees in a
forest of size Ft at time t. The initial forest stock is strictly positive, i.e. F1 > 0.
Within each time period, woodcutters simultaneously play. The game lasts two
periods 5. At the end of the first period, total harvested quantities H1 are subtracted
from the initial stock. The remaining stock F1 − H1 grows at rate g and we define
G = 1 + g for ease of notation 6. In general, the forest stock at the end of period t is
F2 = G(F1 −H1).
Aggregate harvest is the sum of individual harvests Ht =
∑N
i=1 hit. Individual
harvest h of player i at time t is a piece-wise linear function of forest stock, own effort
ei and others’ effort e−i. Effort levels are bounded between 0 and e¯, a large enough
level of effort which defines a finite action space for each player. The individual
harvest function is
hit =

eit if
N∑
j=1
ejt < Ft
eit∑N
j=1 ejt
Ft otherwise
(3.1a)
(3.1b)
In the first piece of the harvest function (3.1a), woodcutter i harvests a quantity
equal to his level of effort. The second piece of the harvest function (3.1b) corresponds
to a resource exhaustion situation. If aggregate effort is sufficient to harvest the whole
5. The second period can be interpreted as the second period present value of remaining periods.
6. We assume that the discount factor is equal to 0. Readers interested by this parameter can read the whole
model assuming that G =
(1+g)
(1+δ)
with δ the discount factor.
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resource, the resource stock is fully depleted and divided among loggers with respect
to their relative share of effort 7. The utility Ui of woodcutter i is linear in both
payoff and cost with 0 < c < 1, the cost of effort 8.
Ui(eit, hit(eit, e−it, Ft)) =
2∑
t=1
(hit − ceit) (3.2)
At any point in time and conditionally on harvesting the whole resource, the
efficient level of aggregate effort is such that
∑N
j=1 ejt = Ft. Woodcutters put just
enough effort to deplete the forest. They generate an aggregate payoff equal to
(1− c)Ft. If G > 1, the size of the forest grows over time and it is straightforward to
show that the social optimum of the game is to efficiently deplete the forest in the
last period. It is achieved with effort levels equal to ej1 = 0 and
∑N
j=1 ej2 = GF1. It
yields an aggregate payoff equal to (1− c)GF1. 9
3.3.2 Nash equilibrium
In an open-access setting with simultaneous moves, each player maximizes one’s
utility, taking others’ effort as given. The game is solved by backward induction. In
period two, we know from (3.1a) that woodcutters harvest the forest since c < 1,
and thus
∑N
j=1 ej2 ≥ F2. Considering the second piece of the harvest function (3.1b),
there is one maximization problem for each player:
max
ei2
ui2 = max
ei2
ei2∑N
j=1 ej2
F2 − cei2 (3.3)
Each maximization problem yields one first order condition:
∂ui2
∂ei2
=
∑N
j 6=i ej2
(
∑N
j=1 ej2)
2
F2 − c = 0 (3.4)
By symmetry, it is easy to show that ei2 = ej2 for ∀i, j and for the sake of
simplicity, we drop the individual index.
7. Notice that the first piece of the harvest function can be interpreted as the slope of a strictly monotonic
increasing and concave harvest function at the exhaustion point.
8. c ≥ 1 is a trivial problem where resource extraction does not strictly increase players’ utility.
9. If G ≤ 1, i.e. the value of the resource decreases over time, socially optimal extraction happens in the first
period with effort level
∑N
j=1 ej1 = F1 and ej2 = 0. It generates an aggregate payoff equal to (1− c)F1.
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(N − 1)e
N2e2
F2 = c ⇒ e = (N − 1)
cN2
F2 (3.5)
To remain with an interior solution on (3.1b), we need Ne ≤ F2 which is verified iff
c < N−1
N
, or equivalently iff 1−c > 1
N
. We further work with this additional restriction
in the range of c. Given the second period subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, each
player second period utility is given by the expression:
u2 =
1
N
F2 − N − 1
cN2
F2 ⇒ u2 = 1
N2
F2 (3.6)
It is suboptimal since Nu2 =
F2
N
< (1− c)F2 if c < N−1N .
In period 1, the maximization problem shrinks to
max
ei1
Ui = max
ei1
ui1 + ui2 = max
ei1
hi1 − cei1 + 1
N2
G(F1 −
N∑
j=1
hj1) (3.7)
Combining (3.1a) and (3.7), first period extraction occurs if G < N2(1 − c). It
can thus occur although G > 1, which is not the socially efficient state. If so,∑N
i=1 ei1 ≥ F1 and (3.1b) is the relevant piece of the extraction function, which
corresponds to resource exhaustion. By a similar argument than in the second period
subgame, the equilibrium level of effort in the first period is e1 =
(N−1)F1
N2c
. It means
that the resource is fully exhausted in the first period and woodcutters achieve a
payoff equal to Ui =
F1
N2
.
To summarize, if G < N2(1 − c) then the game has one pure Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium with realized individual payoff equal to F1
N2
and associated strategy
e1 =
(N−1)F1
N2c
and e2 = 0. It is a pure prisoners’ dilemma. If G ≥ N2(1 − c) then
the game has one more Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium with associated strategy
e1 = 0 and e2 =
(N−1)GF1
N2c
. For each player, it yields a payoff equal to GF1
N2
, bearing
in mind that H1 = 0, so that F2 = GF1. This strategy is payoff-dominant while the
previous one is risk-dominant. Notice that when G is large the game combines both
characteristics of the prisoners’ dilemma and of the stag hunt.
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3.3.3 Static and dynamic inefficiencies
The aggregate payoff differential between the first best and the payoff-dominated
Nash equilibrium is equal to (1 − c)GF1 − F1N . Inefficiencies result both from the
absence of resource conservation between periods and from excessive harvesting effort
by woodcutters. Two second bests are worth discussing.
First, let us define sharing as a strategy where all players restrain their effort and
share the resource with effort level Ft
N
, conditionally on others playing Ft
N
. Sharing
allows players to extract the resource at one point in time with the efficient level
of effort. Compared to sharing, the Nash Equilibrium generates aggregate within
period inefficiency equal to (1− c)Ft− FtN = (N−1N − c)Ft > 0. Sharing in t is however
not an equilibrium since the best response to e−it = FtN is eit =
(√
N−1
Nc
− N−1
N
)
Ft
and generates a net additional benefit equal to dt = ωFt, the net deviation payoff
from period t sharing. ω therefore represent the net share of the resource value that a
player gains when he deviates from sharing. The value of ω is an increasing function
of the number of players N and a decreasing function of the cost of effort c, with
ω = N−1
N
+ c − 2√c
√
N−1
N
(shown in the appendix). In Ostrom’s terminology dt is
the source of a typical appropriation problem referring to static inefficiencies.
Second, let us define conservation as a strategy where players refrain from
extracting in the first period by playing e1 = 0, conditionally on others exerting no
effort at all. Conservation means that the forest grows between the two periods. If
G < N2(1−c), this strategy is not necessarily an equilibrium since a deviating player
could extract the whole resource on his own in the first period and gain a net deviation
payoff from conservation equal to dc = (1− c− GN2 )F1 (proof in the appendix 10. By
extracting the resource in the first period, players forego a higher second period
payoff and generate dynamic inefficiencies. Ostrom refers to inefficiencies related to
the inter-temporal evolution of the resource as provision problems.
Let us finally define B, the set of tuples (c,N,G) for which incentives to deviate
from first period sharing and conservation are equal. Any tuple belonging to B is
10. It is obvious that if G is too large given c, dc can be negative. Or, equivalently, there exist combinations of c
and G such that dc < 0
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such that d1 = dc, or more formally
B =
{
(c,N,G) : G = ωN2, 0 < c <
N − 1
N
, N,G ∈ R+
}
(3.8)
Proposition 3.1. On incentives to deviate from socially desirable strategies:
1. if a tuple (c, n,G) belongs to the strict upper(lower)-contour set of B, then the
net deviation payoff from first period sharing is strictly smaller (larger) than
the net deviation payoff from conservation, that is d1 < dc (d1 > dc).
2. if the growth rate is larger than a threshold, then there is no benefit of deviating
from conservation. Formally if G ≥ N2(1− c), then dc ≤ 0 ≤ d1
dc < 0 < d1
0 < d1 < dc
0 < dc < d1
1
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Cost parameter c
4−4c 2−8c+4√2c
Summary of proposition 1
Figure 3.1 – Map of proposition 1
Figure 3.1 maps proposition 3.1 for two players. First, the dashed line maps the
contour set B where provision problems are just equal to appropriation problems.
Below the dashed line, in the light grey area, players have more incentives to deviate
from conservation than from sharing. Above the dashed line, the growth rate is suf-
ficiently large to reduce incentives to deviate from conservation and these incentives
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become smaller than incentives to deviate from sharing. In the white area, deviation
from conservation is no more beneficial. It corresponds to the second part of propo-
sition 3.1. Future gains are so high that the second period Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium payoff is larger than the payoff associated to a monopolistic extraction
in the first period. Conservation is a matter of pure coordination. In this case, the
first period appropriation problem is not relevant.
3.3.4 Governing the commons
In a purely decentralized context, without coordination device nor reputation
building mechanisms, there is no way to escape the tragedy of the commons. This
is true in theory but also has relevance in the field as shown in (Noussair et al.,
2015). However, as put forward by Ostrom (1990), Baland and Platteau (1996) and
others, communities are able to design rules, monitor individual actions and impose
sanctions to members who deviate from a given behaviour.
We define the conditional sanction σs as a direct payoff loss incurred by any player
deviating from strategy s. σs is the minimal level of conditional sanctions required
such that s is a credible strategy, that is σs is sufficient to deter any player from
deviating from the strategy s. Sanctions in a given game are bounded such that
0 ≤ σ ≤ σ¯. σ¯ is predetermined and does not change during the game 11. It refers to
the monitoring and sanctioning technology available in the community 12. We define
a rule R as a strategy s and an associated conditional sanction σs. A rule R{s;σs}
is feasible if σs ≤ σ¯. For the sake of simplicity, we represent the community by a
benevolent planner which sets rules, monitor actions and eventually impose sanctions.
From proposition 3.1, we know that the maximal benefit of deviating from first
period sharing is d1. Therefore, R1 =
{
s1 ≡
[
e1 =
F1
N
, e2 = 0
]
;σs1 = d1
}
implements
first period sharing.
Assuming a Nash solution in the second period, the maximal benefit of deviating
from conservation is dc and Rc =
{
sc ≡
[
e1 = 0, e2 =
GF1
N2c
]
;σsc = dc
}
implements
conservation.
11. We assume σ¯ as predetermined level of effective sanctions since norms often evolve a a slower pace then the
environment.
12. σ¯ can be low if outside valuable options exist, while it can be very high if exclusion from the group is very
costly or if breaking the rule fills the offender with infinite remorse and regrets. Readers interested in imperfect
monitoring can read σ¯ as the expected sanctions in a game with risk-neutral agents.
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Corollary 3.1. On Ostrom conjecture:
If σ¯ > σs2, then Ostrom conjecture does not hold in the upper-contour set of B
and is weakly valid otherwise.
This corollary states that, for any tuple in the upper-contour set of B, it is always
possible to find a level of sanctions σ < σ¯, such that conservation (Rc) is feasible
while first period sharing (R1) is not. This is true even if second period sharing is
not feasible, that is if σ2 > σ¯.
The general intuition behind this corollary lies in players anticipations of second
period gains when they decide on their first period moves. If the growth rate is
sufficiently large, second period payoff is big enough to mitigate individual incen-
tives to extract in the first period, even if a player could be the sole first period
harvester. Small sanctions are then sufficient to deter strictly positive first period
effort levels, even if these sanctions are not sufficient to sustain an efficient extrac-
tion when extraction takes place. The violation of Ostrom conjecture is visible at
the equilibrium if dc < σ¯ < d1 ≤ d2 which corresponds to the dark grey and white
areas in figure 3.1. Under this conditions, players conserve the resource between the
two periods but play Nash in the second period and therefore put too much effort
to harvest the resource. In Ostrom’s terminology, the provision problem is fixed but
the appropriation problem remains open.
Notice that the parameter space in which Ostrom conjecture holds increases as
the number of players goes up. Intuitively, if the number of players is large, the
resource must be shared between many and incentives are diluted. First period
harvest becomes more and more attractive for any woodcutter if others conserve.
On the contrary, for games with few players, static inefficiencies may remain while
dynamic inefficiencies would disappear.
To achieve the first best, it is both necessary to deter players from harvesting
in the first period and prevent excessive effort in the second period. Conditionally
on conservation, d2 is the maximal benefit of deviating from second period sharing.
Conditionally on second period sharing, the maximal benefit of deviating from con-
servation is dc|s2 = (1− c)F1 − (1− c)GF1N = (1− c)(1− GN )F1. This value is smaller
than dc because the second period subgame payoff becomes larger. Sanctions have
therefore to be higher than the two thresholds to achieve the first best, with asso-
ciated rule R? = {s? ≡ [e1 = 0, e2 = GF1N ] ;σs? = max(dc|s2, d2)}. Notice that it is
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possible to find σ¯ such that the first best cannot be implemented, despite being able
to share the resource in the second period. It is the case when dc|s2 > d2. Written
in terms of growth rate, this inequality states that G < (1−c)N
ωN+1+c
. In this case, first
period sharing is the sole feasible improvement with respect to the Nash outcome.
Last, if σ¯ > σs? , the violation of Ostrom conjecture is never apparent because shar-
ing will always be implemented. However if the growth rate is large enough, second
period sharing requires more sanctions than conservation.
3.3.5 Comparative statics
Assuming a given σ¯, this subsection derives comparative statics for each resource
(G,F1). We first map the different equilibrium strategies, then reinterpret Ostrom
conjecture and finally demonstrate that a more valuable resource does not necessary
imply a higher payoff for harvesters.
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Figure 3.2 – Equilibrium strategies with 0 < σ¯ < ∞ statics as a function of resource initial value
F1 and growth G.
Figure 3.2 maps the feasible rule achieving the largest payoff given σ¯ for every
values F1 and growth G of a potential resource. The four graphs correspond to
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different harvest cost c and the illustration corresponds to a two players game.
By definition, R? always achieves the first best. It is feasible only if G ≤ σ¯
ωF1
and
G ≥ N − Nσ¯
(1−c)F1 . It corresponds to the intermediate grey area in figure 3.2.
First period sharing is feasible as long as F1 ≤ σ¯ω . R1 is chosen over Rc if
(1−c)F1
N
> GF1
N2
, which yields the condition G < (1− c)N . This is the darker grey area
in figure 3.2.
Second period Nash is feasible when G ≥ N2(1− c− σ¯
F1
) and is chosen as soon as
G ≥ (1 − c)N . It matches with resources in the white area of figure 3.2. This area
also corresponds to resources for which Ostrom conjecture does not hold or is not
precise enough.
The white area is divided in two parts by a dashed line. At G = N2(1 − c) the
growth rate is just sufficient to reduce the benefit of deviating from conservation
to 0. Above this threshold, sanctions are not necessary to reach the second period
extraction subgame and conservation is a matter of pure coordination. Appropriation
problems do not have to be solved before tackling the provision problem.
In the white area below the dashed line, sanctions are necessary to prevent first
period extraction. Notice that there exist a whole range of resources for which first
period sharing is feasible but is not chosen. For all values F1 ≤ σ¯ω , R1 is feasible
but, in the white area, conservation yields a higher payoff than first period sharing.
Anyway, R1 is no more feasible if the initial value of the resource lies above the
last threshold. Despite this impossibility, the existence of sanctions allow resource
conservation in the white area. It means that sanctions prevent dynamic inefficiencies
while static inefficiencies remain. This is a clear violation of Ostrom conjecture.
Figure 3.2 also emphasize the role of c. A larger cost c raises the marginal cost
of the appropriation effort and decrease extraction benefit. Both R1 and R2 require
less sanctions. Increasing the number of players has similar consequences. It has no
effect on the cost of appropriation but it lowers the benefit of deviation through the
reduction of the initial share for each player in the total effort.
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Based on the rule achieving the highest possible payoff for each resource (G;F1),
we derive the following proposition:
Corollary 3.2. More is not always better:
If 0 < σ¯ < ∞, there always exists some resources (G;F1) which generate lower
payoffs for players than less valuable resources (G′;F ′1) with G
′ ≤ G or F ′1 ≤ F1 and
at least one inequality binding.
Proof. Suppose that R1 is just feasible and achieves the highest feasible payoff for
the resource (G;F1). By definition, it means that d1 − σ¯ = 0. At this frontier,
F1 =
σ¯
ω
. Since sharing in the first period is just feasible, players’ payoff are equal to
uMaxS1i =
(1−c)σ¯
ωN
. Another resource F ′1 = F1 + ε, with ε strictly positive and small,
would not allow the implementation of R1. First period Nash extraction would be
the only possible outcome. Players utility would then be ui =
σ¯+ε
ωN2
< uMaxS1i . To
achieve a larger payoff than uMaxS1i under first period Nash, the value of the resource
has to be at least equal to F ′ ≥ N(1−c)σ¯
ω
.
Rc is just feasible if dc − σ¯ = 0. Rewritten in terms of resource value it yields
F1 =
σ¯
1−c− G
N2
. F1 generates individual payoffs such that u
Nash2
i =
Gσ¯
N2(1−c− G
N2
)
. A
slightly more valuable resource F ′1 = F1 + ε would prevent the implementation of
conservation followed by Nash extraction in the second period. Players would then
extract in the first period and achieve a strictly lower payoff as long as F ′1 <
Gσ¯
1−c− G
N2
.
A similar argument can be repeated at the frontier of the first best implementa-
tion. At the frontier where GF1 =
σ¯
ω
, where R? is just feasible, players achieve a
maximal feasible payoff u? = (1−c)σ¯
ωN
. At the frontier of the first best implementation,
where conservation binds, which is defined by the relation (1− c)(1− G
N
)F1− σ¯ = 0,
payoffs are equal to u? = Gσ¯
N−G . So, at the first of the two frontiers, players need at
least a resource such that GF1 ≥ N(1−c)σ¯ω if conservation remains feasible and F1 > σ¯ω
if first period sharing is implemented. At the second frontier, the growth rate is so
low that first period sharing is the second best option. Under R1, a resource of value
F1 ≥ NGσ¯(1−c)(N−G) is necessary to yield a payoff at least equal to the highest feasible
first best payoff.
This corollary says that if enforcement is imperfect, a resource which is apparently
more valuable can yield a lower utility for harvesters. This is not the case if sanctions
do not exist or if they are infinite. Without sanctions, payoffs under Nash always
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increase as the growth rate G or the initial value of the resource F1 go up. With
infinite sanctions, the first best is always implemented and payoffs under the first
best always increase in the two arguments.
In the presence of limited enforcement, small increases of the growth rate or of the
resource value may lead to switch from one equilibrium to another, less desirable,
equilibrium. Small increases in the resource value or growth rate raise incentives
to deviate from sharing and conservation by a small margin. Because sanctions are
bounded, this might be sufficient to raise the deviation benefit above the value of
sanctions and prevent the enforcement of the rule. As a consequence, there is switch
from a more desirable to less desirable equilibrium with sanctions and users’ payoff
decline.
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Figure 3.3 – When more can be worse: welfare comparison of equilibrium strategies with limited
sanctions.
Figure 3.3 illustrate proposition 3.2. It maps in grey all combinations (G;F1)
which generate individual payoffs lower than another resource (G′;F ′1) with G
′ ≤ G
or F ′1 ≤ F1 and at least one inequality binding. The four graphs consider different
cost parameters.
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3.3.6 Discussion
This basic model allows understanding how rules can help a community to over-
come the tragedy of the commons in a dynamic setting. First, we show that, as the
growth rate of a resource increases, the relative size of incentives to deviate from
sharing decreases compared to incentives to deviate from conservation. When the
growth rate is large enough, players even do not have any benefit to deviate from con-
servation. The benefit to deviate from conservation also decreases as the extraction
cost goes up since it reduces the value of harvesting. Conservation becomes more
difficult as the number of players rises since the value of harvesting with competition
in the first period increase.
To escape from the prisoners’ dilemma, rules and associated sanctions are neces-
sary. For very large resource growth rates, the only relevant issue is the ability of the
community to solve future static inefficiencies, i.e. to prevent non-cooperative ex-
traction in the second period. For intermediate growth rates, we show that it is easier
to implement a conservation rule than to immediately share the resource. Dynamic
inefficiencies are fully overcome even though static inefficiencies partly remain. For
small growth rates, communities with a relatively low ability to implement sanctions
can rationally craft rules which lead to a first period sharing equilibrium even if the
community is well aware that second period sharing is the social optimum.
The comparative static exercise has broad practical implications. In our model
we always consider that the value of the resource and its growth rate are exogenously
determined. However, in practice, field observations report that players may have
some influence on the initial investment. An anecdotal evidence collected during
field visits in Udaipur district, Rajasthan, India, in August 2012 nicely illustrates
this point. Some community forest user groups refrain from planting teak despite
its very high value and intermediate growth rate. They prefer to plant species like
mango or bamboo trees. Group leaders justify their investment decision by their
anticipations of members’ future behaviour. They point out that the community
of users will not be able to prevent its members from felling teak down before it
gets mature, precisely because its value is too large. At the opposite, bamboo trees
grow faster and have a lower initial value. Rules and associated effective sanctions
prevailing in the group are sufficient to deter early logging. It is even more salient
with mango trees. Mango timber in itself is not worth a lot. It is then relatively
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easy to implement conservation and sharing rules of mango fruits, the value of which
increases sharply in a short period of time as fruits get mature.
The question is then why, empirically, achieving conservation often appears more
difficult than solving the appropriation problem. The role of the number of players,
the characteristics of the resource and the cost of extraction explicit appear in the
model. Imperfect information is often cited as an argument against conservation.
This is true as shown Antoniadou et al. (2013) for instance, however the spread of
scientific knowledge decrease the salience of this argument. Higher inequalities may
also make conservation more difficult (Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan, 2002) in spite
of the mitigating effect of inequalities on static inefficiencies.
On top of these positive implications, the model also provides some normative
insights. If more is always better in failed and in highly effective communities, we
show that more can be worse in the presence of a moderately effective commu-
nity. When sanctions are limited, larger resource growth rate or initial value can
lead to a change of equilibrium strategies and consequently to a drop of players’
utility. The wide-range causes of such changes include natural resource improved
management techniques, climate change consequences, new investment possibilities,
improved market access, resource booms. The ability to implement sanctions is key
to understand that two communities managing the same resource in the same way
might react very differently following an increase in the value of the resource. One
community can improve its members’ livelihoods while in the other, everyone might
end up worse off. From a policy perspective, one should take care while designing
external interventions. The sole focus on technical solutions might not be sufficient
and special caution should also be given to institutional reinforcement.
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3.4 Conclusion
This article investigates determinants of successful management in a regulated
common property, compare to the unregulated case. We construct a N-players, two
period non-cooperative game with a growing resource to emphasize the difference be-
tween appropriation and preservation issues. Appropriation problems refer to static
inefficiency and can be solved by sharing the resource within a time period. Preser-
vation problems tackle the problem of natural resource conservation, closely related
to dynamic inefficiencies. As broadly investigated in the literature on rent-seeking,
competing players exert excessive effort and generate social waste. We also show
that, for low and moderate growth rates, competition lead to dynamic inefficiencies.
Players extract too early and prevent themselves to reach a higher second period
payoff.
Nevertheless, it appears from field studies that communities are not doomed to
mismanage their resources and to fall in the well documented tragedy of the commons.
Some craft rules, monitor and sanction users. We show that it is not necessarily easier
for a community to have credible appropriation rules than to set up preservation
rules. For intermediate growth rate and large growth rate our model explains why
users may protect a resource until a certain point and then fight to appropriate it.
This paper also stresses that, under imperfect institutions, a more valuable re-
source can actually decrease players’ welfare. This result does not hold in purely
decentralized context nor with perfect institutions. It is therefore crucial to correctly
understand the ability of a group to solve collective action problems while designing
external interventions. Rules may have a limited scope and successful management
is also conditional on resource characteristics. Something important to keep in mind,
especially when time is needed to achieve changes within institutions.
3.5. APPENDIX 125
3.5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let’s first prove that dt = (
N−1
N
+ c− 2√c
√
N−1
N
)Ft. Suppose that all players but
i play e?−it =
Ft
N
. The maximization problem of player i becomes
max
eit
uit = max
eit
eit
eit + (N − 1)e?−it
Ft − ceit (3.9)
This yields the first order condition for player i:
∂uit
∂eit
=
(N − 1)e?−it
(eit + (N − 1)e?−it)2
Ft − c = 0 (3.10)
(N−1)Ft
N[
eit +
(N−1)Ft
N
]2Ft − c = 0
N − 1
cN
F 2t =
[
eit +
(N − 1)Ft
N
]2
√
N − 1
cN
Ft = eit +
(N − 1)
N
Ft
eit =
(√
N − 1
cN
− N − 1
N
)
Ft (3.11)
Knowing the best response of player i to e?−it =
Ft
N
, we can compute the highest
utility level achievable by a player deviating from sharing:
uit =

√
N−1
cN
− N−1
N√
N−1
cN
− N−1
N
+ N−1
N
− c
√
N − 1
cN
+ c
N − 1
N
Ft (3.12)
uit =

√
N−1
cN
− N−1
N
− cN−1
cN
+ cN−1
N
√
N−1
cN√
N−1
cN
Ft
126 CHAPTER 3. SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF COMMUNITIES
uit =
[
1− 2N − 1
N
√
cN
N − 1 − c
N − 1
N
]
Ft
uit =
[
1 + c
N − 1
N
− 2√c
√
N − 1
N
]
Ft (3.13)
To know the net benefit of deviating from sharing, the last step is to compare the
deviation payoff with the sharing payoff.
dt =
[
1 + c
N − 1
N
− 2√c
√
N − 1
N
]
Ft − (1− c)Ft
N
(3.14)
dt =
[
N + cN − c− 1 + c
N
− 2√c
√
N − 1
N
]
Ft
dt =
(
N − 1
N
+ c− 2√c
√
N − 1
N
)
Ft (3.15)
Let’s then prove that dc =
(
1− c− G
N2
)
F1. Suppose that all players but i do
not extract in the first period and play Nash in the second period. They therefore
opt for a strategy
(
e−i1 = 0; e−i2 = GF1cN2
)
. Player i first period maximization problem
shrinks to
max
ei1
ui = max
ei1
ei1 − cei1 + G(F1 − ei1)
N2
(3.16)
It means that i harvests the resource in the first period only if 1 − c − G
N2
> 0,
which can be rewritten as G < (1− c)N2. The net benefit of harvesting in the first
period is then equal to the whole surplus that i gets by harvesting the whole resource
in the first period minus what i would have received if abstaining from extracting in
t = 1 and playing Nash in t = 2.
dc = (1− c)F1 − GF1
N2
=⇒ dc =
(
1− c− G
N2
)
F1 (3.17)
It is straightforward to modify the last proof assuming that second period sharing
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is implemented. The net benefit of harvesting in the the first period is then equal to
ui − uShare2i = (1− c)F0 −
(1− c)GF0
N
=⇒ dc|s2 = (1− c)(1−
G
N
)F1 (3.18)
The contour set B is the set of tuples (c,N,G) for which dc = d1. This equality
can be written as(
1− c− G
N2
)
F1 =
(
N − 1
N
+ c− 2√c
√
N − 1
N
)
F1 (3.19)
or, stated in terms of resource growth rate,
G = N − 2N2c+ 2N2√c
√
N − 1
N
(3.20)
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Abstract 1
We study short-run and long-run effects of a government subsidy to private non-
profit ownership of public good projects. In a simple model, we show that the sub-
sidy increases the prices of project assets in the short run; however, the effect does
not persist and prices decline in the long run. This happens because the subsidy
temporarily relaxes the resource constraint of non-profit organizations, which allows
them to engage in supply-expanding activities. We test this prediction using a unique
dataset that we have constructed from Belgian notarial land-transaction records and
exploiting a policy reform in public subsidies for land purchases by non-profits aim-
ing at creating privately-owned natural reserves. Using the MS-estimation method
(Maronna and Yohai, 2000) robust to outliers, we also provide a methodological
contribution to the analysis of markets with quasi-donations.
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Protected areas; Conservation
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4.1 Introduction
Non-profit organizations are key providers of public goods in modern economies.
67 per cent of in-patient hospitals in the United States are non-profits, and so are
all orchestra and opera theatres in the United Kingdom and Japan (Bilodeau and
Steinberg, 2006). In the OECD countries, on average, 7.5 per cent of economically
active population is employed in the non-profit sector, and for some countries (Bel-
gium, Netherlands, Canada, U.K., Ireland) this share exceeds 10 per cent (Salamon,
2010). Non-profits provide public goods in such diverse sectors as education, health,
environment, social protection, arts and culture, and human rights. The key issue is,
therefore, whether non-profit provision (and ownership of key assets used in provi-
sion) of public goods is socially desirable. The seminal paper by Besley and Ghatak
(2001) provides the first answer to this question: they argue that the ownership of
such assets should be given to the party (i.e. to the government or to the non-profit
organization) that has the highest valuation of the public good, regardless whose
investment increases more the value of the public-good project.
However, this general normative analysis does not provide guidance about how
the transfer of ownership of public goods to non-profits (in case these have the highest
valuation) should be organized. This is a fundamental policy question, given that
governments dispose of a rich set of tools that can affect the incentives for the non-
profit ownership of assets used for public good provision. These tools include, among
others, subsidies for purchase of assets from private holders, direct grants to non-
profits, tax exemptions to private sellers, etc. Designing an effective policy requires,
first of all, understanding - theoretically and empirically - the effects of such policies
on the behaviour of non-profits and the outcomes on the asset markets. Economists’
current knowledge in this area is extremely limited, in particular, at the level of
a market. Insights from standard microeconomic analysis of markets provide only
limited answers, given that nonprofits possibly react to financial incentives in ways
which are systematically different from those of their for-profit counterparts.
A crucial difference between for-profit and non-profit organizations is that non-
profits are legally barred from redistributing profits. This “non-distribution con-
straint” first formally introduced by Hansmann (1980), is at the heart of some of
the main particularities of the non-profit sector. Non-profits are predominant in the
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provision of goods characterized by a high non-contractible quality content, such as
health, the arts, or biodiversity (Kuan, 2001; Castaneda et al., 2008). Asymme-
tries of information make most for-profits unreliable in the delivery of these goods
characterized by unmeasurable quality. Thus, users prefer to rely on organizations
whose members are motivated by something else than profit maximization. Non-
profits have instead “missions”, which usually differ between organizations: each has
a particular appraisal of the quality form and content that should be embedded in
the public good they provide. Given this heterogeneity, missions can more or less
accurately mirror the preferences of donors. Nonprofits can improve the matching
of their mission with the donor’s preferences by either adapting their mission, or
by persuading donors of the soundness of it (Rose-Ackerman, 1982; Aldashev and
Verdier, 2010).
In this paper, we evaluate the short-run and long-run effects of a government
subsidy to non-profit ownership of assets used in public-good projects. We first
develop a dynamic model of a market for assets populated by competing non-profits.
The market is decentralized and finding each new potential asset requires some search
(prospecting) efforts by the nonprofit. The nonprofit can persuade, at a cost, sellers
into contributing to the mission by either donating or accepting a lower payment for
the asset they sell. A good performance by a nonprofit at any given period attracts
volunteer labour in subsequent periods. This creates a virtuous circle because new
volunteers engage in new prospecting efforts, which expand supply. We show that the
introduction of a subsidy starts such a virtuous circle. Initially, the subsidy increases
units exchanged and prices paid. The increase in purchased quantities immediately
after the shock attracts more volunteer labour, which in turn prospects to increase
supply. At the steady state, a permanent subsidy permanently increases purchased
quantities, while prices fall back to their pre-subsidy levels.
Next, we test these predictions using a unique dataset that we have constructed
from notarial land-purchasing acts in the Walloon region of Belgium. This dataset
includes all the land purchases by environmental conservation non-profits in Walloon
region between 1950 and 1994. Importantly, our data allows us to study the effect of
the policy reform undertaken in 1986, when the regional government introduced an ad
valorem subsidy to land purchase by non-profits. The non-contractible quality can-
not – by definition – be measured; however, other main predictions of the model are
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testable. We find that exchanged quantities increase substantially, while the effect on
the asset price varies over time, in the way predicted by our model: the subsidy cre-
ates a sharp price increase in the short-run, followed by a gradual decline of the land
prices. We argue that this occurs because the subsidy makes tradable goods (land)
relatively cheaper than non-tradable assets (time), inducing non-profits to reallocate
their time/human resources from quality-improving efforts into quantity-expanding
activities, namely fundraising and prospecting activities. Because the reallocation
of internal resources takes some time, the subsidy initially creates a demand shock
by increasing the purchasing power of the nonprofits, and over time prices gradually
decrease due to the reallocation of non-tradable resources into searching and nego-
tiating activities. This non-linear trend in prices is empirically identified thanks to
the fact that the introduction of the subsidy was unexpected by market participants,
and because comparable land unaffected by the reform did not exhibit any similar
pattern regarding their prices. In addition, while we cannot directly observe quality,
the data shows that nonprofits for which quantity-based objectives are emphasized
in their mission statements capture a significantly more important share of the mar-
ket, compared to nonprofits emphasizing quality-based objectives in their mission
statements.
Our paper also makes a methodological contribution to the empirical analysis
of markets for assets with a public-good component. A broad range of markets in
which non-profits represent the buyer side fall into this category: the markets for
works of art, labour markets for jobs in the non-profit sector, etc. In such markets,
the motivation of actors on the supply side often consists of a mix of profit-oriented
and altruistic elements, and thus such actors are often willing to sell the assets at
a reduced or symbolic price or donate them. Data from such markets thus usually
contain numerous observations that are considered as outliers. We show that by the
use of an appropriate estimator robust to outliers (the MS-estimator, developed by
Maronna and Yohai, 2000), one can estimate the trends in market outcomes much
more accurately.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our the-
oretical model of a market for assets and derives testable predictions. Section 3
describes the context from which our data is collected, provides a short history of
natural reserves in the Walloon region and describes the dataset. Section 4 presents
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our identification strategy, the descriptive statistics and the results of the regres-
sion analysis. Section 5 discusses the interpretation of our empirical results and the
methodological contribution. Section 6 highlights the broader implications of our
findings and concludes.
4.2 Model
During each period t, there is a unit size continuum of size k potential sellers,
each endowed with one unit of an asset required for the production of a public
good. A set of i ∈ N non-profit Organizations (NPOs) are potentially interested in
purchasing such assets. The market is decentralized, and NPOs have to exert a time-
consuming effort nit to find, bargain and match with potential sellers. For simplicity,
suppose that that k is sufficiently large, or prospecting sufficiently inefficient, for
the probability of a seller being discovered by more than one NPO simultaneously
is negligible. Define nit as the prospecting effort exerted by each NPO, expressed
in units of time. This effort has two effects: first, it allows the NPO to discover
nit potential sellers, and secondly, it persuades discovered sellers to accept a lower
price for their asset. This second effect arises through bargaining and persuasion.
Conditional on being discovered, a seller trades if the price pikt proposed by the NPO
is above her reservation price γk.
Suppose that γk follows a uniform distribution defined as follows:
γk v U
[
0,
1
nit
.
]
While NPOs do not know the exact reservation price of the sellers, prospecting
efforts narrow its distribution. Conditionally on discovering a seller, trade occurs
with probability nitp
ik
t . Given that the NPO discovers n
i
t potential sellers, the supply
that i faces is
qit =
∫
k
nit
2
pikt dk = n
i
t
2
pit
in which qit are the units of asset supplied at t, and p
i
t denotes the average price
paid by NPO i. Note that the square exponent of the prospecting efforts captures
the double dividend of discovering sellers, and reducing expected reservation prices.
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The inverse supply function writes
pit =
qit
nit
2 . (4.1)
The mission of each non-profit is the provision of a public good which has a
quantity and a quality dimension. The public good uses the aforementioned qti assets
as an input. Let us denote the quantity and the quality of the public good provided
by non-profit i with qi and xi. Each non-profit manager has v
i
t units of volunteer
labour time that she allocates between improving the quality of the public good
(xit), conducting fundraising activities (f
i
t ), and searching/prospecting for the assets
necessary to the production of the public good (nit). Given the legal non-profit status,
the organizations cannot distribute earnings amongst its members. The optimization
problem of non-profit i at period t is:
max
{qit,xit,nit,f it}
qitx
i
t
ωi
[Objective function]
s.t vit ≥ xit + f it + nit [Time constraint]
(1− σ)pitqit ≤ µf it [Non-distribution constraint]
with pit = q
i
t/n
i
t
2
. Each NPO pursues the double objective of increasing the
quantity and quality of the public good it produces, weighted by ωi in the Cobb-
Douglas objective function. ωi increases with the intrinsic preference for the quality
dimension. Notice that we implicitly assume that time devoted to improve quality
during period t applies only to assets purchased during this period; stocks of assets
purchased in previous periods have already benefited from quality improvements and
remain unchanged in subsequent periods. A simple way of justifying this assumption
is by stating that available volunteer hours vit are net of time resources sunk in the
management of previously purchased lands. The Cobb-Douglas objective function
prevents that changes in the price of assets directly modify the allocation of volun-
teer time: this choice is made to prevent our results from being explained by simple
substitution effects. The first inequality in the optimization programme displays the
time resource constraint of the organization in terms of volunteer hours available at
period t. The non-distribution constraint states that all the funds available to the
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non-profit have to equal its expenditures for public good provision (i.e. the organi-
zation cannot distribute profits to its owners/members). The only expenditure item
is assets purchased. Government provides the ad valorem subsidy σ ∈ [0, 1] for asset
purchase over the paid price pit. On the revenue side, the available funds are obtained
through donations (collected thanks to fundraising activities with the simple linear
technology µf it ).
4.2.1 Static Equilibrium
The Lagrangian associated to the problem of the NPO is :
L(qit, xit, nit, f it , λit, νit) = qitxitω
i − λit
[
(1− σ)
(
qit
nit
)2
− µf it
]
+ νit(v
i
t − xit − f it − nit)
in which λit and ν
i
t are the Lagrange multipliers. Solving this problem character-
izes the static equilibrium (details are provided in the appendix). In terms of the
allocation of available volunteer time we obtain
xit
∗
=
2ωi
3 + 2ωi
vit [Time devoted to improving quality]
nit
∗
=
2
3 + 2ωi
vit [Time devoted to prospecting for assets]
f it
∗
=
1
3 + 2ωi
vit [Time devoted to fundraising]
The specification of the objective function makes the allocation of time invariant
in changes of the relative price of the assets. As one could expect, when the NPO
weights more quality relative to quantity (when ωi increases), time devoted to im-
prove quality increases, to the detriment of prospecting and fundraising activities.
More available volunteer hours increase the time devoted to all three activities by a
fixed proportion.
Concerning quantities purchased, the optimization program obtains:
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qit
∗
= 2
(
vit
3 + 2ωi
)3/2(
µ
1− σ
)1/2
(4.2)
Improvements in the fundraising technology (µ), and increases in the subsidy
(σ) relax the non-distribution constraint of the NPO, allowing it to purchase more
assets. More volunteer hours allow the NPO to devote more time to prospecting
activities, finding more potential sellers and persuading them of selling more assets.
As noted above, an increased focus on the quality dimension reduces time devoted
to prospecting, driving down quantities purchased.
Finally, the equilibrium price paid by i is:
pit
∗
=
√
3 + 2ωi
vit
· µ
1− σ (4.3)
As fundraising technology improves, prices increase because the NPO has more
disposable income, shifting the demand curve upwards. An increased focus on qual-
ity increases prices as well, because less time is devoted to prospecting, which results
in worse deals for the NPO. On the contrary, more available volunteer time increases
prospecting. Finally, an increase in the subsidy shifts the demand curve up, increas-
ing prices, as in any typical market. Next, we explore how this equilibrium changes
dynamically.
4.2.2 Dynamics
Assume that the number of volunteers willing to adhere to a certain NPO depends
on its performance in the previous period. Namely, volunteers adhere to the organi-
zation if it has performed well in the quantity and in the quality dimension. Because
quality is by assumption non-observable, volunteers infer the quality improvements
by observing how much time has been devoted to (observable) fund raising and
prospection. The more time the NPO devotes to these activities, the less volunteers
are willing to adhere, as they feel that it does not invest sufficient resources in the
desirable output. In other words, the NPO appears to less driven by the mission,
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and more by a budget-maximizing strategy. Assume that
vit+1 =
qit
f it + n
i
t
. (4.4)
Substituting by the static equilibria values of qit ,f
i
t , and n
i
t at any period t, this
rewrites as a law of motion of volunteer time:
vit+1 =
2
3
[
µ
1− σ
vit
3 + 2ωi
] 1
2
.
This particular law of motion is a calibration adapted to emulate the results ob-
tained in the empirical section of this paper. It ensures a closed-form solution and
a convergent time series; other laws of motion, if convergent, would produce quali-
tatively similar results to those obtained here. The 1/2 exponent on vit guarantees
that this series is convergent.
From any initial arbitrary volunteer time vi0, the law of motion obtains
vit =
[
2
3
[
1
3 + 2ωi
· µ
1− σ
] 1
2
]2−21−t
vi0
2−t
(4.5)
which is the value of vit at any period t depending in the initial stock of volunteer
time. The Appendix proves this statement. Note that there is some path dependence,
as the initial stock of volunteer hours determines the subsequent trajectory. As t
increases, volunteer time converges to its steady state value
viSS =
4
9
[
1
3 + 2ωi
· µ
1− σ
]
. (4.6)
Remark that the steady state is independent from the initial volunteer labour time.
Relaxing the non-distribution constraint increases quantities purchased, attracting
more volunteers in the long run. Finally, quality-oriented NPOs will attract less
volunteers in the long run. The quadratic supply function indicates that the returns
of prospecting are surpass those of investing in quality; each unit of labour devoted to
prospecting increases purchases more than it would have improved quality, therefore
quantity-oriented NPOs will attract relatively more volunteers.
Plugging viSS in equations (4.2) and (4.3) one obtains the steady state quantities
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and prices:
qiSS =
16
27
(
1
3 + 2ωi
)3(
µ
1− σ
)2
piSS =
3
2
(3 + 2ωi)
Proposition 4.1 (Steady state prices and quantities). Under the law of motion of
volunteer labour defined in (4.4), the steady state for each NPO in this decentralized
market is such that:
1. if fundraising technology improves or if the government introduces subsidies,
then the amount of assets purchased increases at the steady state;
2. if the NPO weights more quality than quantity, then at the steady state prices
paid are higher and quantities purchased are smaller;
3. the subsidy has no effect on the steady state price.
It is immediate that:
d2qiSS
dσdωi
< 0
Corollary 4.1 (Effect of the subsidy across NPOs). NPOs more concerned with the
quality dimension will buy proportionately less assets when the subsidy is introduced.
It follows that the subsidy will decrease the market share of those more concerned
with the quality dimension.
Let us study now the effect of the introduction of the subsidy in the short run
by examining the transition from the pre-subsidy steady state to the steady state in
which the government finances the permanent subsidy. Denote t = 0 the period at
which the subsidy is introduced. The moment at which the unexpected subsidy is
introduced, the number of volunteers remains at the pre-subsidy steady state until
new recruitments occur. By (4.6),
vi,eaSS =
4
9
[
µ
3 + 2ωi
]
in which vi,eaSS denotes the ex-ante steady state. The moment the subsidy is intro-
duced, using (4.3) and (4.2) we how that prices and quantities jump to:
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pit=0 =
1√
1− σ
3
2
(3 + 2ωi)
qit=0 =
1√
1− σ
16
27
(
1
3 + 2ωi
)3
µ2
Immediately after the introduction of the subsidy, prices and quantities are multi-
plied by scalar (
√
1− σ)−1 larger than one. By substituting the ex-ante steady state
volunteer time as an initial condition in (4.5), the number of volunteers at each t
after the shock is
vit =
(
1
1− σ
)1−2−t
4
9
[
µ
3 + 2ωi
.
]
(4.7)
From it, we obtain the motion of quantities and prices following the introduction of
the subsidy:
qit
∗
=
16
27
(
1
3 + 2ωi
)3
µ2
(
1
1− σ
)2−3·2−t−1
pit
∗
=
3
2
(3 + 2ωi)
(
1
1− σ
)2−t−1
Proposition 4.2 (Motion of prices and quantities). Under the law of motion of
volunteer labour defined in (4.4), the introduction of an unexpected permanent subsidy
is such that:
1. immediately after the introduction of the subsidy, there is a hike of demand,
which increases prices,
2. the price of the assets progressively declines while purchases progressively in-
crease
3. at the new steady state, the price converges to the pre-subsidy situation, while
the increase in purchases is permanent.
We test this proposition in the empirical section of the paper. Figure 4.1 plots
quantities and prices for four NPOs, which vary in their degree of concern for the
quality of the public good. We fix µ = 1 and σ = 0.5 which corresponds to a 50%
ad-valorem subsidy. Initial available voluntary hours are arbitrarily fixed. Before the
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Figure 4.1 – Motion of Prices and Quantities after the introduction of the Subsidy.
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permanent subsidy unexpectedly introduced at t = 0, prices and quantities converge
to the ex-ante steady state. At the moment of the shock, both prices and quantities
hike, then prices progressively return to their pre-subsidy levels, while quantities
continue rising until reaching a new, higher, steady state.
4.3 Institutional context and data
4.3.1 Natural reserves worldwide and in the Walloon Region
The first American national park, the Yellowstone, was established by the U.S.
Congress already in 1872. In Europe, the formal institutions for the conservation of
nature started somewhat later and were much more grassroot-driven. The United
Kingdom and France saw the birth of private conservation charities in 1895 and 1901,
respectively. These societies had the mission of protecting countryside landscapes,
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scenic beauty, and major natural sites (Lansley, 1996; Lepart and Marty, 2006).
In the UK, the National Trust almost immediately started to buy land plots and
buildings from private owners. It created several natural reserves and progressively
became the main private actor of environmental policy in the UK. Thanks to its
two million members, the National Trust has relieved the UK government from a
substantial part of its tasks in the environmental conservation domain; in exchange,
the government granted the charity with considerable fiscal advantages. In France,
the “Socie´te´ pour la Protection des Paysages et de l’E´sthe´tique de la France”, the
oldest French environmental non-profit association chose instead a strategy focused
on lobbying the government on various environmental policies. France passed its
first environmental-protection laws in the beginning of the 19th century, while its
first national park was established in 1913.
Currently, throughout the world, private foundations aimed at creation and pro-
tection of natural reserves play an important role both in public-good provision and
advocacy. The prominent example is The Nature Conservancy, a U.S.-based global-
operations environmental charity. With more than one million members, Nature
Conservancy manages over 8000 kilometers of rivers and 50 million hectares of land (a
surface exceeding that of California) in more than thirty countries (www.nature.org).
Belgium (and especially the Walloon Region, the Southern half of the country)
exhibits a system of environmental conservation that combines certain aspects of
the French mostly public sector-oriented approach with some characteristics of the
British charity-based approach. In 1943, Ardenne et Gaume, an environmental non-
profit, created the first natural park in the Walloon Region. In subsequent thirty
years, the environmental non-profits kept playing the major role of environmental
public good providers, by either contracting long-term leases or purchasing and man-
aging new plots of land. Initially, the budgets of non-profit consisted mainly of private
contributions and donations, complemented by small-scale commercial activities.
The national government showed interest in the natural park creation and man-
agement around 1957 and made its first acquisition of land in 1972. Political de-
centralization of Belgium implied that the conservation of nature fell under regional
jurisdiction in 1980, and the government of the Walloon Region created a new strat-
egy, which included a set of policies towards environmental non-profits. Most im-
portantly, in 1986 the regional government passed a reform (with retroactive effect
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to January 1, 1985) introducing large subsidies to environmental non-profits. This
reform essentially consisted of two sets of subsidies. The first (and by far the most
important) is a subsidy for land acquisition, consisting of paying (reimbursing) 50
per cent of the price of land plots that a legally registered non-profit purchased from
a private owner (with the scope of creating a natural reserve) on any date after
Jan. 1, 1985. The second is a subsidy for management expenses of natural reserves,
which consists of covering 50 per cent of effective ordinary management expenses
(or an annual lump-sum of around 100 Euros per hectar of certified natural-reserve
surface) and of fully covering the extraordinary (emergency) expenses. To qualify
for these subsidies, the land plot acquired by a non-profit should obtain the status
of “Re´serve Naturelle Agre´e” (RNA hereafter) from the Department of Nature and
Forests of the Walloon regional government, following the decision of a council of
experts. This council (composed of scientists, non-profit representatives, and public
servants) is the only administrative structure that has the right to decide on the
RNA status. Its main task that of verifying whether the proposed land area has a
sufficiently high environmental value. This council also plays a similar role in the
creation of the public counterpart of RNAs, called “Re´serves Naturelles Domaniales”
(RNDs), that are publicly owned and managed.
Given the substantial expertise of the council members, virtually all the existing
natural reserves are created on the land areas with a relatively high environmental
potential. Such land typically has few alternative production uses (such as intensive
agriculture) but, if properly managed, can yield considerable positive externalities
(protection of natural habitats and endangered species, environmental tourism, etc.).
Thus, the main actors in the Walloon region on the buyer side of the market for this
type of land are the legally recognized environmental non-profits (there are ten such
organizations in the region) and, to some extent, the regional government. The
seller side consists of a multitude of small landowners (many of whom are heirs of
individuals that bought these land plots in the past mostly for extensive pastoralism
or to diversify their wealth portfolios).
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4.3.2 Data
The data that we collected comes from the archives of the branch of the Walloon
regional administration that is in charge of the conservation of nature 2. This branch
is in charge of administering payments of subsidies to environmental non-profits both
for land acquisition and for the management of the natural reserves. We construct
our data using the certified copies of notary deeds of land acquisitions by non-profits
from private owners, that the legally registered environmental non-profits have to
provided to the DGO3 in case they receive any subsidy. Importantly, even though
the policy was introduced in 1986, subsidies for ordinary management expenses are
paid for natural reserves regardless of their date of creation. Provided that the land
plot has a sufficiently high environmental value, conditions to fulfil in order to qualify
for the ordinary-management subsidy are quite loose. This implies that for the year
range 1943 to 2010, we have data on virtually all the land transactions related to
creation of private natural reserves. In this paper, we restrict our analysis to the
period between January 1950 and March 1994 for two main reasons: (1) there is
no price deflator available for the observations before 1950, and (2) starting April
1994, the European Union started to provide additional subsidies for environmental
non-profit land purchases through the program (with somewhat different eligibility
conditions), which we plan to investigate in future work.
From each notary deed, we extracted (and quantified, wherever needed) informa-
tion about the transaction, i.e. the date and the price at which land was purchased,
identities of both parties, and precise information about land plots (geographic char-
acteristics, cadastral number, size of the plot, and the exact location). Importantly,
given that our sources are the notary deeds, we can disregard the problems related
to misreporting, which usually have to be addressed in survey-based data.
4.4 Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 Identification strategy
Our identification strategy relies on the discrete change in policy towards non-
profits introduced in 1986 by the Walloon regional government, as described above.
2. Direction Ge´ne´rale Ope´rationelle 3 (DGO3)
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This policy change deeply modified the incentives faced by non-profits. We want
to analyze the behavioral response of non-profits to this policy change, both in the
short- and the long run, as compared to the behavior and outcomes before the policy
reform.
We argue that this identification strategy is valid because the policy reform was
unanticipated and not simultaneous with any other major change in environmen-
tal policies. The reform was carried out by a coalition government consisting of
Christian-Democrats and Liberals, shortly after this government was formed. Given
that the Walloon region is traditionally a stronghold of the Socialist Party, this par-
ticular government is (so far) the only regional government in the history of the
Walloon region where Socialists were not in power, and for the first time, the min-
ister of environment was a Liberal and not a Socialist. Given the Belgian political
context, prior to the elections that led to formation of this government, it was thus
extremely difficult to foresee the exact composition of this government and the iden-
tity of ministers’ cabinet members. Moreover, the reform was not widely discussed,
neither at the regional parliament, nor in the media, essentially because in that
particular period, tensions between the French-speaking and the Flemish-speaking
communities in Belgium occupied most of the public debates, and the environmental
conservation was definitely not considered a key issue 3.
The timing of elections and of the implementation of reform also limited potential
anticipation effects. The regional government was in place from December 1985
onwards, following the regional election in October 1985. The reform was then
passed, in a relatively short period of time. Transactions on the land market, instead,
require substantial amount of time to be concluded 4. Thus, this timing leaves little
space for the reform to have retroactive effects on transaction prices before July 1986.
For robustness, we provide additional evidence below that our findings are not driven
by purchases between 1985 and July 1986. If anything, our estimates provide a lower
bound, if some of the land transactions finalized after July 1986 had not yet been
influenced by the reform.
Our identification relies on the policy break and on comparing the land plots
3. Reading through the major regional newspapers in the period 1985-87, we could not find any article discussing
this reform.
4. Typically, once the buyer and the seller agree on the transaction details, they sign a provisional sale agreement
in front of a notary; a procedural delay of two to four months usually follows, before the final bill of sale is signed in
the notary’s office.
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with similar characteristics transacted before and after the reform. However, one
key concern is that other (unobservable) changes in the environment of the market
for land might have occurred around the same time. This would jeopardize our
identification. To allay this concern, we collected the data on the aggregate market
prices for comparable types of land (woodland and farm land/pastures). We use
these series to show that there are no similar changes in the prices for these types of
land (that do not qualify for the subsidy), in the several years before and after the
policy reform.
4.4.2 Descriptive statistics
The dataset that we use for this paper consists of 938 land plots acquired by envi-
ronmental non-profits between 1950 and 1994. This represents virtually the universe
of such land purchases within this time period 5. Transactions at the beginning of
this period are few, given that systematic land purchase by non-profits started in
the 1970s, followed by a boom in both the quantity and the size of transactions in
the 1990s, as can be seen in Figure 4.2. 148 plots were purchased before the reform
and 790 were bought after it. Twenty-one plots were purchased between January 1,
1985 (the date of retroactive effect of the reform) and the official announcement of
the reform.
The land surface purchased increased substantially: it rose from 134 hectares
before the reform to 728 hectares after it. The number of environmental non-
profits buying land increased as well: three non-profits were buying land before
1986, whereas after the reform this number doubled. However, the market structure
became much more concentrated. Before the reform, two non-profits had relatively
large market shares (71 and 27 per cent, respectively), leaving a residual market share
to the third actor. After the introduction of subsidies, the largest buyer increased
its market share even further (up to 93 per cent of the market), becoming a de facto
monopolist (as depicted in Figure 4.3).
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics of our main variables before and after the
reform of July 1986. In addition, we also look at a sub-sample of observations which
are potentially strongly affected by the reform and are less affected by potential
unobservable variables. This restriction allows us to exclude the surge in the number
5. We lose 11 observations because of missing information on the transaction price.
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Figure 4.2 – Number of land transactions with non-profits as buyers
of plots purchased in the early 1990s, where other time-varying factors might be
driving this dynamics. In this sub-sample, we thus focus on 75 observations after
the reform and compare them to 75 observations just before it (we also compare
the post-reform observations to 75 acquisitions before January, 1 1985, the earliest
purchase date to qualify for the subsidy).
In all comparisons, prices after the reform are higher than those before the reform.
The difference is statistically significant only when we restrict the comparison to
observations shortly before and shortly after the reform; however, notice that the
variance in prices also increases considerably. Average plot size remains relatively
stable (slightly below one hectare). Around half of the plots were owned by multiple
sellers (these typically are multiple heirs of the landowning farmer). This share falls
to less than 40 per cent after the reform. In addition, there are two large changes in
the portfolio of plots purchased by the non-profits. First, there is a change in land
occupation pattern of purchased plots. After the reform, non-profits seem to buy
more woodlands, wetlands and pasture lands, and fewer wastelands. However, the
change in the quality of land is small when we restrict our comparison to the 150-
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Figure 4.3 – Land market share, by non-profit, before and after the reform
observation window (dropping the observations in the “grey” area between early 1985
and July 1986). The differences in land quality are not statistically significant in this
restricted window (because point estimates are smaller and not because difference-
in-means tests are less accurate in smaller sample). Finally, as shown in Figure
4.4, non-profits increase the geographic spread of their purchasing activity after the
reform. They remain highly active at their core area in the Eastern part of the
Walloon region, but start to buy plots in other provinces where land prices are, on
average, higher. This might indicate that after the reform non-profits increase their
search and prospecting efforts.
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Figure 4.4 – Location of acquisitions in the Walloon region before and after the reform
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Figure 4.5 – Interpretation of regression coefficients
4.4.3 Regression analysis
As explained above, our econometric analysis relies on the discontinuity around
the policy reform date. We thus estimate the relationship:
Lnpricei = α0 + α1Policyi + α2Y eari + α3Policyi ∗ Y eari + Xiβ + εi. (4.8)
Here, Lnpricei is log of the (deflated) purchase price of plot i, Policyi is an indicator
variable that takes value 1 if the plot was purchased under the subsidy regime, and
zero otherwise, Y eari denotes the year of transaction (amending for temporal auto-
correlation), Xi is a vector of control variables (size of the plot, number of sellers,
geographic characteristics, identity of the buyer, etc.), and ε an idiosyncratic compo-
nent. Figure 4.5 presents the interpretation of the main coefficients. α1 denotes the
average short-term change in prices of land plots driven by the policy change (i.e.
with the year of the policy change is referenced as Y ear = 0). Since our dependent
variable is expressed in logs and Policyi is a binary variable, the exact predicted
average change between the prices of subsidized and non-subsidized land purchases
equals eα1 − 1. α2 controls for the overall time trend in prices, whereas α3 allows
to capture the difference in time trends between the period before the reform and
the one after the reform. In a linear specification, the time necessary to revert to
the pre-reform trend after the policy reform is given by the ratio between α1 and
α3, provided that these two coefficients have opposite signs. Table 4.2 reports the
results of estimating of equation (4.8) by ordinary least squares. Point estimates of
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α1 are systematically positive, relatively large but very imprecise (standard errors
are clustered at municipality level); therefore, the coefficient is never significantly
different from zero in any of our specifications. However, it is worth noting that es-
timates of both α1 and α3 are relatively stable when we add controls for the number
of sellers, land quality (geographic characteristics), and whether the plot is located
in a province where there were no purchases before 1986. Specification (5) adds
controls for the identity of the buyer (i.e. non-profit fixed effects). Taking into ac-
count that only two non-profits engaged in land purchase transactions both before
and after 1986, these controls purge our estimated coefficients from a potentially
different market behaviour of new buyers. The estimated coefficient α1 increases
substantially, which suggests that new entrants buy, on average, at lower prices than
the two incumbents. Observing the two main coefficients of interest jointly, we find
some evidence in favour of an increase in prices after the introduction of subsidies;
however, this increase looks temporary as suggested by a negative sign of α3 (the
coefficient of the interaction term between the time trend and the policy dummy).
Qualitatively identical results obtains when prices and land area are evaluated in
levels (not reported).
The methodology used for these estimations is unsatisfactory, as clearly indicated
by the coefficients of the plot area. In general, land market prices are almost per-
fectly proportional to the plot size; our discussions with several notaries involved in
such transactions indicate that in most transactions, the purchase price is roughly
calculated as the price per-hectare multiplied by the plot surface (after taking into
account the land quality). Therefore, we should observe that a one percent increase
of plot area should be accompanied by an increase in price by roughly one percent.
Our OLS estimations suggest, instead, that the price only increases by 0.8% or less
(moreover, the coefficient is somewhat unstable across specifications).
A potential explanation for this under-estimation is the public-good nature of
assets that are traded on this market. The land market for natural reserves is a
market where assets acquired by non-profits are used to produce public goods. Like
in any other land market, buyers exchange money for land plots, and, overall, prices
are determined by demand and supply. However, unlike in the usual land markets,
buyers also invest substantial effort in convincing sellers to accept a lower price in
the interest of the public good (or in prospecting for sellers that are more public-
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spirited). During our work on data, we collected anecdotal evidence concerning
several landowners who were happy to sell their land for a symbolic price, provided
that the buyer maintains the landscape and protects endangered animals living in the
area. These benefits are non-rival and non-excludable, which means that the seller is
sure to enjoy those environmental services without paying a management cost. On
the other hand, non-profits are sometimes inclined to pay a relatively high price for
a small plot because that plot would allow the extension of a green mesh between
sites. Both types of transactions constitute outliers, and failing to take them into
account biases the estimates obtained above.
From the econometrics point of view, these transactions constitute vertical out-
liers for small plots with high prices and bad leverage points for large plots sold at
symbolic prices, creating serious issues of heteroscedasticity. The presence of both
types of outliers biases regression coefficients downwards and increases standard er-
rors. In specification (6) of Table 4.2, we estimate our model including a dummy
variable flagging seven most obvious quasi-donations, i.e. land plots sold for a clearly
symbolic price. Four of these transactions occurred before July 1986 and the remain-
ing occurred after. The price-surface elasticity is jumps from 0.75 to 0.82 and the
t-statistic doubles. The coefficient on the policy dummy drops by about 15 per cent,
whereas the R2 reaches 0.72. This implies that correcting for less than one percent
of observations has a major influence on our results. Proceeding in such a way would
not be problematic if we could easily flag all the transactions with exceptionally low
and high prices; however, this is quite cumbersome (given the size of our dataset)
and might also involve some arbitrariness in borderline cases.
A better way of attacking this problem is to use an estimator robust to outliers.
We opt for the MS-estimator proposed by Maronna and Yohai (2000) and developed
by Verardi and Croux (2009). It allows for a robust and efficient estimation in the
presence of outliers in a multidimensional setting, deals with dummy variables in
the set of explanatory variables, and properly handles asymmetric distribution of
residuals in the presence of outliers. The loss function of this estimator is a Tukey-
Biweight function in which the marginal change of the residuals’ weight tends to 0
as residuals become large. It means that all observations have some weight in the
regression but that this weight does not explode when the observation lies far away
from the regression line.
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Table 4.3 reports estimates of the same specifications than those in Table 4.2, with
estimations performed using the MS-method. Robust estimation does not affect
the signs of coefficients. The elasticity of prices to land surface is now very close
to one and is highly stable across specifications. The introduction of the subsidy
has an estimated positive effect on prices of an order between 41 and 57 per cent.
Therefore, for a plot valued e100, the introduction of the subsidy pushes the price
up to e150 (of which e75 are paid by the non-profit recipient of the subsidy). Thus,
in the short run the subsidy represents a e25 saving for the non-profit. Over time,
the price steadily declines until it reaches the pre-subsidy price around nine years
after the introduction of the subsidy. Given that our sample is limited to the eight
years following the reform, we cannot know if the trend would have continued until
subsidized prices become actually lower than non-subsidized prices or whether it
would have stabilized around the trend.
The introduction of the dummy variable indicating quasi-donations in the last
specification leaves our estimates virtually unchanged, contrarily to the instability
of OLS estimates noted above. The regression coefficient on this dummy is unsur-
prisingly large, predicting a drop in the price for these plots by more than 99 per
cent; however, all other coefficients remain unaffected. This stability is a clear indi-
cation that our methodology is justified and that robust estimates adequately depict
regular market conditions without being much affected by other mechanisms that
drive the outliers. We also report in this table a generalized Hausman test proposed
by Dehon et al. (2011). For all estimations, the ordinary least squares method (an
efficient but potentially inconsistent estimation technique) systematically provides
estimators which are significantly different from robust ones. Despite a somewhat
lower efficiency of the MS-methodology (28.4 per cent loss in efficiency), it seems
reasonable to prefer the consistent robust estimation technique.
In the Appendix, we provide three further tables with robustness checks. Table 4.4
reports estimates based on the outlier-free subsample of the first five specifications
of Table 4.2. Point estimates of the main coefficients of interest are slightly lower
in absolute value than robust estimates on the full sample; however, all the results
go in the same direction. Estimates of price-surface elasticity are remarkably stable.
Table 4.3 introduces several variations in the model specification. The first column
corresponds to the baseline specification estimated by the MS-estimator. The second
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column allows for a more flexible relationship between the price and the time trend by
introducing quadratic terms in the trend. The estimated effect of the policy reform is
smaller and less precisely estimated but remains economically significant. The third
column reports estimates on a subsample generated by eliminating all land purchases
made between January 1985 and July 1986 (i.e. transactions potentially affected by
anticipating the reform). Point estimates of the coefficient on the reform dummy
increases a little bit; which could indicate some (minor) anticipation of the reform.
Specification (4) introduces another modification to check that the anticipation effect
does not seriously affect our estimations. In this specification, we set the timing
of the policy reform on January 1, 1985: this eliminates the distinction between
the starting date of the retroactive effect of the reform and the date of the reform
itself. Estimates remain similar in terms of the signs and sizes of coefficients, and
inference is not affected much. Finally, in the specification in the last column, we
impose an extremely conservative restriction on our sample: we consider only the 75
transactions preceding January 1, 1985 and the 75 transactions immediately following
the policy reform. We comfortingly find effects similar to those found for the full
sample, with slightly larger standard errors (despite the relatively low statistical
power caused by our sample restriction), consistently with our previous findings.
Table 4.6 confirms the results of a the MS estimation in a linear specification, finding
qualitatively identical results.
Our identification is based on the policy break in 1986 and on comparing the land
plots with similar characteristics acquired by the non-profits before and after the
reform. However, it is possible that other changes in the environment of the market
for land might have occurred around the same time. For instance, if other policy
changes that concerned all the agricultural land in the region were introduced shortly
before or after the subsidy, one would observe a pattern similar to the one that we
find, but it would be driven (at least in part) by these other policy changes. In that
case, our findings would be a poor test of the theory presented above.
To allay this concern, we have collected the data on the aggregate land market
prices for two major types of land: woodland and farm land/pastures. The markets
for these types of land are of an order of magnitude larger as compared to the market
for the land that non-profits acquire. Crucially, a very small proportion of these types
of land could qualify for the 1986 subsidy. The time series of prices comes from the
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Belgian National Statistics Agency (INS, 1994), and represents average prices per
hectare (from all land transactions, by type, which are officially registered).
Figure 4.6 – Evolution of prices for different land types
Figure 4.6 plots the evolution of land prices in the Walloon region, from 1979 until
1994. It depicts three series: the average price per hectare of woodlands, the average
price per hectare of farmland and pastures, and the predicted price per hectare of
land acquired by non-profits (constructed on the basis of our notary-deeds data).
For clarity, we have normalized the prices, with 1986 (the year of the reform) being
the baseline. One clearly sees that there is not a break around 1986 in prices of
woodlands and farm lands, at least not of a magnitude comparable to the predicted
natural reserve land prices. Following the pattern that we have documented above,
we see that prices of land prices purchased by non-profits first jumps, and then
converges in the long-term to the initial level).
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4.5 Discussion
4.5.1 Interpretation of empirical results
Our theoretical model has generated two testable propositions. Proposition 4.2
predicts a the differential effect of the subsidy over time: we should observe that
prices of assets bought by non-profits strongly increase in the short-run and then
decrease in the long-run as compared to this short-run peak; the quantity of assets
bought should increase unambiguously over time. Above, we have tested this pre-
diction using data on land acquisitions by environmental non-profits in the Walloon
region of Belgium. Properly taking into account the presence of outliers in the data
(both vertical ones and bad leverage points) by using the MS-estimator, we show that
the empirical results are in line with this first prediction of our theoretical frame-
work. All the parts of Proposition 4.2 are confirmed: we observe a spike in prices just
after the introduction of the subsidy (i.e. α1 > 0), followed by a progressive decline
towards the initial price (α3 < 0). Even if the effect of the subsidy on the market
price vanishes over time, the number of transactions largely increases by the end of
the sample period, as shown in Figure 3. This is fully consistent with a positive
demand shock followed with a long-run expansion of the supply curve.
Corollary 4.1 predicts a differential effect of the subsidy across non-profit types.
In particular, one should observe a relatively stronger increase in land purchases by
non-profits that give a relatively higher weight to the quantity than to the quality of
public goods provided (captured by the parameter αi in our model). In our data, the
two main non-profits have different preferences in the quantity versus quality trade-
off; these differences are made clear when one looks at their mission statements. The
mission statement of the first organization (Ardenne & Gaume) reads:
“[The association] has the objective of creating (and participating to
the creation) and managing (and participating to the management of) nat-
ural reserves [...] and more generally of any structure, private or public,
regardless of its form, that contributes to preserving nature.”
For the second organization (R.N.O.B.), one reads:
“[The association] is devoted to preserving and managing threatened
natural habitats. To this end, the association develops a strategy of pur-
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chasing or renting land with considerable biological interest, mainly in the
Walloon and Brussels regions.”
The first non-profit seems to be more open to partnerships and its mission state-
ment mostly emphasizes natural reserve management efforts. Contrarily, the second
statement makes clear that the organization’s priority is on purchasing land. As dis-
played in Figure 4.3, we can see that the second non-profit (R.N.O.B.) is purchasing
the largest number of land plots (in terms of total surface) after the reform. The
market share of each of the two non-profits changes following the introduction of the
subsidy in the direction predicted by our model. Consequently, the subsidy makes
the quantity-driven non-profit capture virtually all the new land purchases.
This change in the market structure is consistent with corollary 4.1. In a market
with relatively few actors, one should observe that the subsidy has a relatively small
effect on the long-run price and a relatively large effect on the quantity purchased, at
the expense of less effort devoted to quality enhancement. Given that our empirical
analysis focuses on only one market, we cannot compare its outcomes to those of a
less concentrated market. However, combined with information about the context
that we have discussed above, it is clear that the de facto monopsony position of the
R.N.O.B., driven by its quantity-oriented mission, induced it to engage massively in
supply-expanding prospecting activities, avoiding the free-riding that would plague
a market with multiple small prospecting non-profits. Under these conditions, the
long-run impact of the ad valorem subsidy in such a concentrated market had a huge
impact on quantities of land purchased, as we have shown previously.
Policy-wise, the relatively limited effect on prices and the long-run convergence
towards the pre-reform trend, combined with the large expansion in quantity pur-
chased might seem a positive result, given that large amounts of land were traded
without a massive price pass-through effect of taxpayers’ money to private sellers.
However, a caveat should be mentioned. As we have argued above, the less aggressive
quality-oriented buyers are driven out of the market and the market is dominated by
organizations that consider quantity purchased to be the priority. A negative effect
of the subsidy is that quality-enhancing management effort per unit of land is pre-
dicted to decrease. Therefore, the ad valorem subsidy encouraging private ownership
of public goods is an efficient policy tool only if the quantity of the public good (and
not its quality) is the policy objective.
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4.5.2 Econometric methodology
In our empirical investigation we implicitly assume that (at least) two different
data-generating processes (DGPs) generated our sample. This assumption is sup-
ported by the anecdotal evidence collected during our data construction. A part
of transactions on the land market for natural reserves does not fit the classical
supply-and-demand framework. Some transactions are non-standard in the sense
that public-good considerations, warm-glow and persuasion play a key role in shaping
the prices. Our data are thus “contaminated” by these observations with potentially
abnormally low prices. It is, however, impossible to disentangle the DGP of each
observation a priori. Identification of other DGPs requires additional information
(not observed, and, in some cases, unobservable). This lack of information can be
overcome by using robust estimation techniques that allow to consistently estimate
the main DGP. We opt for the MS-estimator for four reasons: (1) it is robust to good
and bad leverage points; (2) it allows for asymmetries in outliers distribution; (3) it
allows to handle categorical variables; and (4) it has a very low break-down point of
50 per cent (i.e. the estimated coefficients are consistent even when almost half of
the sample is contaminated by outliers).
Once the coefficients behind the main DGP are estimated, one can consistently
identify the outliers in the data as shown for instance in Figure 4.7. Importantly, the
identification process relies on an objective statistical procedure rather than on the
a priori of the researcher, and in case one is interested in understanding the origin of
the outliers in one’s data, this procedure offers a systematic basis for the case-study
analysis of outliers.
More generally, this methodology might be useful in settings where different DGPs
might coexist and where other tools to grasp their co-existence are missing (provided
that one DGP generates at least half of the data points). We believe that our method
has numerous potential applications in the empirical analyses of non-profit sector,
given that the theoretical literature agrees that the behaviour of various actors in
this sector (donors, managers, volunteer workers, etc.) is driven by a mix of classic
extrinsic high-powered incentives and intrinsic motivation (see, e.g., Benabou and
Tirole (2003); Tirole and Be´nabou (2006); Besley and Ghatak (2005)). Standard
estimation techniques might miss this co-existence of DGPs and lead to inconsistent
estimates.
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Figure 4.7 – Outliers in specification 4 of table 4.3
4.6 Conclusion
What are the broader implications of our model and empirical findings? The
framework of analysis that we have developed above applies to a large set of contexts
where the provision of a public good is delegated to a non-profit organization. These
are the contexts in which a certain asset or input potentially can generate substantial
externalities or has a fundamental public-good nature, but is initially held by a
private party that value insufficiently these externalities. At the same time, there
exist agents (or organizations founded by such agents) that are intrinsically motivated
and would like to internalize these externalities or release the public-good potential of
the asset. Usually, however, these agents are credit-constrained (or, more generally,
cannot easily monetize their intrinsic motivation; so their willingness-to-pay does not
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fully reflect their motivation). Thus, they can either raise funds through solicitations
from other agents, or the government can assist in transferring the ownership of the
asset to these motivated agents. Moreover, locating such assets implies a positive
search cost.
One example of such a setting (beyond environmental conservation discussed
above) is the market for art. Most private non-profit organizations devoted to artis-
tic or cultural heritage conservation face the problem similar to the one discussed in
our paper: works of art are often held by individuals that do not fully value their
public-good nature, and such objects are traded in a competitive market. Govern-
ment can subsidize the acquisition by non-profit museums of these works of art, but
finding the art pieces that best suit the collection of the non-profit museum requires
effort.
Another example is the non-profit organizations whose mission is to combat en-
vironmental pollution by, for example, recycling polluting second-hand appliances.
There exists (relatively thin) markets for these objects. Some appliances are more
polluting than others (e.g. they contain highly environmentally-hazardous sub-
stances); however, given the absence of monetary incentives, some owners are unlikely
to be willing to pay the cost of bringing them to the recycling points. Thus, the non-
profits often conduct the door-to-door campaigns of searching for such appliances,
which requires substantial effort. From the policy perspective, it is important to in-
vestigate the desirability of government subsidies for the purchase of such appliances
by non-profits.
In addition, our empirical analysis has an important methodological implication.
In applied problems of evaluating the effects of government subsidies on the market
outcomes in this kind of settings, a non-negligible fraction of data points exhibit very
low prices. This occurs because some of the initial owners of the assets can also be
intrinsically motivated, and these owners would sell these assets to non-profits for a
price that does not correctly reflect the market value of the assets (i.e. a symbolic
price). In that case, failing to treat such outliers properly might induce the researcher
to underestimate the effect of the subsidy on the market price and to overestimate
the effect on the quantity. Our analysis above highlights such pitfalls and illustrates
the appropriate robust methodology for treating these outliers.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Resolution of the Lagrangian
L(qit, xit, nit, f it , λit, νit) = qitxitω
i − λit
[
(1− σ)
(
qit
nit
)2
− µf it
]
− νit(vit − xit − f it − nit)
First order conditions:
wrt qit :
xit
ωi
= λit (1− σ)2
qit
nit
2 (4.9)
wrt xit :
ωiqitx
i
t
ωi−1
= νit (4.10)
wrt nit :
λit(1− σ)2
qit
2
nit
3 = ν
i
t (4.11)
wrt f it :
λitµ = ν
i
t (4.12)
wrt λit :
(1− σ)
(
qit
nit
)2
= µf it (4.13)
wrt µit :
vit = x
i
t + f
i
t + n
i
t (4.14)
Use (4.12) to replace all νti by λ
i
tµ . The ratio (4.9)/(4.10) yields
xit = ω
i2
1− σ
µ
(
qit
nit
)2
(4.15)
(4.11) can be rearranged to :
nit = 2
1− σ
µ
(
qit
nit
)2
(4.16)
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(4.13) can be rearranged to :
f it =
1− σ
µ
(
qit
nit
)2
(4.17)
Plugging back the three previous equations in (4.14) obtains :
vit = (3 + 2ω
i)
1− σ
µ
(
qit
nit
)2
(4.18)
Combining (4.15) and (4.18) we obtain
xit
∗
=
2ωi
3 + 2ωi
vit
Combining (4.16) and (4.18) we obtain
nit
∗
=
2
3 + 2ωi
vit (4.19)
Combining (4.17) and (4.18) we obtain
f it
∗
=
1
3 + 2ωi
vit
Using (4.18) and (4.19) one obtains :
qit
∗
= 2
(
vit
3 + 2ωi
)3/2(
µ
1− σ
)1/2
(4.20)
Finally, by using (4.1) the equilibrium price paid by i is:
pit
∗
=
√
(3 + 2ωi)µ
(1− σ)vit
(4.21)
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4.7.2 Details on the motion of volunteer hours
From any initial state vi0 we obtain
vi1 =
2
3
[
µ
(3 + 2ωi)(1− σ)v
i
0
] 1
2
vi2 =
[
2
3
[
µ
(3 + 2ωi)(1− σ)
] 1
2
] 1
2
vi0
1
22
...
vit =
[
2
3
[
µ
(3 + 2ωi)(1− σ)
] 1
2
]Στ=t−1τ=0 12t
vi0
1
2t
(4.22)
Because Στ=t−1τ=0
1
2t
=
1− 1
2t
1− 1
2
= 2− 21−t , we obtain
vit =
[
2
3
[
µ
(3 + 2ωi)(1− σ)
] 1
2
]2−21−t
vi0
2−t
4.7.3 Additional tables
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Abstract 1
This paper describes the Stata implementation of Baltagi and Li’s (2002) series
estimator of partially linear panel data models with fixed effects. After a brief de-
scription of the estimator itself, we describe the new command xtsemipar. We
then simulate data to show that this estimator performs better than a fixed effect
estimator if the relationship between two variables is unknown or quite complex.
Keywords:
xtsemipar, semiparametric estimations, panel data, fixed effects
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A.1 Introduction
The objective of this note is to present a Stata implementation of Baltagi and Li
(2002)’s series estimation of partially linear panel data models.
The structure of the note is the following: section 2 describes Baltagi and Li
(2002)’s fixed effects semiparametric regression estimator. Section 3 presents the
implemented Stata command (xtsemipar). Some simple simulations assessing the
performance of the estimator are shown in Section 4. Section 5 provides a conclusion.
A.2 Estimation method
A.2.1 Baltagi and Li (2002) semiparametric fixed effects regression esti-
mator
Consider a general panel data semiparametric model with distributed intercept of
the type:
yit = xitθ + f(zit) + αi + εit, i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T where T << N (A.1)
To eliminate the fixed effects αi, a common procedure, inter alia, is to differentiate
(A.1) over time which leads to
yit − yit−1 = (xit − xit−1)θ + [f(zit)− f(zit−1)] + εit − εit−1 (A.2)
An evident problem here is to consistently estimate the unknown function of
z ≡ G(zit, zit−1) = [f(zit) − f(zit−1)]. What Baltagi and Li (2002) propose is to
approximate f(z) by series pk(z) (and therefore approximate G(zit, zit−1) = [f(zit)−
f(zit−1)] by pk(zit, zit−1) = [pk(zit) − pk(zit−1)]) where pk(z) are the first k terms of
a sequence of functions (p1(z), p2(z), ...). They then demonstrate the
√
N normality
for the estimator of the parametric component (i.e., θˆ) and the consistency at the
standard non-parametric rate of the estimated unknown function (i.e., fˆ). The
equation (A.2) therefore boils down to
yit − yit−1 = (xit − xit−1)θ + [pk(zit)− pk(zit−1)]γ + εit − εit−1 (A.3)
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which can be consistently estimated by using ordinary least squares. Having
estimated θˆ and γˆ, we propose to fit the fixed effects αˆi and go back to (A.1) to
estimate the error component residual
uˆit = yit − xitθˆ − αˆi = f(zit) + εit. (A.4)
The curve f can be fitted by regressing uˆit on zit using some standard non-parametric
regression estimator.
A typical example of pk series is spline which is a fractional polynomial with pieces
defined by a sequence of knots c1 < c2 < ... < ck where they join smoothly.
The simplest case is a linear spline. For a spline of degree m the polynomials
and their first m − 1 derivatives agree at the knots, so that m − 1 derivatives are
continuous (see Royston and Sauerbrei (2007) for further details).
A spline of degree m with k knots can be represented as a power series:
S(z) =
m∑
j=0
θjz
j +
k∑
j=1
λj(z − cj)m+ where (z − cj)m+ =
{
z − cj if z > cj
0 otherwise
The problem here is that successive terms tend to be highly correlated. A probably
better representation of splines is a linear combinations of a set of basic splines
called (kth degree) B-splines which are defined, for a set of k + 2 consecutive knots
c1 < c2 < ... < ck+2 as
B(z, c1...ck+2) = (k + 1)
k+2∑
j=1
[ ∏
1≤h≤k+2,h6=j
(ch − cj)
]−1
(z − cj)k+
B-splines are intrinsically a rescaling of each of the piecewise functions. The
technicalities of this method are beyond the scope of this paper and we refer the
reader to Newson (2001) for further details.
We implemented this estimator in Stata under the command xtsemipar. We
describe the command here below.
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A.3 The xtsemipar command
The xtsemipar command fits Baltagi and Li’s double series fixed-effects estimator
in the case of one single variable entering the model nonparametrically. Running the
xtsemipar command requires the prior installation of the bspline module developed
by Newson (2000).
The general syntax for the command is:
xtsemipar varlist [if] [in] [weight], nonpar(varname) [generate([string1 ] string2 )
degree(#) knots1(numlist) nograph spline knots2(numlist) bwidth(#) robust
cluster(varname) ci level(#)]
The first option, nonpar, is mandatory. It declares which variable enters the model
nonparametrically. None of the remaining options are compulsory. The user has the
opportunity to recover the error component residual - the left hand side of equation
(A.4) - whose name can be chosen by specifying string2. This error component can
then be used to draw any kind of nonparametric regression. Since the error compo-
nent has already been partialled out from fixed effects and from the parametrically
dependent variables, this amounts to estimating the net nonparametric relation be-
tween the dependent and the variable that enters the model nonparametrically. By
default, xtsemipar reports one estimation of this net relationship. string1 makes it
possible to reproduce the values of the fitted dependent variable. It is worth noting
that the plot of residuals is re-centered around its mean. The remaining part of this
section describe options that affect this fit.
A key option in the quality of the fit is degree. It determines the power of the
B-splines that are used to consistently estimate the function resulting from the first
difference of f(zit) and f(zit−1) functions. By default it is set to 4. If the nograph
option is not specified, i.e. the user wants the graph of the nonparametric fit of
the variable in nonpar to appear, degree will also determine the degree of the local
weighted polynomial fit used in the epanechnikov kernel performed at the last stage
fit. If spline is specified, this last nonparametric estimation will also be estimated
by the B-spline method and degree is then the power of these splines. knots1 and
knots2 are both rarely used. They define a list of knots where the different pieces
of the splines agree. If left unspecified, the number and location of the knots will be
chosen optimally, which is the most common practice. knots1 refers to the B-spline
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estimation in A.3. knots2 can only be used if the spline option is specified and
refers to the last stage fit. More details about B-spline can be found in Newson
(2001). The bwidth option can only be used if spline is not specified. It gives the
half-width of the smoothing window in the epanechnikov-kernel estimation. If left
unspecified, a rule-of-thumb bandwidth estimator is calculated and used (see lpoly
for more details).
The remaining options refer to the inference. The robust and cluster options
correct the inference respectively for heteroskedasticity and for clustering of error
terms. In the graph, confidence intervals can be displayed by a shaded area around
the curve of fitted values by specifying the option ci. Confidence intervals are set
to 95% by default, however it is possible to modify them by setting a different
confidence level through the level option. This affects the confidence intervals both
in the nonparametric and in the parametric part of estimations.
A.4 Simulation
In this section we show, by using some simple simulations, how xtsemipar behaves
in finite samples. At the end of the section we illustrate how this command can be
extended to tackle some endogeneity problems.
In brief, the simulation setup is a standard fixed-effects panel of 200 individuals
over 5 time periods (1,000 observations). For the design space, four variables x1, x2,
x3 and d are generated from a Normal distribution with mean µ = (0, 0, 0, 0) and
variance-covariance matrix:

x1 x2 x3 d
x1 1
x2 0.2 1
x3 0.8 0.4 1
d 0 0.3 0.6 1

Variable d is categorized in such a way that five individuals are identified by each
category of d. In practice we generate these variables in a two-step procedure where
x’s have two components. The first one is fixed for each individual and is correlated
with d. The second one is a random realization for each time period.
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Table A.1 – Comparison between xtsemipar and xtreg
Bias x1 Bias x2 MSE x1 MSE x2
xtsemipar with nonparametric control for x3 -0.0006 -0.0007 0.00536 0.00399
xtreg with linear control for x3 -0.2641 0.03752 0.07383 0.00462
xtreg with 2nd and 3rd order polynomial control for x3 -0.0023 -0.0009 0.00410 0.00321
500 replications are carried-out and for each replication an error term e is drawn
from a N(0, 1). The dependent variable y is generated according to DGP: y =
x1 +x2−x3−2∗x23−0.25∗x33) +d+ e. As it is obvious from this estimation setting,
multivariate regressions with individual fixed effects should be used if we want to
consistently estimate the parameters. So, we regress y on the x’s by using three
regression models.
1. xtsemipar considering that x1 and x2 enter the model linearly and x3 non-
parametrically.
2. xtreg considering that x1, x2 and x3 enter the model linearly.
3. xtreg considering that x1 and x2 enter the model linearly whereas x3 enters the
model parametrically with the correct polynomial form (i.e. x23 and x
3
3).
Table 1 reports the bias and mean squared error (MSE) of coefficients associated
with x1 and x2 for the three regression models. What we find is that Baltagi and
Li’s (2002) estimator performs much better than the usual fixed effect estimator with
linear control for x3, both in terms of bias and efficiency. As expected, the most effi-
cient and unbiased estimator remains the fixed effect estimator with the appropriate
polynomial specification. However this specification is generally unknown. Figure 1
displays the average non-parametric fit of x3 (plain line) obtained in the simulation
with the corresponding 95% band. The true DGP is represented by the dotted line.
If we want efficient and consistent estimates of parameters, estimations relying on
the correct parametric specification are always better. Nevertheless, this correct form
has to be known. It could be argued that a sufficiently flexible polynomial fit could
be preferable than to a semi-parametric model. This is however not the case. Indeed
let’s consider the same simulation setting described above, but now the dependent
variable y is created according to the new DGP y = x1 + x2 + 3sin(2.5x3) + d + e.
Figure 2 reports the average non-parametric fit of x3 in a black solid line, with a
95% confidence band around it. The dotted grey line represents the true DGP which
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Figure A.1 – Average semi-parametric fit of x3
is quite close to the average fit estimated by xtsemipar using a 4th order kernel
regression with a bandwith set to 0.2. The dashed grey line is the average 4th order
polynomial fixed-effects parametric fit. As it is clear from this figure, xtsemipar
provides a much better fit for this quite complex DGP. xtsemipar can also ease up
the identification of the relevant parametric form and avoid some trial and error that
applied researchers often face.
In much of the empirical research in applied economics, measurement errors, omit-
ted variable bias and simultaneity are common issues that can be solved through IV
estimation. Baltagi and Li (2002) extend their results to address this kind of prob-
lems and establish the asymptotic properties for a partially linear panel data model
with fixed effects and possible endogeneity of the regressors. In practice, our esti-
mator can be used within a two-step procedure to obtain consistent estimates of the
β’s. In the first stage, the right-hand side endogenous variable has to be regressed
(and fitted) by using (at least) one valid instrument. It should be noted that at this
stage of the procedure, the non-parametrical variable linearly enters into the esti-
mation procedure. In the second stage, the semi-parametric fixed effect panel data
model can be used to estimate the relation between the dependent variable and the
set of regressors. The non-parametrical variable now enters the model nonparamet-
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Figure A.2 – Average semi-parametric fit of x3
rically, exactly as explained before. If the instrument is valid, this procedure leads
to consistent estimations.
Another problem can arise if the non-parametrical variable is subject to endo-
geneity problems. In this case, we suggest, as first step of the estimation procedure,
using a control functional approach as explained by Ahamada and Flachaire (2008).
However we believe that the technicalities associated to this method go well beyond
the scope of this note.
A.5 Conclusion
In econometrics, semiparametric regression estimators are becoming standard
tools for applied researchers. In this paper, we present Baltagi and Li (2002) se-
ries semiparametric fixed effects regression estimator. We then introduce the Stata
codes we created to put it into practice. Some simple simulations to illustrate the
usefulness and the performance of the procedure are also shown.
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